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INTRODUCTION
Can law be "symbolic," "expressive," or "meaningful"? Can it
"send a message"? And, if so, should law be evaluated in terms of what
it "symbolizes," "expresses," or "means"? Does the "meaning" of law
bear upon its moral rightness, goodness, or legitimacy?
An "expressive" theory of law gives affirmative answers to these
questions. Such a theory claims that the action of a legal official or
official body can indeed be meaningful, and that the meaning thus
attached to an official action is relevant to, if not determinative of, the
moral status of that action. Yet this formulation is only preliminary; it
needs to be further developed. For what is the meaning, here, of
"meaningful"? Is law "meaningful" in the way that language is mean-
ingful, or in some other way, such as the way that dark clouds "mean"
rain?1 And how robust a connection between the meaning of an offi-
cial action (whatever precisely that entails) and the moral rightness,
goodness, or legitimacy of that action must a moral theory posit, for
that theory to count as "expressive"? For example, a preference-
utilitarian will happily concede that if some legal actor's saying Xwill
lead to the highest degree of preference satisfaction overall, then that
legal actor is under a moral obligation to say X This hardly implies
that the preference-utilitarian holds an "expressive" theory of law;
what government says has only a contingent, and normally only a
2causal, connection with the satisfaction of preferences.
In this Article, I try to clarify these conceptual issues. What, pre-
cisely, is an expressive theory of law? I then turn to the substantive
question: Are expressive theories (thus clarified) persuasive? The an-
swer, I will argue, is that they are not.
What motivates this Article is the recent popularity of expressive
theories (or at least theories described as "expressive" by their propo-
nents) within legal scholarship. I have in mind, especially, the work of
Professors Richard Pildes, Dan Kahan, and Cass Sunstein. Professor
Pildes has proposed an expressive theory of voting rights law in a fre-
quently cited 1993 article about the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw
1 See PAUL GRIcE, Meaning, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDs 213, 213-15 (1989)
(distinguishing between linguistic and nonlinguistic meaning); infra text accompany-
ing notes 70-72 (discussing this distinction).
2 See infra Part I.D (distinguishing between moral impact and foundational moral
relevance of speech, with specific reference to preference-utilitarianism).
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v. Reno and in several follow-up articles.4 Pildes offers the following
defense of Shaw, which invalidated a voting district that was drawn to
increase black voting strength and that had a geographically "bizarre"5
shape:
Government cannot redistrict in a way that conveys the social impression
that race consciousness has overridden all other, traditionally relevant
redistricting values. In the Court's view, certain districts whose appear-
ance is exceptionally "bizarre" and "irregular" suggest that impression.
Plaintiffs need not establish that they suffer material harm, in the sense
of vote dilution, from such a district. Shaw is fundamentally concerned
with expressive harms: the social messages government conveys when
race concerns appear to submerge all other legitimate redistricting val-
6
ues.
Nor is Pildes merely an election law specialist. His views about vot-
ing rights are merely one component of a larger expressive theory,
one that covers a wide range of constitutional provisions. These
broader views are presented in a recent article, in which Pildes asserts
the following:
The expressive dimension of governmental action plays a central, but
underappreciated role in constitutional law. This is not a technical
point with only obscure significance but a central aspect of ongoing con-
stitutional practice with pervasive implications for the way both defend-
ers and critics understand constitutionalism....
[T]he [nonexpressive] view of rights as trumps fails to recognize the
role of expressive harms in constitutional law. On the atomistic concep-
tion of rights, only injuries to individual interests in autonomy, dignity,
self-expression, freedom of conscience, and the like, can generate con-
stitutionally cognizable harms. But American constitutional law provides
a more expansive conception of harm because it is more attuned than
conventional rights theory appreciates to the social meanings of state ac-
tion. Expressive harms, no less than material harms to these kind of in-
dividual interests, ground constitutional doctrine in many areas.
3 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
4 See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 483 (1993) [hereinafter Pildes & Niemi, Expressive Harms]. The follow-up articles
are: Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106
YALE L.J. 2505 (1997) [hereinafter Pildes, Pindpled Limitations]; and Richard H. Pildes,
Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27J.
LEGAL STUD. 725, 744-47, 755-60 (1998) [hereinafter Pildes, Why Rights Are Not
Trumps].
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 644.
6 Pildes & Niemi, Expressive Harms, supra note 4, at 526-27.
Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra note 4, at 760, 762; see also Richard H.
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Pildes has advanced equally general claims about the expressive cast of
governmental regulation-claims that will be described and criticized
at some length below.
Professor Kahan has not yet offered an expressive theory of law
comparable in breadth to Pildes'. What Kahan has done, with much
vigor and success, is to develop and defend an expressivist approach
to a specific legal institution of great practical importance and schol-
arly interest-the institution of criminal punishment. In What Do Al-• • 9
ternative Sanctions Mean? -an article that, like Pildes' work on expres-
sivism, has had a very high profile within the legal academy and has
gained a fair measure of extra-academic attention as well---Kahan ar-
gues that standard proposals to replace imprisonment with more
cheaply administered sanctions, such as fines or community service,
are politically unpalatable and normatively unattractive because they
ignore the expressive dimension of punishment. Imprisonment sym-
bolizes moral condemnation," while the message communicated by
these alternative sanctions is far less clearly condemnatory;12 further, a
condemnatory message is, Kahan claims, an appropriate response to
criminal wrongdoing on both deterrent and retributive theories of
punishment." Thus, where imprisonment is too expensive, the state
should replace it with a cheaper but expressively apt sanction, specifi-
cally the sanction of "shaming":
Pildes, Avoiding Balancing. The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45
HASTINGS LJ. 711 (1994) (defending the claim, central to Why Rights Are Not Trumps,
that constitutional law is structured by excluding certain reasons or justifications for
state action).
a See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, SlingingArrows at Democracy: Social
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121 (1990)
[hereinafter Pildes & Anderson, SlingingArrows]; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CI. L. REV. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Pildes & Sun-
stein, Reinventing the Regulatory State]; infra Part II.C (summarizing and criticizing the
expressive theory of regulation presented in these articles).
9 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CI. L. REV. 591
(1996).
10 My Westlaw check (on April 25, 2000, in the journals and law review ('JLR") da-
tabase) turned up 81 citations to Kahan's article, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?,
supra note 9, 140 citations to Pildes' co-authored article with Niemi, Expressive Harms,
supra note 4, and 145 citations to Pildes' co-authored article with Anderson, Slinging
Arrows, supra note 8. Kahan's article has, in particular, ignited a scholarly debate about
the legitimacy of "shaming" penalties, see, e.g., James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with
Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998), and Kahan's views on this score
have been reported in the television, radio, and print media, see Stephen P. Garvey,
Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CIII. L. REV. 733, 744 n.52 (1998).
1 SeeKahan, supra note 9, at 597-601.
12 See id. at 605-30.
13 See id. at 601-05.
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Punishment is notjust a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special social
convention that signifies moral condemnation. Not all modes of impos-
ing suffering express condemnation or express it in the same way. The
message of condemnation is very clear when society deprives an offender
of his liberty. But when it merely fines him for the same act [or imposes
a penalty of community service], the message is likely to be different:
you may do what you have done, but you must pay for the privilege....
This mismatch between the suffering that a sanction imposes and the
meaning that it has for society is what makes alternative sanctions politi-
cally unacceptable.
[By contrast, s]haming penalties unambiguously express condemna-
tion and are a feasible alternative to imprisonment for many offenses.
14
Kahan has pursued this defense of "shaming," and the underlying
idea that the state's response to criminal wrongdoing should commu-
nicate a linguistic message (i.e., the message of condemnation), in a
number of subsequent articles.15
Professor Sunstein's endorsement of expressivism is more tenta-
tive than that of Pildes or Kahan. Sunstein's original interest in this
subject stems, it seems, from his work on "incommensurability. 1 6 To
say that government's choices are incommensurable means, roughly,
that their comparative worth cannot be measured on a single scale-
in particular, on a utilitarian scale or a cost-benefit scale.17 For exam-
14 Id. at 593-94. See generally id. at 630-52 (defending "shaming").
is See Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy ofDisgust in Criminal Law, 96 MIcNH. L. REV. 1621,
1639-43 (1998) (reviewing WItnIAM IAN M=LR, TiE ANATOMY oF DIsGUST (1997));
Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 704-06
(1998); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 382-85 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence];
Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 609,
615-17 (1998); cf. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV.
413, 419-35 (1999) (analyzing deterrence and expressivism as two contrasting idioms
of legal discourse).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MIcH. L. REV.
779, 820-24 (1994) [hereinafter Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation] (discussing
the expressive function of law within the context of a work on incommensurability); see
also Cass K. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation: Some Applications in Law
[hereinafter Sunstein, Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation], in
INcOMMENsURABunY, INCOMPARABILTY, AND PRACnCAL REASON 234, 244-45 (Ruth
Changed., 1997) [hereinafter INCOMMENSURABIUTY] (same).
See generally Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 1169 (1998) [hereinafter Adler, Introduction] (elaborating different senses of
"incommensurability"); Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1169 (1998); Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1371, 1383 n.47 (1998) [hereinafter Adler, Cost-Benefit Analysis] (citing philo-
2000] 1367
1368 VNTVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:1363
ple: How can we compare, in dollar terms, the choice between pre-
serving a pristine wilderness area and opening it to commercial devel-
opment? How can we compare, in terms of "utils," the choice be-
tween a free market in babies and a prohibition on surrogacy and
baby-selling? One reason why governmental choices of this kind
might be incommensurable on a dollar or utilitarian scale-if indeed
they are-is that such scales ignore the expressive considerations bear-
ing upon these choices. This is what Sunstein proposed:
A society might identify the kind of valuation to which it is committed
and insist on that kind, even if the consequences of the insistence are
obscure or unknown. A society might, for example, insist on an antidis-
crimination law for expressive reasons even if it does not know whether
the law actually helps members of minority groups. A society might pro-
tect endangered species partly because it believes that the protection
makes best sense of its self-understanding, by expressing an appropriate
valuation of what it means for one species to eliminate another. A soci-
ety might endorse or reject capital punishment because it wants to ex-
press a certain understanding of the appropriate course of action after
one person has taken the life of another.E
Sunstein advanced a similar claim in a joint article with Professor
Pildes, defending an expressive theory of regulation.'9 More recently,
in a 1996 piece entitled On the Expressive Function of Law, Sunstein
backed away from the view that it is intrinsically important for gov-
ernment to express certain meanings, quite apart from the conse-
quences of such expression:
[Siome people appear to think that consequences are barely relevant,
and that it is intrinsically problematic to "say," through law, that envi-
ronmental amenities are ordinary goods with appropriate prices. Is this
a good objection to emissions trading programs if (as we might suppose)
such programs can save billions of dollars in return for the same degree
of environmental protection? I do not believe [so].20
On the other hand, Sunstein has continued to argue for the proposi-
tion that law's meaning can have significant, causal consequences, par-
sophical literature on incommensurability).
is Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation, supra note 16, at 823.
19 See Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, supra note 8, at 64-72.
20 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expreasive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2046
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law]. There is some skepti-
cism about the intrinsic importance of expression in Sunstein's earlier article on in-
commensurability, see Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation, supra note 16, at 824,
although not, as far as I can tell, in the co-authored article with Professor Pildes, see
infra text accompanying note 294 (quoting Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, supra note 8, at 66).
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ticularly in shaping social norms, and that legal officials must there-
fore attend to the statements communicated by the actions they per-
form.
2 1
The work of Professors Pildes, Kahan, and Sunstein, just de-
scribed, has given renewed salience and currency to expressive theo-
ries of law.22 But it bears emphasis that their scholarship is simply the
most recent contribution to a much older and larger body of scholarly
writing about the symbolic cast of legal decisions. For example, stu-
dents of the criminal law have long debated the expressive dimension
of punishment. The famous legal philosopher Joel Feinberg, in a
1965 article entitled The Expressive Function of Punishment,2 rejected the
then standard definition of punishment as "the infliction of hard
treatment by an authority on a person for his prior failing in some re-
spect," 4 and asserted by contrast that punishment was essentially ex-
pressive-that it necessarily had a "symbolic significance largely missing
from other kinds of penalties."25 Specifically, Feinberg claimed:
"[P]unishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes
of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and
reprobration, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or
of those 'in whose name' the punishment is inflicted."26 Feinberg's
article touched off a still-flourishing debate within criminal law schol-
arship, prompting rebuttals by (among others) C.L. Ten, Michael
Moore, and Michael Davis, and defenses by (among others) Robert
21 See Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 20, at 2029-44; Cass .
Sunstein, SocialNorms andSocialRoles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 964-65 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles].
In a broader sense, the same is true of Larry Lessig's article, The Regulation of So-
cialMeaning 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995). However, because Lessig is focused not on
the meaning of governmental action, but on the effect of governmental action (mean-
ingful or not) on the "social meaning" of individual behavior, I do not count him as an
expressivist. See infra Part I.E (distinguishing between expressivism about individuals
and expressivism about governments); infra notes 371-74 and accompanying text (fur-
ther discussing Lessig's work).
Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment 49 MONIST 397 (1965), re-
printed inJOELFEINBERG, DOINGAND DESERVING 95 (1970).
24 Id. at 95 (citing earlier work by A.G.N. Flew, S.I. Benn, and H.L.A. Hart).
2 Id. at 98.
26 Id.
27 See C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 41-46 (1987); Michael Davis, Pun-
ishment as Language: Misleading Analogy for Desert Theorists, 10 LAW & PHI 311 (1991);
Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBEnY, CHARACrER, AND
THE EMOTIONs 179, 181 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); see also H.L.A. HART, LAW,
LBERTAND MORALTY 60-69 (1963) (criticizing James Fitzjames Stephen's expressive
theory of punishment).
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Nozick, Jean Hampton, Igor Primoratz, Anthony Duff,28 and, now,
Professor Kahan. Kahan quite happily admits that the conceptualiza-
tion of punishment as entailing the communication of a condemna-
tory message is not a new one.2
An equally well-established line of expressivist scholarship is that
concerning the Equal Protection Clause, particularly the constitu-
tional status of race and racial discrimination. This scholarship was
animated by the expressive account of school segregation offered by
the Supreme Court itself in Brown v. Board of Education The Court
relied quite centrally on the claim that the institution of segregation
communicated a harmful message: "[T]he policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
group [and this] sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child
to learn."3' The idea endorsed by the Court here-that segregation
stigmatized black children, that it sent an (incorrect!) message about
their appropriate status-was then developed by constitutional schol-
ars, most prominently by Paul Brest in his 1976 article about discrimi-
nation:
[One] rationale for the antidiscrimination principle [embodied by the
Equal Protection Clause] is the prevention of harms which may result
from race-dependent decisions. Often, the most obvious harm is the
denial of the opportunity to secure a desired benefit-a job, a night's
lodging at a motel, a vote. But this does not completely describe the
consequences of race-dependent decision making. Decisions based on
assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective indifference inflict psycho-
logical injury by stigmatizing their victims as inferior. Moreover, because
acts of discrimination tend to occur in pervasive patterns, their victims
32suffer especially frustrating, cumulative and debilitating injuries.
28 See R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 233-66 (1986); ROBERT Nozic,
PHILOSOPHicAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97 (1981); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus
Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659 (1992); Igor Primoratz,
Punishment as Language, 64 PHIL. 187 (1989). Other entries in the debate about ex-
pressive theories of punishment are cited by Kahan, supra note 9, at 594-96 nn.7-19 and
accompanying text.
See Kahan, supra note 9, at 594-97.
30 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31 Id. at 494 (internal quotation omitted).
32 Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimi-
nation Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1976). For an earlier, expressivist account of
the racial component of the Equal Protection Clause, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). Other prominent schol-
arly accounts of this kind include KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERIcA: EQUAL
CTZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 15-27 (1989) [hereinafter KARsT, BELONGING TO
AMERICA]; Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship
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This expressive rationale for the antidiscrimination principle has
been less controversial than the expressive account of punishment of-
fered by theorists such as Feinberg and Kahan. There appears to be
widespread agreement among constitutional scholars that race dis-
crimination is both meaningful and wrongful in virtue of what it
means-in short, that an expressive theory is at least one component
of a complete theory of the Equal Protection Clause.33 Andrew Kop-
pelman recently produced a book-length treatment refining this view
and extending it to discrimination based on gender and sexual orien-
tation, and to private as well as governmental actions.34
Thus far, I have described the considerable and resurgent role of
expressive theories within legal scholarship. But it bears mention that
expressivism has also figured significantly within legal doctrines, par-
ticularly constitutional doctrines. One important example is equal
protection. The expressivism of Brown v. Board ofEducation had its an-
tecedents in the nineteenth-century case of Strauder v. West Virginia-
which characterized a state law excluding blacks from juries in expres-
sive terms, as constituting "an assertion of [black] inferiority 6--and
has been carried forward to modem equal protection case law. For
example, the current Court has sought to justify the "suspect" status of
all racially discriminatory statutes and programs (including affirmative
action programs) by relying upon a stigma theory of discrimination.
In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., for example, the Court stated
that: "[c]lassifications based upon race carry a danger of stigmatic
harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may
in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of
Under the Fourteenth Amendmen 91 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1977) [hereinafter Karst, Foreword];
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 89 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1987); and Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92
MIcH. L. REV. 2410 (1994). See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTmISCRMNA TrION
LAWAND SOCIAL EQUAItY 57-76 (1996) (citing and summarizing "stigma" theorists).
33 See David A. Strauss, Discriminatoy Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 935, 941-43 nn.15, 18 & 24 (1989) (citing scholars who support the stigma ac-
count of the Equal Protection Clause, or who hold related views to the effect that the
Clause prohibits "subordination" or "second-class citizenship").
See KOPPELMAN, supra note 82. Others who have extended the theory beyond
the racial component of the Equal Protection Clause include KARST, BELONGING TO
AMERICA, supra note 82; and Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above Alk Sex, Race, and
Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986). It is more accurate to speak of the
stigma theory of the "racial component" of the Clause, rather than the stigma theory of
"race discrimination," since some stigma theorists think that nondiscriminatory laws
can stigmatize blacks and thereby be unconstitutional. See infra note 226.
100 U.S. 303 (1879).
56 Id. at 308; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) (depicting segregation as placing a "badge of servitude" upon blacks).
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racial hostility."
3 7
Another area of legal doctrine in which expressivism has been
particularly influential is the Establishment Clause. Justice O'Connor,
in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,s argued that the Court
should employ an "endorsement" test in adjudicating Establishment
Clause cases. The central question in such cases, she contended,
ought to be whether the challenged practice constituted an "en-
dorsement" of religion-whether it sent a message that a particular
religion, or religion in general, was officially approved:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adher-
ence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the politi-
cal community. Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two
principal ways. One is excessive entanglement with religious institu-
tions.... The second and more direct infringement is government en-
dorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval
sends the opposite message. 9
Since Lynch, the Court has repeatedly incorporated an endorsement
analysis into its Establishment Clause decisions;40 and all nine sitting
justices are now on record as favoring some such analysis.4'
Finally, it bears noting that there is an apparent overlap between
claims about the expressive nature of law, and claims about the role of
law in shaping norms. Professor Sunstein now claims that the main
expressive role of law, insofar as it is properly expressive, is in shaping
37 City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); see also Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995) (quoting statement in Croson de-
scribing racial classifications as stigmatic). Cases within equal protection jurispru-
dence outside of the affirmative action context in which the concept of stigma has
been invoked by the modern Court include: Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485 (1992);
Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527, 544 (1982); and Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971). See generally Note, Expressive
Harms and Standing 112 HARV. L. REV. 1313 (1999) (discussing the extent to which the
Supreme Court recognizes "expressive harm" as a basis for standing, in various Equal
Protection Clause and Establishment Clause contexts).
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
39 Id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40 See infra notes 246-56 and accompanying text (citing and discussing case law).
41 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763-69 (1995)
(opinion of Scalia, J., joined by the ChiefJustice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas);
id. at 772-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgmentjoined
by Justices Souter and Breyer); id. at 797-815 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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social norms: "[M]ost straightforwardly, the law's 'statement' about,
for example, the impropriety of monetary exchanges may be designed
to affect social norms and in that way, ultimately to affect both judg-
ments and behavior."4 Similarly, Robert Cooter, a leading norms
scholar, has used the term "expression" to describe the influence of
law on norms:
When many people in a community internalize an obligation, it becomes
a social norm. People who internalize obligations express their com-
mitment in various ways. Economic analysis of law, which has recently
turned to the study of social norms, has said little about internalization
and expression. [I attempt] to build the foundations for an economic
theory of expressive law. According to the expressive theory of law, the
expression of social values [i.e., the creation of norms] is an important
function of the courts or, possibly, the most important function of the
courts.4
I mention this apparent link between expressivism and norms because
of the large amount of recent legal scholarship focusing specifically
on norms." Is it the case, as Cooter suggests, that the norm-shaping
role of law is identical to its expressive role? Are the two different, but
connected? Or, notwithstanding a 1998 symposium on norms and
expressivism entitled Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic
Analysis of Law,es is there really no important connection at all?
In sum, we have a significant recent body of scholarly work, some
of it quite general, defending expressive theories of law (the work of
Pildes, Kahan, and Sunstein); an even larger body of recent scholar-
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 20, at 2025.
43 Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 585, 585-86
(1998).
4The legal scholarship includes ROBERT C. ELucxsON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw:
How NEIGHBORS SETrLE DISPUTES (1991); the various articles in Symposium, Law,
Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996); the various articles in Symposium,
Social Norms, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 537
(1998); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Robert Cooter, Normative Failure
Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947 (1997); Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social
Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1999); William K. Jones, A Theory of
Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545; Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of
Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1997); Lessig, supra note 22; Richard H.
McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race
Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1003 (1995) [hereinafter McAdams, Cooperation and
Conflict]; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MIcH. L. REv. 338 (1997) [hereinafter McAdams, Origin, Development]; Sunstein, Social
Norms and Social Roles, supra note 21. Further entries in the legal literature are cited by
Hetcher, supra, at 3 nn.3-4.
4See Social Norns, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 44.
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ship, the "norms" scholarship, which apparently overlaps with this
work on expressivism; a longstanding debate in certain specific areas
of legal scholarship, most obviously criminal law and constitutional
law, about the fact and import of law's meaning; and a significant role
for expressivism in certain segments ofjudicial doctrine, particularly
Equal Protection Clause and Establishment Clause doctrine. All of
this makes the time ripe, if not overdue, for a general analysis and as-
sessment of expressive theories of law-the analysis and assessment
that this Article seeks to provide.
Part I of the Article does the initial analytic work. There, I try to
clarify the concept of an expressive theory. Strictly speaking, an ex-
pressive theory claims that law is meaningful in the way that language is
meaningful. But how is language meaningful? What is the meaning
of "linguistic meaning"? These questions themselves have been the
subject of long-running debate within the philosophy of language, go-
ing back to Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. It is a standard philo-
sophical position that speakers have meaning, it is also a standard posi-
tion that sentences have meaning.46 The speaker's meaning of a
statement is (roughly) what the speaker intended to communicate by
her utterance of it; its sentence meaning is (roughly) what the state-
ment is conventionally uttered to communicate. I argue in Part I that
expressive theories of law should be understood as sentence-meaning
theories, not speaker's-meaning theories. Legal decisions typically
lack speaker's meanings. Notwithstanding the common scholarly
habit, both within and outside the literature on expressivism, of refer-
ring to the "purposes" or "intentions" or "motivations" of legal bod-
ies,47 there typically is no such thing (at least for multimember bodies
such as courts or legislatures). On the other hand, legal decisions can
and do possess sentence meanings-at a minimum, and noncontro-
versially, the meaning that a particular action is prescribed, pro-
scribed, or permitted.
What, then, does an expressive (sentence-meaning) theory of law
consist in? A genuine expressive theory of law must involve more than
the claim that the sentence meaning of law has a moral impact. On
virtually any moral theory, language can make a moral difference; on
46 See infra text accompanying notes 79-103 (defining linguistic meaning and dis-
tinguishing between speaker's meaning and sentence meaning).
See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Consti-
tutional Law, 97 MxcH. L. REV. 1, 82 n.278 (1998) (giving references to official "pur-
poses," etc., within constitutional scholarship); infra note 56 (giving references to offi-
cial "purposes," etc., within expressivism literature).
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virtually any theory, it can matter (morally speaking) whether a gov-
ernmental actor performs an action that possesses a particular sen-
tence meaning, as opposed to an action that possesses a different
meaning or is meaningless. The expressivist goes beyond attributing
moral impact to linguistic meaning. Rather, and more robustly, she
claims that linguistic meaning has foundational moral relevance-that
the linguistic meaning of an action figures in the best or most per-
spicuous description of that action. In short, the genuine expressivist
claims that linguistic meaning is an irreducible moral factor. This
conception of expressivism is fleshed out and defended in Part I.
Parts II and III of the Article provide a critical assessment of ex-
pressive theories, as defined in Part I. Part II focuses on the best-
developed theories within legal scholarship and judicial case law- (1)
the expressive theories of punishment developed by Feinberg, Kahan,
et al.; (2) expressive theories of constitutional law, specifically the two
kinds that have hitherto been most influential, namely the "stigma"
theory of the Equal Protection Clause and the "endorsement" theory
of the Establishment Clause; and (3) the expressive theory of regula-
tion defended by Pildes and, at one time, by Sunstein, as well as by
48Professor Elizabeth Anderson. It is obviously beyond the scope of
this Article to provide a definitive verdict on these theories, but I fur-
nish reason to be skeptical about each and every one. Each theory in-
volves some variant of the claim that the linguistic meaning of gov-
ernmental action possesses foundational moral relevance; but in no
case does the claim turn out to be persuasive or even particularly
plausible.
Part III generalizes the criticism offered in Part II. The failure of
the particular expressive theories hitherto developed by legal schol-
ars-the theories of punishment, constitutional law, and regulation-
does not entail that no such theory is true. We need a more general
argument against expressivism, and I provide such an argument in
Part III. Morality is surely plural and complex-it incorporates a wide
variety of moral factors, such as overall well-being, equality, status and
self-respect, deontological constraints, the factors of desert and re-
48 This discussion is meant to be exemplary, not exhaustive. An exhaustive discus-
sion would, for example, cover Professor Pildes' expressive theory of voting rights, see
sources cited supra note 4; his general theory of constitutional law, see id.; expressivism
about family law, see, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE LJ.
293 (1988); and expressivism about tort law, see, e.g., Alan Strudler, Mass Torts and
Moral Principles, 11 LAw & PHI. 297 (1992). These particular theories surely bear
critical scrutiny, but I have sought to prevent an overly long article from becoming
even longer and thus have not provided that scrutiny here.
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sponsibility, and other factors that, in various ways, may seem to in-
volve linguistic meaning-but in every case the purportedly expressive
factor turns out to be nonexpressive. For example, deontological
constraints prohibit actors from doing or intending harm, not from
saying something; individual status and self-respect are only contin-
gently linked to the content of governmental communication; and the
factor of moral desert is, again, about actors receiving what they truly
deserve, not about government's utterance of condemnatory or
praise-conferring statements. The connection between the linguistic
meaning of a legal official's action and what truly matters, morally
speaking, about that action, is a purely contingent connection (nor-
mally a purely causal connection); and this, in turn, has large implica-
tions for determining what the linguistic or symbolic content of the
action ought to be.
I. WHAT Is AN EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF LAW?
This Part clarifies the concept of an "expressive theory of law." At
the threshold, let me clarify that the focus of this Article is upon moral
theories governing the actions of legal officials. By "expressive theory of
law," I mean an expressive moral theory of law-a theory of the moral
criteria applicable to legal officials, such that the expressive content of
official action is significant within that theory (in a way to be eluci-
dated below). Nonmoral theories of law can, conceivably, have ex-
pressive variants.49 For example, one could conceivably have a theory
about the nature of law, such that legal enactments (or a subset
thereof) are seen to be necessarily expressive in some way. Or, one
could have an expressive theory about the appropriate actions of legal
officials-an expressive, normative theory-that is not a moral theory.
For example, one could have a normative theory to the effect that (a)
legal officials are obligated by the Constitution not to make certain
statements, and (b) this expressive obligation flows from the text of
the Constitution, in virtue of the "plain meaning" of the text, or its
original understanding, and not in virtue of moral criteria.
But the scholars who have actually proposed expressive theories of
law have been mainly moral in their focus.50 Explicitly or implicitly,
49 I am indebted to Brian Bix and Claire Finkelstein for raising this important
point and pressing me to make explicit that this Article is focused upon expressive
moral theories of law.
so See infra Part II (discussing expressive theories of punishment, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, the Establishment Clause, and regulation defended by legal scholars). As
should become clear from my discussion of the scholars who have proposed expressive
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they have been mainly concerned with morally evaluating legal or
governmental action in light of its expressive content. Thus, my own
effort, in this Article, will be to explicate what makes a moral theory of
governmental action "expressive" and then to criticize moral theories
of this kind.
In what way is an expressive (moral) theory of law different from,
say, standard utilitarianism, or from a standard justice-based theory
that enjoins lawmakers to equalize the distribution of resources? The
proposition that the meaning of governmental decisions has moral
import, within a standard utilitarian orjustice-based theory, is true but
quite banal. No one disputes that if government utters a sentence
with one meaning rather than another, that utterance might affect
overall well-being or the distribution of resources. Expressivists are
surely making a more robust and interesting claim than that. But
what, precisely, does the more robust and interesting claim consist in?
This important, conceptual question has to date received very little at-
tention in the legal literature on expressivism.
I proceed to address the question as follows. Section A distin-
guishes between expressive theories of law and a particular position in
metaethics, the position known as metaethical "expressivism." Section
B distinguishes between two kinds of linguistic meaning-sentence
meaning and speaker's meaning-and argues that expressive theories
of law are most plausibly understood as sentence-meaning theories.
Section C differentiates between the various kinds of sentence mean-
ings that might be attached to the actions of legal officials: between
the prescriptive meaning that their actions uncontroversially possess
and the further, nonprescriptive meaning that is typically posited by
expressive theories. Section D describes the special role that the sen-
theories of the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses, these scholars do (at least
implicitly) take the relevant constitutional clauses to incorporate moral norms, be-
cause their arguments are straightforwardly moral-namely, that stigmatic governmen-
tal utterances degrade the social status and therewith the self-respect of those stigma-
tized, violating the moral norm of equality. See infra text accompanying notes 232-34,
281-85; see also infra text accompanying notes 243-45 (suggesting that legal as opposed
to moral requirements can readily make reference to expression, but that this fact is
not particularly interesting, since legal requirements can readily make reference to a
wide range of different features of actions and persons).
There are a few exceptions to my claim that expressivists within legal scholarship
have generally proposed moral theories of governmental or legal action. For example,
Joel Feinberg's expressive theory of punishment is centrally a conceptual theory about
the nature of punitive sanctions-punitive sanctions consist in part of a condemnatory
statement, or so Feinberg claims-and not a moral theory specifying the conditions
under which government should or should not condemn criminal wrongdoing. See
infra text accompanying notes 162-65 (discussing Feinberg's theory).
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tence meaning of official action plays in a genuine, expressive theory
of law: in such a theory, the sentence meaning of an official's action
has foundational moral relevance, and cannot be reduced to another,
more basic factor. Finally, Section E distinguishes between expressive
theories of law and expressive theories of individual action. There is a
temptation to conflate the two, but in fact expressivism about individ-
ual action does not entail expressivism about law, nor vice versa.
A. "Expressivism, "Metaethics, and Moral Philosophy
"Expressivism" is the standard name within moral philosophy for a
particular metaethical position. Metaethics is the branch of moral
philosophy that concerns the nature of morality. It addresses ques-
tions such as these: Do moral statements, such as "Murder is wrong"
or "Social and economic advantages ought to be distributed so as to
maximize the position of the least-well-off' or "That action is morally
permissible," describe facts, or do they do something else? Equiva-
lently, are moral statements true or false-are they truth-evaluable-in
the way that ordinary descriptive statements about the physical world
are truth-evaluable? And if the answer to this last question is affirma-
tive, are moral facts just the same as other facts, such as physical facts,
or are moral facts somehow different?51
The position known as metaethical "expressivism" has the follow-
ing features. First, the metaethical expressivist is a noncognitivist. She
thinks that moral statements are not truth-evaluable; they do not de-
scribe facts; they are not properly the subject of belief. 2 Second, the
51 For a comprehensive yet succinct overview of contemporary metaethics, see
STEPHEN DARWALL ET AL., Toward Fin de Siece Ethics: Some Trends, in MORAL DISCOURSE
AND PRAcncE: SOME PHELOSOPHcAL APPROACHES 3 (1997). Other good overviews
are DAVID 0. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1989); DAVID
MCNAUGHTON, MORAL VISION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETmICS (1988); and MICHAEL
SMITH, TiE MORAL PROBLEM (1994).
52 See DARwALL ET AL., supra note 51, at 15-19 (characterizing expressivism as a par-
ticular variant of noncognitivism); BRINY, supra note 51, at 19 ("[The] noncognitiv-
ist... denies that there are moral facts or true moral propositions or, as a result, any
moral knowledge.").
More precisely, I use "cognitivism" here to mean the view that (1) moral statements
are truth-evaluable, and sometimes true, in virtue of being (2) strictly descriptive or
assertoric statements. The point that moral statements are "sometimes true" is needed
to rule out the view that moral statements are genuinely truth-evaluable, but always
false-a so-called "error theory" of morality. The second qualification, about moral
statements being descriptive or assertoric, is needed because of the recent proposal
that statements that are not strictly descriptive or assertoric might nonetheless be
truth-evaluable in a thin or "minimal" sense of truth. On this view of truth, if cognitiv-
ism is simply defined in the traditional way-as the view that moral statements are
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metaethical expressivist thinks that moral statements function to ex-
press certain attitudes (other than beliefs) regarding the actions or
events that are putatively the subject of moral description S--for ex-
ample, to express the speaker's emotional reaction to these actions or
events, or to express a special kind of preference for or against these,
or to express a desire that the listener engage in certain behavior, or
perhaps something else. The metaethical expressivist cashes moral
language, not as an assertion of the existence of moral facts, but as an
expression of some attitude (other than a belief) that the utterance of
moral language communicates. The seminal version of metaethical
expressivism-and the crudest version as well-is that set forth by A.J.
Ayer more than a half-century ago:
The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its
factual content. Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing
that money," I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said,
"You stole that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not
making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral
disapproval of it. It is as if I had said "You stole that money," in a pecu-
liar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special excla-
mation marks.s
4
Considerably more refined and plausible versions of expressivism have
been presented by R.M. Hare and, most recently, by Simon Blackburn
and Allan Gibbard.5
truth-evaluable-then expressivism (the view that moral statements function to express
non-belief attitudes rather than to describe) could be a kind of cognitivism. For a dis-
cussion of the connections between cognitivism, expressivism, and a minimal view of
truth, see SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS 48-83 (1998); DARWALL ET AL., supra
note 51, at 8 n.32; James Dreier, Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth, 83 PHIL.
STUD. 29 (1996); and Michael Smith, Why Expressivists About Value Should Love Minimal-
ism About Truth, 54 ANALYSIS 1 (1994).
My narrower definition of cognitivism preserves the standard-view that metaethical
expressivism is a kind of noncognitivism. See DARWAL ET AL., supra note 51, at 15-19.
Further, I believe there are good arguments in favor of a (narrowly defined) cognitivist
approach to morality, notjust a (traditionally defined) cognitivist approach. See infra
note 62.
53 See, e.g., DARWALLET AL., supra note 51, at 17 ("Most noncognitivists are expressiv-
ist. they explain moral language as expressing moral judgments, and explain moral
judgments as something other than beliefs."); SMrrH, supra note 51, at 16 ("Expressiv-
ists deny that moral judgments represent the world as being one way [or] another....
[They] rather serve to express the judger's attitudes of approval and disapproval, or
perhaps their more complicated dispositions to have such attitudes." (citations omit-
ted)).
ALFREDJULIUS AVER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 107 (2d ed. 1948).
s See SIMON BLACKBURN, How To Be an Ethical Anti-Realis in ESSAYS IN QUASI-
REAlISM 166 (1993); BLACKBURN, supra note 52, at 48-83; SIMON BLACKBURN,
SPREADING THE WORD: GROUNDINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 181-223
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Why even mention all this? I mention it both because expressive
theories of law might incorrectly be understood as related to
metaethical expressivism and because, best construed, they are not.
As for the first point: the risk of taking the two to be related stems
from a number of factors, including, of course, the fact that the words
for referring to these two different things, "expressive theories of law"
and "metaethical expressivism," share a key term ("expressive"), but
also from several other factors as well. Certain concepts that are es-
sential to metaethical expressivism-specifically, the concept of an at-
titude that the utterance of a moral statement expresses-are also
widely deployed in the literature on legal expressivism. For example,
attitudes are central to Professor Pildes' version of legal expressivism.
In his most recent article on expressivism in constitutional law, Pildes
defines "expressive harm" as follows:
An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes ex-
pressed through a governmental action rather than from the more tangi-
ble or material consequences the action brings about... Public policies
can violate the Constitution not only because they bring about concrete
costs but because the meaning they convey expresses inappropriate re-
spect for relevant constitutional norms.
Conversely, certain concepts that are central, and may be essen-
tial, to legal expressivism-specifically, the concept of a "norm"-have
also played a role in the literature on metaethical expressivism. Allan
Gibbard, one of the most recent and sophisticated of the metaethical
expressivists, builds his entire theory around norms.5 7 Finally, there is
at least a faint whiff of noncognitivism in some of the literature on ex-
pressive theories of law. Professor Sunstein certainly comes close to
noncognitivism when he says that "[a] ny particular characterization or
(1984) [hereinafter BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD]; ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE
CHOIcEs, APT FEELiNGS: A THEORY OF NORMATiVE JUDGMENT (1990); P.M. HARE,
MORAL TINRING (1981).
Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra note 4, at 755 (emphasis added). For
reference to attitudes within the literature on punishment-expressivism, see, for exam-
ple, FEINBERG, supra note 23, at 98 (stating that "punishment is a conventional device
for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation"); within the literature
on stigma, see, for example, Brest, supra note 32, at 8 (suggesting that stigmatic deci-
sions are "based on assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective indifference"); and
within the literature on the Establishment Clause, see, for example, Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Examination of both the sub-
jective and the objective components of the message communicated by a government
action is therefore necessary to determine whether the action carries a forbidden
meaning.").
57 See GiBBARD, supra note 55, at 45-48 (summarizing "norm-expressivist" ap-
proach).
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accounting of consequences will [not] rest.., on some depiction of
the brute facts; instead, it will be mediated by a set of (often tacit)
norms determining how to describe or conceive of consequences.
'5
Similarly, Sunstein and Pildes seem to espouse a kind of noncognitiv-
ism in their co-authored work when they state: "[The] expressive or
symbolic dimensions of policy are central [because p]art of what pol-
icy-making does is to define, interpret, and create collective under-
standings and values.... Decisions today crystallize collective under-
standings in ways that shape the perceived meaning and appropriate
resolution of future choices."
5 9
Notwithstanding these seeming intermittent denials of the exis-
tence of moral truth and moral facts by Professors Sunstein, Pildes,
and other legal expressivists, and notwithstanding their apparent or
real flirtation with metaethical expressivism, I suggest that the best way
to achieve clarity about expressive theories of law is simply to place
metaethical expressivism to one side. Expressive theories of law, of
the kind described in the Introduction, are best analyzed and assessed
within a cognitivist moral fiamework, which takes moral statements to
be descriptive statements that assert the existence of moral facts and
are genuinely truth-evaluable (and sometimes true).6° Metaethical
expressivism, which as I have said is a variant of noncognitivism, is
thus mentioned here only to be ignored for the remainder of the Ar-
ticle.
My reasons for analyzing expressive theories of law within a cogni-
tivist framework and specifically for assuming metaethical expressivism
to be false are as follows: Noncognitivist views (including both
metaethical expressivism and other noncognitivist views) are subject
to a variety of objections well rehearsed in the philosophical literature.
The noncognitivist must reject a basic feature of our moral discourse:
that we criticize each other's moral judgments, claims, and arguments
as right or wrong, true or false.61 Relatedly, she has serious difficulty
58 Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 20, at 2048.
59 Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, supra note 8, at 70 (emphasis
added).
60 Note that the cognitivist framework for analyzing expressive theories, as I have
presented it here, is a narrowly cognitivist framework. See supra note 52 (providing
narrow definition of cognitivism).
61 See, e.g., BRINK, supra note 51, at 7-8 ("Although various sorts of considerations
support moral realism, its intuitive appeal [and a fortiori that of cognitivism] de-
rives ... from the way it explains the point and nature of moral inquiry.... We think
people can be morally mistaken and some people are morally more perceptive than oth-
ers."). If the common-sense view of morality is taken to be the view that moral claims
are truth-evaluable, then this view constitutes support only for cognitivism understood
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explaining how we can properly reason from moral premises to moral
conclusions using the mundane rules of logical inference that we rou-
tinely employ, since these rules apparently presuppose that the prem-
62ises and conclusions are truth-evaluable. Further, the proposition
that motivates noncognitivism-the proposition that moral facts, if
they were to exist, could not be just the same as physical facts-is ar-
guably correctes but it is also surely much too hasty to conclude from
this proposition that moral facts do not exist at all. A wide variety of
statements are uncontroversially true or false, without those state-
ments being just like statements of physical fact. For example, the
statement "this is red" can be true or false, even though the redness of
an object (unlike its physical features) has no robust causal role,64 and
even though the property of redness (unlike physical features) makes
essential reference to an observer.6 Moral facts, like facts about color,
and unlike physical facts, might indeed lack a robust causal role, and
might make essential reference to observers, but none of this entails
as truth-evaluability and not specifically for narrow cognitivism. If the common-sense
view is taken to be the view that moral claims function to describe, then narrow cogni-
tivism does gain support from common sense.
62 Here is a simple example: (1) "Lying is wrong"; (2) "If lying is wrong, murder is
wrong"; therefore (3) "Murder is wrong." If moral statements are descriptions, the
inference from the premises of this syllogism to its conclusion is logically unimpeach-
able, since the premises and conclusion are (for purposes of the rules of logic) no dif-
ferent than ordinary descriptive statements like "Socrates is a human being," "If Socra-
tes is a human being, then he has 46 chromosomes," and "Socrates has 46
chromosomes." By contrast, despite intensive efforts on this score, see, e.g.,
BLACKBURN, supra note 52, at 68-77; BLACKBURN, SPREADING THEWORD, supra note 55,
at 189-96; GIBBARD, supra note 55, at 92-102, noncognitivists have not yet satisfactorily
explained how we can reason from (1) and (2) to (3). The seminal statement of this
problem for expressivists and, more generally, noncognitivists-the so-called "embed-
ding" problem-is P.T. Geach, Assertion, 74 PHIL. REV. 449 (1965). Modern criticisms
of Blackburn's and Gibbard's purported solutions to the embedding problem include:
Bob Hale, Realism and Its Oppositions, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE 288-91 (Bob Hale & Crispin Wright eds., 1997); Paul Horwich, Gibbard's
Theory of Norms, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 67 (1993); Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Some Prob-
lemsfor Gibbard's Norm-Expressivism, 69 PHIL. STUD. 297 (1993); and Mark Van Roojen,
Expressivism and Irrationality, 105 PHIL REV. 311 (1996). I take these criticisms to be
support for narrow cognitivism, in that they show Blackburn's and Gibbard's nonde-
scriptivist analyses of moral language not to have solved the embedding problem.
But see DARWALL ET AL., supra note 51, at 24-30 (describing cognitivists who take
moral facts to be more or less similar to physical and other scientific facts).
64 Cf Hale, supra note 62, at 296 (discussing the "Wide Cosmological Role" that
certain facts or properties play, and that arguablyjustifies realism about them).
The locus classicus for understanding moral properties as a kind of "secondary
quality," epitomized by color properties, is John McDowell, Values and Secondary Quali-
ties, in MORALriy AND OBJECTIVITY 110 (Ted Honderich ed., 1985). See generally
DARwALL ET AL., supra note 51, at 19-24 (summarizing McDowell's view); L.W.
SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS AND ETHICS 27-34 (1996) (same).
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that moral facts are illusory.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to make a case for moral cog-
nitivism or even to describe in any detail the case that others have
made and that I have just sketched out in the most cursory way. Let
me simply note that cognitivism is now probably the dominant posi-
tion within moral philosophy and that metaethical expressivism is
probably a minority view.r Further, I am inclined to think that the le-
gal scholars who have written about the expressive function of law are
at bottom cognitivists, despite their intermittent, apparent skepticism
about moral truth. The central purpose of these scholars is morally
evaluative and critical: it is to evaluate legal decisions and institutions
as morally good or bad, right or wrong, positive or negative, and to
criticize the decisions and institutions that are found to be bad,
wrong, or negative. If noncognitivism about morality is correct, then
the morally evaluative and critical statements that are pervasive in the
literature on legal expressivism and that take a descriptive, truth-
evaluable form must be reformulated. For example, Pildes' claim that
bizarre-shaped voting districts "expressively endors[e] an impermissible
view of the constitutionally regulated role of race in public life"r" must
be reformulated as the claim that these districts "expressively endorse
a view about the constitutionally regulated role of race in public life
that I do not approve," or something like that. Similarly, the statement
by Pildes and Sunstein that "CBA [cost-benefit analysis] ... cannot
adequately capture all the expressive dimensions of policy choices r
must be translated into a form that does not take normative language
like "adequate" to be descriptive and truth-evaluable, namely: "CBA
cannot capture all the expressive dimensions of policy choices in a way
that we want expressive dimensions to be captured." It is hard to think that
Pildes, Sunstein, or other expressivists would be comfortable with such
noncognitivist reformulations, which dramatically weaken the critical
and evaluative force of their scholarly texts.
So to repeat: this Article will analyze and assess expressive theo-
ries of law within a cognitivist moral framework. Noncognitivism, and
specifically metaethical expressivism, will henceforth be assumed to be
incorrect. But how is it possible to be a moral cognitivist and, at the
same time, to think that law has an expressive function? How is it pos-
sible to be a moral cognitivist and, at the same time, a legal expressiv-
See sources cited supra note 51.
67 Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra note 4, at 760 (emphasis added).
6Pides & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatoy State, supra note 8, at 70 (emphasis
added).
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ist? Very easily. Someone who holds these views in combination be-
lieves not only that (1) moral statements are true or false and describe
moral facts (cognitivism), but also that (2) it is truly morally good or
bad, right or wrong, positive or negative, for legal decisions to possess
certain meanings (legal expressivism). If I say, "race-discrimination
sends a message that blacks are inferior, and for government to send
that message is truly morally wrong," I have committed myself both to
cognitivism and to some kind of expressive theory of law. If I say
"government's use of cost-benefit analysis to assess measures that save
human lives communicates contempt for human life, and it is truly
wrong for government to communicate that message," I have again
committed myself both to cognitivism and to some kind of expressive
theory of law. The cognitivist who does that is no weirder than the
utilitarian cognitivist who says that "race discrimination reduces over-
all well-being, and for government to make a decision that reduces
overall well-being is truly morally wrong." Expressive theories of law
do not presuppose noncognitivism or metaethical expressivism any
more than utilitarianism does.
B. Speaker's Meaning and Sentence Meaning
An expressive theory of law, in short, claims that the actions of le-
gal officials are truly better or worse, right or wrong, legitimate or ille-
gitimate, in virtue of what the actions mean. But what kind of "mean-
ing" is posited here? I suggest that expressive theories are plausible, if
at all, as sentence-meaning rather than speaker's-meaning theories,
where the "sentence meaning" of an official action is its meaning
pursuant to the very same kind of rules and conventions that assign
meaning to a well-formed English sentence.
Let us step back a second. "Meaning" can refer either to nonlin-
guistic meaning or to linguistic meaning.70 H.P. Grice, in his seminal
article on this topic, gave the following examples of nonlinguistic
meaning: "Those spots mean (meant) measles"; "Those spots didn't
mean anything to me, but to the doctor they meant measles"; "The re-
cent budget means that we shall have a hard year."7 ' Roughly speak-
ing, an action, event, or state of affairs has nonlinguistic meaning if it
provides evidence of something; that thing is what is "meant" by the
69 I will, throughout the Article, use the terms "legal decision," "action of a legal
official," "governmental action," and similar terms interchangeably.
SSeeGRV1c, supra note 1, at 213-15.
71 Id. at 213.
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action, event, or state, where "meant" is synonymous with "evidenced,"
"indicated," or "signaled."n As is clear from this definition, and as
Grice's examples show, many entities besides linguistic utterances or
sentences of a language can have nonlinguistic meaning. The actions
of legal officials, in particular, can have a host of different Gricean
nonlinguistic meanings. They can nonlinguistically mean (evidence,
signal, or indicate) all the different things for which their perform-
ance provides evidence. For example, the enactment of a particular
statute might nonlinguistically mean that constituents have certain
preferences, that the Republicans will win the next election, that spe-
cial interest groups have been relatively active or inactive in their lob-
bying, that the President made a strategic error, that most Americans
are racist, and so on.
But this evidentiary feature of statutes and other legal decisions is
not, I take it, what expressivists intend to refer to when they describe
the actions of legal officials as being "meaningful." Rather, they claim
(or at least many of them do) that official actions are meaningful in
the way that language is meaningful Punishing crime C is meaningful
and, in particular, expresses condemnation, in the very same way that
the utterance, "crime C is wrong" is meaningful and expresses con-
demnation, or so expressivists about punishment standardly claim.7
Discriminating against black children is meaningful and, in particular,
72 See Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99YALE LJ. 945, 953 (1990) ("[Entities]
possessing what H.P. Grice termed 'natural' [i.e., nonlinguistic] meaning.., function
as symptoms of conditions in the world to which they are causally related.").
See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 28, at 235-36 ("Punishment... expresses condemna-
tion: it denounces and formally disapproves the criminal's act; it disavows that act as
one which is not to be tolerated or condoned.... [We can express a formal disap-
proval of someone's criminal wrong-doing simply by the words which constitute a
criminal conviction: but the further punitive measures which are then imposed on a
criminal can also express condemnation . . . ."); FENBERG, supra note 23, at 98
("[P]unishment is a conventional device for the expression of [certain attitudes and
judgments] .... [and] has a snbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of
penalties."); NOZICx, supra note 28, at 370 ("The complicated structure of the nine
conditions for retribution [presented by Nozick], wherein something intentionally is
produced in another with the intention that he realize why it was produced and that
he realize he was intended to realize all this, fits the account of [linguistic] meaning
offered by H.P. Grice.... Retributive punishment is an act of communicative behav-
ior."); Hampton, supra note 28, at 1685-98 (defending an account of retribution that
includes a linguistic component); Kahan, supra note 9, at 594 (arguing that "punish-
ment is usefully conceived of as a language"); Primoratz, supra note 28, at 187, 196-98
(defining "expressionism" as the view that the "evil inflicted on the person punished is
not an evil simpliciter, but rather the expression of an important social message-that
punishment is a kind of language," and defending a variant of "expressionism" thus
defined).
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labels them as inferior, in the very same way that an official edict that
reads, "blacks are hereby declared to be inferior" is meaningful and
labels them as inferior, 74 or so expressivists about the Equal Protection
Clause standardly claim.75 Placing a creche on city property is mean-
ingful and, in particular, constitutes an endorsement of Christianity,
in the very same way that a governmental declaration, "We hereby en-
dorse Christianity" does, or so expressivists about the Establishment
Clause standardly claim.76 We shall briefly turn, in the Conclusion, to
74 The term "labels" here is intentionally ambiguous between the view that to stig-
matize is to invoke a descriptive linguistic convention, and the view that it is to invoke a
declarative one. On this issue, see infra text accompanying note 223.
75 See, e.g., KOPPELMAN, supra note 32, at 57-76 (describing stigma theorists of race
discrimination, including Black, Brest, and Karst, and defining stigma as a
"mark ... that defines the bearer as deviant, flawed, or otherwise undesirable"); Black,
supra note 32, at 425 ("[Segregation is intended] to stamp [blacks] with the mark of
inferiority."); Brest, supra note 32, at 8-9 (endorsing the view that racial discrimination
"stigmatizes" blacks, and explaining the concept of stigma by reference to a statement
in Strauder v. West Virginia that discrimination is "practically a brand upon
[blacks] ... [and] an assertion of their inferiority" (internal quotations omitted));
Karst, Foreword, supra note 32, at 48, 49 ("The chief target of the equal citizenship prin-
ciple [animating the equal protection clause] is the stigma of caste," which paradig-
matically although not exclusively involves a "deliberate legislative choice to impose a
badge of inferiority."); Lawrence, supra note 32, at 355-56 (proposing a test that would
"evaluate governmental conduct to see if it conveys a symbolic message to which the
culture attaches racial significance" and noting that "certain actions, words, or signs
may take on meaning within a particular culture as a result of the collective use of
those actions, words, or signs to represent or express shared but repressed [racist] atti-
tudes"). The linguistic construa of stigma is not universal--some stigma theorists are
less concerned with governmental actions that place a mark of inferiority on blacks
than with actions that have a certain, negative cultural effect upon them, see infra notes
241-42 and accompanying text-but it is certainly quite standard, as the quotations
here are meant to suggest. As David Strauss puts it: "[The stigma] approach [to equal
protection] focuses... on the message that the [governmental] action conveys to oth-
ers. Stigma in this sense is related to defamation." Strauss, supra note 33, at 942.
76 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("The central issue in this case is whether [the city] has endorsed Christianity by its
display of the creche. To answer that question, we must examine both what [the city]
intended to communicate.., and what message the... display actually conveyed.");
Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Govern-
ment, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 503, 517-18 (1992) ("Problems both definitional and
institutional embarrass the effort to make the endorsement of religion into a general-
ized legal test governing the whole range of Establishment Clause issues.... [These]
problems diminish, however, when the case at hand involves an official governmental
display of a religious symbol. Whatever else can be said about such a display, it com-
municates a message and is so intended.... When the symbols of government are re-
ligious symbols, then, the endorsement test seems [an appropriate] doctrinal formula
.... "); Gary C. Leedes, Rediscovering the Link Between the Establishment Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment: The Citizenship Declaration, 26 IND. L. REV. 469, 507 (1993) ("It
violates enduring American traditions of justice if state supported religion 'sends a
message [of endorsement] to nonadherents' [of the endorsed religion]." (citation
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theories of law that are predicated on the nonlinguistic meaning pos-
sessed by the actions of legal officials,7 but the focus of this Article Will
be upon linguistic meaning.78
This brings me to the distinction between speaker's meaning and
sentence meaning. That distinction is a distinction within the category
of linguistic meaning. Speaker's meaning and sentence meaning con-
stitute two different ways in which language is meaningful; they consti-
tute two different ways in which words are symbols, and not just evi-
dence or signals.79 Very roughly, the speaker's meaning of a linguistic
utterance is what the speaker intends by that utterance. If I say, "that
man is wearing a hat," knowing that you are a novice speaker of Eng-
lish who understands "is wearing a hat" the same way that fluent
speakers of English understand "is a postman," and if I make the ut-
terance in order to get you to believe that the man is a postman, then
the speaker's meaning of my utterance is: that man is a postman.
That is what I intend the utterance to mean; that is the belief that I
intend to induce in you by my performance of it!' Similarly, if I draw
omitted)); Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the
Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential ofJustice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV.
1049, 1051, 1069 (1986) (stating that "government cannot convey a message that any-
one is inferior or superior because of his or her religion" and concluding that an en-
dorsement test "is well suited to preventing successful government attempts, whether
subtle or overt, to impose a 'badge of inferiority' on our religious minorities").
See infra text accompanying notes 446-51. Andrew Altman's recent article, Ex-
pressive Meaning Race, and the Law: The Racial Gerymandering Cases, 5 LEGAL THEORY 75
(1999), is focused on expressivism in various nonlinguistic senses. See id. at 75, 77. I
agree with Altman that expressivism might be thus understood, but I do not agree that
extant scholarly theories described by their proponents as "expressive" are generally
concerned with nonlinguistic rather than linguistic meaning. See id. at 75.
78 Expressivists about regulation are also, at least arguably, concerned with linguis-
tic meaning. See, e.g., Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, supra note 8, at
66 ("By expressive dimensions-what might be understood as cultural consequences of
choice-we mean the values that a particular policy choice, in the specific context in
which it is taken, will be generally understood to endorse."). Alternatively, the refer-
ence to "cultural consequences" here might be read to support the view that regula-
tion-expressivists really are concerned with expression in a nonlinguistic sense, such as
a cultural-impact sense or some other nonlinguistic sense. For more on this issue, see
infra note 294.
For general discussions of linguistic meaning and of the subcategories of
speaker's meaning and sentence meaning, see BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD, Su-
pra note 55, at 110-40; ROBERT M. MARTIN, THE MEANING OF LANGUAGE 65-95 (1987);
Anita Avramides, Intention and Convention, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE 60-86 (Bob Hale & Crispin Wright eds., 1997). For a discussion with spe-
cific reference to law, see Hurd, supra note 72.
80 This is true on Grice's definition of speaker's meaning; it may not be true on
others. See MARTIN, supra note 79, at 85-93 (summarizing objections to Grice's defini-
tion); infra note 82 (citing alternative definitions).
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a picture of a man with a big shoe and show the picture to you, hop-
ing to get you to realize that the postman is coming (we have an inside
joke that postmen, because they walk so much, need big shoes), then
my drawing of the picture has the speaker's meaning, "the postman is
coming," and in that way is a linguistic utterance. Grice himself
thought that speaker's meaning was the most basic kind of linguistic
meaning, and offered the following analysis of it:
Perhaps we may sum up what is necessary for A to mean something by x
[that is, to linguistically mean something by x] as follows. A must intend
to induce by x a belief in an audience, and he must also intend his utter-
ance to be recognized as so intended. But these intentions are not in-
dependent; the recognition is intended by A to play its part in inducing
the belief, and if it does not do so something will have gone wrong with
the fulfillment of A's intentions. Moreover, A's intending that the rec-
ognition should play this part implies.., that he assumes that there is
some chance that it will in fact play this part, that he does not regard it
as a foregone conclusion for the belief will be induced in the audience
whether or not the intention behind the utterance is recognized.8
Yet more refined and complex analyses of speaker's meaning have
subsequently been offered. What they share with Grice's first and
seminal analysis is some reference to the actual communicative inten-
tions of the speaker-to what the speaker actually meant by her utter-
82ance.
81 GRICE, supra note 1, at 219.
See, e.g., STEPHEN B. SCHIER, MEANING (1972);JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECHACrS:
AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969); William P. Alston, Illocutionay Acts
and Linguistic Meaning in FOUNDATIONS OF SPEECH ACT THEORY PHILOSOPHICAL AND
LINGUISTIC PERSPECIViES 29 (Savas Tsohatzidis ed., 1994) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS
OF SPEECH ACT THEORY]; John R. Searle, What Is a Speech Act?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE 129-80 (A.P. Martinich ed., 1985) [hereinafter Searle, What Is a Speech Act?];
P.F. Strawson, Intention and Convention in Speech Acts, 73 PHIL. REv. 439 (1971). See gen-
erally Avramides, supra note 79, at 71-78 (summarizing critiques of and refinements to
Gricean definition).
Although some of these subsequent definitions of speaker's meaning tie it more
closely to sentence meaning, I take it that they still leave some scope for an utterance to
possess a speaker's meaning distinct from its sentence meaning. For example, Searle's
definition emphasizes the conventional element of speech acts:
In the performance of [a speech act] the speaker intends to produce a certain
effect by means of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce
that effect, and furthermore, if he is using words literally, he intends this rec-
ognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that the rules for using the ex-
pressions he utters associate the expressions with the production of that ef-
fect.
Searle, What Is a Speech Act?, supra, at 130. But Searle also notes that "[iun hints, in-
sinuations, irony, and metaphor-to mention a few examples-the speaker's utterance
meaning and the sentence meaning come apart in various ways." JOHN SEARLE, Indirect
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But whatever the importance of speaker's meaning in a general
theory of language, as one kind or even the most basic kind of linguis-
tic meaning, it will hardly work as the foundation for an expressive
theory of law. The actions of legal officials typically do not possess
speaker's meanings. More precisely, the actions of multimember legal
bodies-the enactment of statutes by legislatures; the issuance of
opinions by multimember courts; the promulgation of regulations by
multimember agencies-typically do not possess speaker's meanings.
Although such actions are partially constituted by words and lan-
guage-specifically, by the official text that a majority of the
multimember body has voted to approve-there is typically no actual
intention behind this text that would give purchase to a speaker's-
meaning theory of law.83
To begin, legislatures, courts, agencies, and other legal institu-
tions do not possess mental states, independent of the mental states of
the persons that make up these institutions."3 If every member of the
legislature intends M1 and solely M1 by her enactment of the statute,
then (at best) the legislature itself intends M1 and solely M; it cannot
intend M2 if no member herself intends that. We might say, meta-
phorically, that the legislature "intends M," but the term "intends"
here will not refer to an actual mental state of anyone-of anything
that has a mind-and will therefore not signify the kind of intention
that lends speaker's meaning to actions. For example, we could say
metaphorically that the legislature in this case "intends M 2",-and
therefore, that the enactment of the statute "means M"--because that
enactment leads the population to believe that M, is the case or to be-
Speech Acts, in ExPRESSION AND MEANING 30 (1978) [hereinafter SEAI.E, Indirect Speech
Acts]. Even if it were to turn out that the best analysis of linguistic meaning leaves no
scope for an utterance to possess a speaker's meaning distinct from its sentence mean-
ing-and I am skeptical that that will turn out to be the case-that would not under-
mine my thesis in this Section, which is that the kind of linguistic meaning relevant for
expressive theories of law is sentence meaning. See infra text accompanying notes 83-
103.
83 See generally Hurd, supra note 72, at 968-76 (arguing that statutes do not possess
speaker's meaning, specifically because legislatures are not "speakers"). As Hurd puts
it:
The first challenge facing any attempt to describe statutes as speech acts is the
well-known difficulty of conceiving of the legislature as having any intentions
at all, let alone the kinds of communicative intentions which Grice and others
have demonstrated are necessary.... [T]here can be no communication un-
less there is a speaker performing a speech act with an utterance; whether
there is such a speaker and speech act wholly depends upon whether the req-
uisite intentions are possessed.
Id. at 968-69.
8 See id. at 969-70.
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lieve that the legislature intends M, But such "meaning" is no more
linguistic than the case of clouds meaning rain. Genuine communica-
tion presupposes a genuine speaker or-a point we will get to in a
moment-genuine rules, conventions, or practices for attaching sig-
nificance to actions,"' both of which are lacking here. If the argu-
ments for, or implications of, a linguistic-meaning theory of law are
plausibly different from the arguments for, or implications of, a mere
signaling theory (or some other nonlinguistic theory)-and I think
the arguments and implications are plausibly different-it is a signifi-
cant conceptual mistake to lump together the case of the legislature
"meaning M" notwithstanding individual members solely intending
M, with the case of a genuine speaker's meaning.
So if the action of a multimember legal body is to possess a genu-
ine speaker's meaning, the collective intention that confers such
meaning upon that action must be some function of the individual in-
tentions of the members. Either the collective intention is (1) an in-
tention that is shared by all the members, or least by those who ap-
proved the action, or it is (2) some other function of the members'
individual intentions.
As for the first option: the members of a body that issues a legal
text typically do not share any intentions with respect to that text, be-
yond the intention to write the text into law."' If the legislature ap-
proves a racially discriminatory law, all we can typically say is that the
legislators who voted for the law shared the intention to enact it; we
cannot, typically, ascribe some further intention to them, or at least
See infra text accompanying notes 92-103.
See Hurd, supra note 72, at 971-78 (detailing difficulties with the view that legisla-
tive intention can be understood "as a summation of the intentions shared by a major-
ity of [the legislature's] members"). For similar skepticism about legislators sharing
intentions with respect to a statute, beyond the intention to enact the statute into law,
see Jeremy Waldron, Legislaton' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND
INTERPRETATiON: ESSAYs IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 329 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) [here-
inafter LAW AND INTERPRETATION]; Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an
"It" Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). But see Larry
Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions ofAuthorities and the Authority of Intentions,
in LAW AND INTERPRETATION, supra, at 357 (arguing that legal texts should be inter-
preted as their drafters intended, insofar as legal texts function to provide an authori-
tative determination of what ought to be done); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Legislative Intent and Public Choice; 74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1988) (arguing that "legislative
intent" is coherent and should play an important role in statutory interpretation).
Skepticism about legislators sharing intentions is, in part, what motivates the "textual-
ist" approach to statutory interpretation. This approach is defended most vigorously
byJustice Scalia. SeeWilliam N. Eskridge,Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,
640-56 (1990).
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not a further intention to communicate anything. (Remember how
detailed a Gricean communicative intention is: "A must intend to in-
duce by x a belief in an audience, and he must also intend his utter-
ance to be recognized as so intended. [Morever, this very recognition
must be] intended by A to play its part in inducing the belief .... "87
This degree of detail seems to make it particularly unlikely that the
individual members of multimember legal bodies routinely share
communicative intentions.) Now, perhaps my claim here is a bit too
strong: if a law has sentence meaning M, then perhaps we can say that
the legislators who voted for the law shared both the intention to write
that text into law and the intention to communicate M. For example,
if race discrimination is a conventional device by which to communi-
cate the inferiority of blacks, perhaps we can say that the legislators
who approve a discriminatory statute intend to communicate black in-
feriority. This approach, however, makes our speaker's-meaning the-
ory of law parasitic upon a sentence-meaning theory.
Option (2) is too counterintuitive to consider at length. Imagine
that one legislator who votes for a statute has an illicit communicative
intention, but no one else in the enacting coalition does, and that the
statute would have been approved even if the one legislator had voted
differently. Would it make sense, on an expressive theory of constitu-
tional law, to strike down the legislature's action-the enactment of the
statute-as unconstitutional? Slightly more plausible is the view that
the statute is unconstitutional if the lone legislator was a but-for cause
of enactment. But this view runs afoul of the objection that various
sorts of illicit communicative intentions can cause the enactment of
statutes without conferring linguistic meaning upon the statutes. (For
example, if a large donor says something illicit to the majority whip,
which in turn leads the whip to work feverishly for the statute's en-
actment-because the whip is scared of electoral defeat, not because
he shares the donor's views-then the resulting statute is caused by
the donor's statement but hardly means what the donor said.) The
action of enacting a statute is ajoint action by legislators; it is a neces-
sary condition, for that action to occur, that a majority of legislators
vote for the statute; and thus it would also seem to be a necessary con-
dition for thejoint action to be attributed a particular speaker's mean-
ing (within a moral theory of legislation) that this was the meaning of
at least a majority of the legislature.8
87 GRicE, supra note 1, at 219.
83 Even if I am wrong about this, there is the further point that the best evidence of
speaker's meaning accessible to the audience for legislation will be its sentence mean-
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At this point, the speaker's-meaning theorist might return to op-
tion (1), dig in her heels, and insist that the expressive criteria of her
theory do refer to the shared communicative intentions of all the
members (or all the approving members) of multimember legal bod-
ies-even though such intentions are not typically shared. On this
view, the expressive constraint against racial stigma in the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is triggered by a regulation if and only if all the agency
members, or at least all the members who voted to promulgate the
regulation, actually intended to communicate the inferiority of blacks;
the expressive constraint against the endorsement of religion in the
Establishment Clause is triggered by a statute if and only if all the leg-
islators, or least all the legislators who voted to enact the statute, actu-
ally intended to endorse religion; and so on. This would mean, for
example, that if the city council approves the placement of a creche
on city property, together with the issuance of a declaration that
"Christianity is the city's official religion," but a majority of the indi-
vidual council members do not (as it happens) intend to endorse
Christianity, then no Establishment Clause violation has ensued. That
is a possible position, but not one that, as far as I am aware, any legal
expressivist has ever advocated.
Further, the position, albeit possible, is implausible. It is implau-
sible because the best evidence of speaker's meaning accessible to
whatever audience is plausibly stipulated by the expressive theorist
(whether that audience is composed of the citizenry, or of lower-level
legal officials, or both) will simply be the sentence meaning of legal
actions.8 If the council enacts the creche ordinance, the audience
will conclude that the council members intended to endorse Christi-
anity. Conversely, if the council enacts an ordinance placing a car in
the city park, and a majority of the council intended to endorse Chris-
tianity by that action, the attempted communication will fail, because
the citizenry (or lower-level officials) will fail to realize what the coun-
cil members intended. So why insist, despite this, that an expressive
theory of law refers to speaker's meanings, not sentence meanings?
I have taken considerable space here to rebut a speaker's-meaning
theory of law, given the common scholarly ascription of "attitudes,"
ing. I make this point, immediately below, with respect to variant (1) of the speaker's-
meaning theory. The same point holds true of variant (2).
89 This point, as well as the need for a general theory to encompass both
multimember legal bodies and individual legal officials, explains why the best expres-
sive theory covering the actions of such individuals is a sentence-meaning theory-
notwithstanding the fact that these actions, by contrast with those of multimember
bodies, may routinely have speaker's meanings apart from their sentence meanings.
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"purposes," "motives," and "intentions" to legal bodies or officials-
often encapsulated in claims that some body's or official's action ex-
presses an impermissible attitude, purpose, motive, or intention."
Professor Pildes, who certainly engages in this kind of talk himself, ul-
timately concludes that the ascriptions are objective, not subjective-
that they do not refer to the actual mental states of the members of
multimember legal bodies or the actual mental states of other legal
officials. "[I] t is the social meaning state action conveys, rather than
subjective intent, that is central to applying the structural conception
[i.e., Pildes' conception] of rights.""' For the reasons that I have just
articulated at some length, Pildes is correct in ultimately rejecting a
speaker's-meaning theory of law.
We are left, then, with sentence meaning. What is that? Roughly,
sentence meaning is the kind of linguistic meaning attached to a well-
formed sentence, independent of the communicative intentions (or
other mental states) that happen to be held by those who utter the
sentence. "Grass is green" is sentence-meaningful even if the utterer
intends to communicate something different, or possesses no com-
municative intention at all, or indeed possesses no intention at all
(say, if he is an automaton who mechanically produces the string of
symbols constituting this sentence) *92 Sentence meaning is therefore a
much more attractive basis than speaker's meaning for an expressive
theory of law. Legal decisions surely can and do possess sentence
90 See supra note 56 (citing such ascriptions).
91 Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra note 4, at 752-53.
See Hurd, supra note 72, at 966 ("[S]tatutes [insofar as they possess sentence
meaning] might be like the often-hypothesized novel typed by random chance by the
thirteen-thousandth monkey chained to a typewriter: meaningful and maybe even
good literature, despite not having been produced as a communication by anyone for
anyone."). Arguably, my claim here is too strong. It may not be the case that a string
of marks produced by an automaton can (without more) have a sentence meaning; at
a minimum, there is the problem of deciding what language those marks are supposed
to be in, given that the automaton had no intentions on that score. See Alexander, su-
pra note 86, at 360-61 & n.1l. However, I take it to be unproblematic that a statute can
have a sentence meaning, even though legislators share no mental states beyond their
intention to enact into law the marks constitutive of the text of the statute, plus a
shared understanding of which set of linguistic conventions (e.g., English) those marks
are to be subsumed under. SeeWaidron, supra note 86, at 334-40, 352-56 (arguing for a
minimal view of the intentionality necessary to make legislative enactments meaning-
ful). As Waldron puts it: "The intentional speech-acts of the legislature are constitu-
tional functions of the intentional voting-acts of the individual members; but what mat-
ters here is simply the intentionality of 'yea' or 'nay' in relation to a given text, not any
hopes, aspirations, or understandings that may have accompanied the vote." Id. at 353.
The necessary conditions for other types of legal utterances (such asjudicial orders) to
possess sentence meaning are similar, and similarly minimal.
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meanings. If the city council enacts an ordinance proclaiming that
"Christianity is the religion of our forefathers," then this ordinance at
a minimum has the (descriptive) sentence meaning, "Christianity is
the religion of our forefathers." If the legislature enacts a statute that
provides, "Blacks may not marry outside their race," then this statute
at a minimum has the (prescriptive) sentence meaning, "Blacks may
not marry outside their race."93
But what, more precisely, does sentence meaning consist in?
There are various, conflicting answers to that question current within• 914
the philosophy of language. The view of sentence meaning I will rely
upon in this Article is the following: "An utterance x... [sentence]-
means that p in a community if and only if there prevails in that com-
munity a convention to use x in order to [speaker's]-mean that p."95
More crisply, the sentence meaning of a linguistic utterance is what
the utterance conventionally communicates. Language is understood as a
series of conventions for performing speech-acts (that is, actions with
speaker's meanings); in turn, the sentence meaning of an action is
simply the meaning assigned to it by those conventions. 95 (A conven-
tion is, roughly, an arbitrary regularity such that we each have reason
to conform to it, if everyone else does.) 97 For short, I will call this view
the conventionalist view of language. It affirms that speakers do have
meanings, indeed that speaker's meaning lies at the foundation of
language. Nonetheless, the conventionalist view also recognizes that
speakers dramatically benefit by the existence of conventions for per-
forming speech-acts. I do in fact perform a linguistic utterance when I
draw a man with a big boot so as to get you to believe that the post-
man is coming, but it would be much easier for both of us if I could
93 "Prescriptive" meaning is the linguistic meaning that inheres in the creation of
legal rights, duties, etc., and is discussed in detail below in Part I.C.
9 See BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD, supra note 55, at 127-34 (describing
competing accounts of sentence meaning).
Avramides, supra note 79, at 80 (variables italicized).
96 See also BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD, supra note 55, at 130-34 (presenting
a conventionalist account of language); MARTIN, supra note 79, at 77-82 (same); Al-
ston, supra note 82 (same). These authors would dissent, in various ways, from the par-
ticular version of conventionalism I have just presented and upon which I will rely in
this Article: An utterance x sentence-means that p only if it is conventional to tise x in
order to speaker's-mean that p. I rely upon that version for expository purposes, be-
cause of its simplicity. Nothing I say hinges upon that version being correct or in-
deed-as I mention below-on a conventionalist, as opposed to truth-conditional, ac-
count of sentence meaning being correct.
97The seminal modem analysis of the concept of convention is DAVID LEWIS,
CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969).
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simply say, "The postman is coming."
9
8
The conventionalist view is a standard view within the philosophy
of language. While it may not be the dominant view, and in any event,
is certainly not a consensus view (no view is!), I rely upon it here be-
cause it is the view most hospitable to expressive theories of law. If
expressive theories fail on the conventionalist view (as I will argue they
do), then afortiori they will fail on a view of sentence meaning that is
less accommodating to the claim that law is linguistically meaningful.
The conventionalist view is particularly accommodating to that claim
for the following reason: it can accommodate multiple types of sen-
tence meanings. Speech-acts fall into a variety of categories.9 Descrip-
tive speech-acts-actions where the speaker intends to get the hearer
to believe some proposition about the world-are simply one cate-
gory. Directive speech-acts-actions where the speaker intends to get
the hearer to do something-comprise a second and quite different
category. If I tell you to "close the door," I do not intend to induce a
belief in you; rather, I intend that you act to close the door and that
you do so by virtue of your recognition of my intention. Beliefs (the
hallmark of descriptive speech-acts) do not enter the analysis of direc-
tive speech-acts at all, or at least not in the same way that they enter
into the analysis of descriptive speech-acts. Other categories of
speech-acts include so-called commissives (where the speaker commits
himself to doing something, e.g., "I promise to pay you $100"); expres-
sives (where the speaker expresses a psychological state, e.g., "I am
sorry about your illness"); and declarations (where the speech-act itself
constitutes the change in the world to which it refers, e.g., "I declare
you husband and wife").1°°
98 See Avramides, supra note 79, at 80-81 (presenting the view that linguistic con-
ventions solve coordination problems).
99 See generally JOHN R. SEARLE, A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts, in EXPRESSION AND
MEANING 1-29 (1979).
100 This taxonomy is taken from SEALE, id. at 2-29. See William Croft, Speech Act
Classification, Language Typology and Cognition, in FOUNDATIONS OF SPEECH ACr
T EoR, supra note 82, at 460 ('The most widely accepted speech act classification is
that of Searle ... ."). I use the term "descriptive" rather than "assertive" speech-act to
refer to Searle's first category so as to highlight the fact that "[t]he simplest test of an
assertive [in my terminology, descriptive] is this: [you can] literally characterize
it... as true or false." SEARLE, supra note 99, at 13. I also have changed Searle's defi-
nition of descriptive speech-acts to make it more Gricean. One crucial element of
Grice's view is its "perlocutionary" cast, namely, that speech-acts of whatever kind in-
volve an intention to achieve some response (e.g., a mental state, an action) by the lis-
tener. See Alston, supra note 82, at 33-36; Avramides, supra note 79, at 71-78. Searle
departs from this feature of Grice's view in his own analysis of descriptives. As he puts
it, "[tihe point or purpose of the members of the assertive class is to commit the
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The conventionalist view of sentence meaning allows that there
can be as many kinds of sentence meanings as there are kinds of
speaker's meanings.' There might well be conventions for uttering
directives, conventions for uttering commissives, conventions for ut-
tering expressives, and conventions for uttering declarations, as well as
conventions for uttering descriptions. By contrast, competing views of
sentence meaning, such as the Davidsonian view that the meaning of a
sentence consists (very roughly) in its truth conditions,' °2 make good
sense of descriptive sentence meaning but have trouble explicating
the other variants. Since at least some expressive theories posit that
law has nondescriptive meaning-for example, the theory that pun-
ishment means condemnation, with "condemning" best understood as
some kind of nondescriptive speech-act' 0 -- a purely descriptivist con-
strual of sentence meaning will prove to be a less secure basis than
speech-act conventionalism for expressive theories of law.
C. Prescriptive Meaning and Further Meaning
Law surely does possess meaning-sentence meaning-in at least
one way. I will call this "prescriptive meaning." That law is meaning-
ful in at least this way should not be overlooked by critics of expressive
theory. Grandiose claims by expressivists about law's symbolism ought
not tempt the critic to the opposite extreme-to the conclusion that
legal decisions are meaningless. On the other hand, expressivists do
not typically confine themselves to prescriptive meaning; they typically
claim that legal decisions have further meaning, beyond what these de-
cisions prescribe; and this claim about further meaning is, indeed, a
fair target for the critic's skepticism.
Legal officials, by their actions, create legal rights, duties, liberties,
powers, liabilities, and immunities. They do so via the utterance of
speaker... to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition."
SEARLE, supra note 99, at 12. For expository purposes, I stick to a Gricean understand-
ing of speaker's meaning and matched sentence-meaning conventions.
101 See, e.g., BLACKBURN, SPREADING THEWORD, supra note 55, at 133 (noting possi-
bility of linguistic conventions for performing nondescriptive speech-acts).
02 See Donald Davidson, Truth and Meaning 17 SYNrHEsE 304 (1967). For a so-
phisticated summary of Davidson's view, see David Wiggins, Meaning and Truth Condi-
tions: From Frege's Grand Design to Davidson's, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE, supra note 79, at 3.
105 On Searle's taxonomy, condemning is probably an "expressive" speech-act.
104 Cf Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Cm. L. REV.
115, 150-51 (1992) (suggesting, in the Establishment Clause context, that claims about
the symbolic content of a challenged state action are parasitic upon claims about the
justifiability of the action with respect to nonexpressive criteria).
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certain sentences: "No person may drive more than fifty miles per
hour"; "A will is valid if attested by two witnesses"; "No state shall
abridge the right of free speech"; "A probationary employee may be
fired at will"; and so on.105 By prescriptive meaning, I mean just the
kind (or kinds) of sentence meaning(s) that these sentences possess.
For a legal official or body to utter, "No person may drive more than
fifty miles per hour" is to invoke the conventions by which persons are
placed under a legal duty not to drive more than fifty miles per hour;
for a legal official or body to utter, "A probationary employee may be
fired at will" is to invoke the conventions by which employers are ac-
corded a legal liberty to fire probationers.
I have not identified which speech-act convention(s) the utterance
of a legal sentence invokes and will not try to do so in this Article.
"Prescriptive meaning" will not be analyzed; I simply use that term to
refer to whatever sentence meaning(s) legal utterances have, in virtue
of their functioning to create legal rights, duties, liberties, and so on.
For one cannot analyze prescriptive meaning, in any detail, without a
well worked-out analysis of the concept of "law"-a concept that re-
mains a subject of considerable and continuing debate among legal
philosophers. 6 Someone who thinks that law is, paradigmatically, a
command will be inclined to analyze prescriptive meaning as directive
meaning.0 7 As I explained above, a directive is a speech-act whereby
the speaker intends to get the hearer to do something; 8 directive sen-
tences, such as "Give me your money," are conventional mechanisms
105 See, e.g., CARL WELLMAN, REAL RIGHTS 12-37 (1995) (specifying different types
of legal positions, such as liberties, claims, powers, and immunities).
The major contributions to the modem, jurisprudential literature about the
concept of law include, of course, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) [herein-
after HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW], and also, among others, JOSEPH RAZ, THE
CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (1970); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS (1980); and RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). The modem debate
focuses, in particular, on the difference between "positivist" and "natural law" accounts
of the concept of law and on the truth of the two types of accounts. Recent contribu-
tions to this debate include H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994); Special
Issue: Postscript to H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law, Part 1, 4 LEGAL THEORY 249 (1998);
Special Issue: Postscript to H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law, Part Z 4 LEGAL THEORY 381
(1998); THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIvISM (Robert P. George ed.,
1996); and W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994). A good introduc-
tion is BRIANBIX,JURiSPRUDEN C: THEoRYAND CONTEXT (1996). See also Adler, supra
note 47, at 81-87 (discussing and citing contributions to a related, ongoing debate
about the nature of authority).
107 See HART, 1HE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 106, at 18-25 (presenting a model
based on Austin's view of law as the sovereign's coercive orders).
108 See supra text accompanying notes 99-100 (summarizing conditions for descrip-
tive, directive, commissive, expressive, and declarative speech-acts).
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for performing directive speech-acts; and the simple-minded com-
mand theorist will thus propose that, when a legal body such as a legis-
lature, court, or agency utters a duty-creating sentence ("No person
may drive more than fifty miles per hour"), this legal action simply in-
vokes the ordinary, directive conventions prevalent within the linguis-
tic community. The notorious problem with this analysis is that it ac-
cords precisely the same type of meaning to "No person may drive
more than fifty miles per hour" as it accords to "Give me your money";
it draws no distinction between the utterances of a legal official and
the utterances of a robber."9 Further, it seemingly fails to explain the
meaning of certain other legal sentences, such as those that create
liberties. "Landowners are at liberty to exclude trespassers by means
of fences, warnings, threats, and other nonviolent means" does not,
apparently, direct landowners to do anything."0
A partial response to these problems, at least to the first, might be
to append a descriptive sentence to legal directives. On this refinement
of the command theory, "No person may X'-when uttered by a legal
official-has the hybrid meaning: "Do not X' (a command) and "It is
morally required that persons not X' (a description). As Joseph Raz
has argued, what distinguishes the legal official from the robber is that
the legal official claims moral authority for her commands."' More
radically, in line with a natural-law analysis of the concept of law, one
might propose that legal sentences merely describe moral facts. On
such a view, the utterance of "No person may X" by a legal official
means "Persons are under a moral obligation not to X'; the utterance
of "Persons are free to X' means "Persons have no moral obligation
not to X'; and so on. (Note how this solves, in a direct way, the prob-
lem of accounting for the meaning of sentences that create legal liber-
ties.) In fact, Heidi Hurd has advanced a natural law theory of pre-
scriptive meaning along purely descriptivist lines.1
So prescriptive meaning is difficult to analyze, but legal sentences
109 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORAIXIY OF FREEDOM 26 (1986) ("[A]ll political
authorities must and do resort to extensive use of and reliance on coercive and other
threats. Yet it is clear that all legal authorities do much more. They claim to'impose
duties and to confer rights.").
n1 See, e.g., HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 106, at 77-79 (summarizing
objections to the view of law as the sovereign's coercive orders); WELLMAN, supra note
105, at 17-24 (discussing the possibility of liberty-creating and power-creating laws that
are not best understood as fragments of duty-creating laws).
I SeeRAZ, supra note 109, at 26. But see Matthew H. Kramer, Requirements, Reasons,
and Raz: Legal Positivism and Legal Duties, 109 ETHICS 375 (1999) (analyzing and criti-
cizing Raz's view).
SeeHurd, supra note 72, at 990-1028.
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surely do possess it, whatever precisely it is. They surely do invoke cer-
tain linguistic conventions in creating legal rights, duties, etc.-
whether those conventions are best understood as directive,
descriptive, directive and descriptive, or something else. Again: the
view that law is meaningless is too extreme. But the existence of a
characteristically legal meaning does not license the further claim that
legal sentences possess whatever nonprescriptive meaning is posited by
the expressive theorist. Expressive theories are typically dualist; they
typically presume not only that legal officials create rights, duties,
liberties, etc., but also that these officials stigmatize, endorse,
condemn, express respect or contempt, or utter some other kind of
sentence meaning that is not entailed by the sheer act of
prescribing. 3 "No blacks may own automobiles" is thought both to
direct blacks not to possess automobiles (on a simple command
theory of law) and to describe or declare blacks as social inferiors."
"The defendant is committed to the state penitentiary" is thought both
to direct the defendant to the penitentiary (on a command theory)
and to condemn his wrongdoing."
5
To be sure, legal officials have the capacity to utter nonprescrip-
116tive sentences. For example, the city council could simply issue a
proclamation that "Christianity is the official religion" (a proclama-
tion that does not confer legal rights, duties, liberties, etc. on any-
one);11 it is not constrained to endorse by prescribing. Similarly, ajudge could accompany his sentence of conviction with an additional
11 See infra text accompanying notes 162, 223, 249-55, 300-01 (describing nonpre-
scriptive meanings typically posited by expressivists about punishment, race discrimina-
tion, religion, and regulation).
14 See, e.g., KOPPELMAN, supra note 32, at 57-76 (summarizing stigma theory).
1 For a particularly clear presentation of the view that the hard treatment partly
constitutive of (normal) punishment has a further, condemnatory content, see DUFF,
supra note 28, at 235-45. I consider, below, the possibility of a purely expressive pun-
ishment-what I call Punishment, . See infra text accompanying note 164. Punishment,
would lack prescriptive meaning, and thus does not falsify my claim here that expres-
sivists about punishment posit a nonprescriptive meaning attached to the utterances of
legal, officials.
61 See Lewis A. Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1626-34
(1998) (noting that legal officials have expressive resources other than the announce-
ment or implementation of legal rules, but suggesting that advocates of an expressive
theory of law are concerned primarily with the expressive content of rule announce-
ment and implementation).
17 See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLuM. L. REV. 2083, 2095, 2092 (1996) (analyzing Establishment Clause status of
"ceremonial deism," defined inter alia as "practices involving.., prayer, invocation,
benediction, supplication, appeal, reverent reference to, or embrace of, a general or
particular deity [that are] created, delivered, sponsored, or encouraged by govern-
ment officials," such as the designation of "In God We Trust" as our national motto).
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sentence, contained in the text of his opinion, that condemns the de-
fendant's wrongdoing. 8 Furthermore, it is possible that certain
straight prescriptive sentences do possess dual meanings; "No blacks
may own automobiles" might really invoke a convention both for pre-
scribing and for stigmatizing. In either case, however, the attachment
of nonprescriptive meaning to the utterances of legal officials is an
empirical and contingent matter, not entailed by the fact of law. This
point will prove of some significance in Part II, when we turn to evalu-
ate expressive theories.
At this juncture, I should mention the possibility of nonliteral sen-
tence meaning-a possibility that is helpful to the expressivist.11 9 An
action A has sentence meaning M on the definition I am using in this
Article if--given existing conventions in the relevant society-this ac-
tion is a conventional mechanism for performing a speech-act with
speaker's meaning M Some theorists of language have suggested that
an action can have a conventional but nonliteral ("pragmatic" rather
than "semantic") linguistic content. For example, the action of utter-
ing "Do you think you could turn down the radio?" has the literal,
conventional meaning of a question, but also possesses an arguably
nonliteral and arguably conventional content to the effect, "Turn
down the radio." ''2 I am not sure whether the distinction between lit-
eral and nonliteral conventional meaning is coherent; if M, and M,
are both conventional meanings of action A, then why are not those
both A's literal meaning?121 In any event, the point to emphasize here
is that A's sentence meaning, by my definition, encompasses any kind
of linguistic meaning (literal or not) for the communication of which
A is conventional. This broad definition helps the expressivist, be-
118 Cf infra text accompanying notes 432-39 (stating that legal utterances, or some
class thereof, should arguably be accompanied by a public justification).
119 1 am indebted to Larry Alexander and Michael Moore for suggesting to me that
the kind of linguistic meaning typically described by expressivists-e.g., the stigmatic
meaning of discrimination-could be a nonliteral or pragmatic, but conventional,
meaning; and to Leo Katz for generally urging me to incorporate the possibility of
nonliteral meaning into my account.
120 See PAUL GRICE, Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS, sup ra
note 1, at 37-40 (discussing possibility of "generalized conversational implicature");
SEARLE, Indirect Speech Acts, supra note 82, at 49 ("[T]here can be conventions of usage
that are not meaning conventions. I am suggesting that 'can you', 'could you', 'I want
you to', and numerous other forms are conventional ways of making requests... but at
the same time they do not have an imperative [literal] meaning .... "). For a general
discussion of nonliteral meaning, see KENT BACH & ROBERT M. HARNISH, LINGUISTIC
COMMUNICATION AND SPEECHACTS 155-72 (1979).
1 See MARTIN, supra note 79, at 218-21 (arguing against the view that words, as op-
posed to speakers, can have a metaphorical meaning).
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cause it supports the view that a legal utterance can possess both a
prescriptive sentence meaning and the nonprescriptive sentence
meaning targeted by the expressivist. It supports the view that "No
blacks may own automobiles" could sentence-mean both "Blacks are
hereby directed not to possess automobiles" and "Blacks are inferior."
Whether prescriptive utterances have a further, nonprescriptive con-
tent is an empirical and contingent matter, both in the sense that this
content is not entailed by the act of prescribing, and in the sense that
nothing in my definition of sentence meaning precludes attaching a
further (and perhaps "nonliteral") sentence meaning to the act of
prescribing.
D. What Makes a Theory Genuinely Expressive?
We now turn to a conceptual problem of great importance for the
debate about expressive theories of law, one that the existing litera-
ture has failed to clarify What makes a moral theory genuinely ex-
pressive? On virtually any moral theory, the linguistic meaning (spe-
cifically, the sentence meaning) of a legal official's action can have a
moral impact. What distinguishes this trivial and virtually universal
feature of moral theories from the nontrivial characterization of a
theory as "expressive"?
To see the issue here, imagine that my moral theory tells me to
minimize the aggregate number of premature deaths.'2 (It is a crude
kind of consequentialist theory.123) Imagine further that if govern-
mental officials utter a certain sentence So at a particular time-where
So is, let us assume, the sentence, "Premature death is a bad thing"-
this utterance will cause the aggregate number of premature deaths to
be minimized. Other utterances at that time, or the performance of
linguistically meaningless actions, will lead to a greater number of
deaths. The details of the causal story do not matter; perhaps killers
12 Cf ITR B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION
FRAMEWORKS FOR PoLICy 15-17 (1981) (describing and discussing "risk-risk" decision
procedure, whereby regulatory agencies seek to minimize the aggregate number of
deaths); Cass Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHL L REV. 1533 (1996) (same);
W. Kip Viscusi, Economic Foundations of the Current ReguZatory Reform Efforts, 10J. ECON.
PERsP. 119, 129-31 (1996) (same).
12 See generally CONSEQUENTiALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988)
(analyzing the structure of consequentialist moral theories); SH= KAGAN, THE
LMIs OF MORALITY (1989) [hereinafter KAGAN, DIE LIMITS OF MORAInY] (same);
SHELLY KAGAN, NORMA=tv ETHIS (1998) [hereinafter KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS]
(same); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, 11M REJCIrON OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (rev. ed. 1994)
(same).
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would be persuaded by the utterance of SO to refrain from killing,
perhaps crime victims would be inspired to take additional precau-
tions, perhaps doctors would redouble their care. 4 In any event, the
official utterance of So is morally required by our crude consequential-
ist theory, what law means, then, has a moral impact. But surely we
have not yet discovered a genuine "expressive theory of law." Gov-
ernmental officials are simply obliged to do whatever it takes to mini-
mize premature death and are prohibited from doing anything else.
The fact that uttering SO leads to minimization is purely contingent
and causal. If this crude consequentialist theory counts as "expres-
sive" just because certain meanings happen to have the right (or
wrong) sort of consequences, then any nonrigged moral theory of
governmental action will count as "expressive" and the description will
be trivial.
25
The point has both theoretical and practical importance. It is
theoretically important, because expressivists (or at least some of
them) claim to be offering a new kind of moral theory and specifically
to be criticizing consequentialism. If the description "expressive"
124 See Kahan, supra note 9, at 602-05 (describing various mechanisms whereby gov-
ernmental expression can cause reductions in future crime).
12 This point is, in effect, articulated by HART, supra note 27, who distinguishes
between expressivism as a distinctive type of theory of punishment, and expressivism as
a claim about the role of denunciation within a nonexpressive theory. Hart writes:
Notwithstanding the eminence of its legal advocates, [the expressive] justifi-
cation of punishment, especially when applied to conduct not harmful to oth-
ers, seems to rest on a strange amalgam of ideas. It represents as a value to be
pursued at the cost of human suffering the bare expression of moral con-
demnation .... But is this really intelligible? ...
It is, I think, probable that what the advocates of this theory really mean
by... the 'appropriate' expression of moral condemnation is one that is ef-
fective in instilling or strengthening in the offender and in others respect for
the moral code which has been violated. But then the theory assumes a dif-
ferent character, it is no longer the theory that the legal enforcement of mo-
rality is a value apart from its consequences; it becomes the theory that the le-
gal enforcement of morality is valuable because it preserves an existing
morality.
Id. at 65-66.
12 See, e.g., DuFF, supra note 28, at 151-86, 233-66 (explicitly criticizing consequen-
tialism and advocating a nonconsequenitialist, expressive theory); NOZICK, supra note
28, at 363-97 (same); Pildes & Anderson, SlingingArrouts, supra note 8 (same); Pildes &
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatoy State, supra note 8, at 66-72 (same); Primoratz, supra
note 28, at 196-98 (same). The differentiation between expressivism and nonexpres-
sive theories (paradigmatically consequentialism) is less explicit in the constitutional
law scholarship discussed infra Part II.B, but the theories of race discrimination and
the Establishment Clause defended by constitutional expressivists are in fact genuinely
expressive by the criteria articulated in this Section.
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applies to any nonrigged theory, the claim and the critique are mis-
guided. As for practical importance: the statements required or pro-
hibited by, say, ordinary consequentialism would presumably be quite
different from those required or prohibited by a genuine expressive
theory. 27 (For example, ordinary consequentialists would find it diffi-
cult to explain why government should always respond to moral
wrongdoing by condemning it.Ls) Anyone interested in deciding
what government ought, or ought not, to say should determine
whether there exist genuine expressive constraints and goals, or sim-
ply the ordinary constraints and goals of a nonexpressive theory that
happen, in a particular instance, to prohibit or require expression.
How, then, should a genuinely expressive theory of law be charac-
terized? One temptation, to be avoided, is to say that a theory is genu-
inely expressive if and only if the linguistic meaning of an action can
have noncausal moral impact. This would rule out the crude conse-
quentialist theoryjust described. But the causal/noncausal distinction
would not properly handle the case where (1) the meaning of a par-
ticular action has a noncausal rather than a causal impact; and yet (2)
linguistic meaning plays no deeper role in the theory than in the case
of a mere causal impact. Imagine that our theory is preference-
utilitarianism, which enjoins government to maximize the satisfaction
of preferences.12 Imagine further that, as it happens, some citizen
prefers that government says So. In this scenario, the meaning of gov-
ernmental utterances has a noncausal moral impact: government's
utterance of So is morally required, etris paribus, not because of what
it causes, but because of what it constitutes, namely the satisfaction of
someone's preference. Yet the possibility of such a scenario hardly
makes preference-utilitarianism a genuine expressive theory. Indeed,
expressivists typically have taken preference-utilitarianism as their
chief target.'ss
I propose, instead, that the concept of an "expressive theory" be
defined as follows:
12 See HART, supra note 27, at 67 (noting that, if an expressive response to wrong-
doing is claimed to be morally justified as instrumental to the reinforcement of exist-
ing morality, that claim is open to criticism on factual grounds: "the assertion that
[expression] does operate in the manner supposed... requires evidence in support,
and at least in relation to sexual morality there is little to be found").
128 See infra text accompanying notes 442-43.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 337-40 (explicating preference-utilitarianism
in detail).
I See, ag., Pildes & Anderson, Slinging Arrows, supra note 8; Sunstein, Incommen-
surabity and Valuation, supra note 16.
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"Expressive Theory of Law: A Definition
An "expressive moral theory" is a theory such that the
moral factors F... F that collectively determine the moral
status of an action (the status of the action as required, pro-
hibited, or permitted)" include at least one expressive factor.
A moral factor F1 is "expressive" if it refers to the linguistic
meaning of an action. More precisely, a moral factor F, is ex-
pressive if meaningless actions (actions lacking linguistic mean-
ing) must fare equally well, with respect to the factor. An "ex-
pressive theory of law" is a moral theory such that the moral
factors F... F,, that collectively determine the moral status of
a legal official's action include at least one expressive factor.
Any moral theory will specify certain moral factors that combine to de-
termine the status of a given action as required, prohibited, or permis-
sible, under that theory. By a "moral factor," I mean a way of charac-
terizing an action that has a canonical or foundational status within
the theory-one that figures in the best statement of the theory'32 and
cannot be reduced to other factors" For example, utilitarianism
specifies a single moral factor F: the amount of well-being produced
by a given action.ss A more sophisticated moral theory, which recog-
nizes the existence of constraints upon welfare-maximizing action, will
specify multiple moral factors: F, plus F... F,... F, where F.. might
131 If there are additional moral statuses beyond these three that an action can pos-
sess, e.g., the status of supererogatory, see generally DAVID HEY, SUPEREROGATION: ITS
STATUS IN ETIcAL THEORY (1982), the definition here can readily be amended to re-
flect them.
132 1 will not attempt to present specific criteria for "best," "canonical," or "founda-
tional," for that goes deeper than is necessary into the nature of moral theorizing;
whatever the criteria, an expressive factor is one which figures in the best statement of
the theory, thus specified.
1 See generally KAGAN, NORMATivE ETHIcs, supra note 123, at 25-186 (presenting a
template for moral theories that incorporate "moral factors" in this sense). Cf. Russ
Shafer-Landau, Moral Rules 107 ETHICs 584 (1997) (discussing the possibility of "par-
ticularistic" theories that do not incorporate such "moral factors"). Although my defi-
nition of genuine expressivism could be modified to accommodate the possibility of a
genuinely expressive, particularistic theory-as a theory such that, 6n certain particular
occasions, the (nonuniversal) properties identified as morally relevant will be expres-
sive properties-I think that particularism is problematic. I will therefore focus on ex-
plicating expressivism within a nonparticularistic fiamework. Further, as far as I can
tell, the specific expressivists whose theories I present and criticize in this Article are
not particularists.
134 For a discussion of utilitarianism, see GEOFFREY SCARRE, UTIITARIANISM
(1996); UTmlTARIANIsM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982);
andJ.J.C SMART& BERNARD WnLLAMS, UTIIITARANISM FORANDAGAINSr (1973).
EXPRESSISM: A SKEPTICAL OVERVIEW
be a constraint against intentionally causing serious harm,"" F,2 might
be a constraint against breaching promises,"6 and F might be a con-
straint against lying.
37
F, is a nonexpressive factor: it concerns the total amount of well-
being produced by an action, not the action's linguistic meaning.
(Two meaningless actions can produce different amounts of overall
well-being.) Similarly, the factor F, is nonexpressive: what matters
with respect to this factor is whether an action causes serious harm
and whether the mental state behind the action is intentional, not
whether the action has a particular meaning. (Given two meaningless
actions, one can constitute a serious, intentional harming, while the
other does not.) The same story can be told about factor F,2, the con-
straint against promise-breaching. By contrast, the factor F, in this
mini-theory is expressive. The constraint against lying refers to the
linguistic meaning of actions. It delineates a property of action (the
property of constituting a lie) such that only a linguistically meaning-
ful action can possess that property. Equivalently, two meaningless ac-
tions will necessarily fare the same with respect to the factor Fr,, Given
two meaningless actions, neither will trigger the no-lying constraint,
because it is a necessary condition for an action to constitute a lie that
it be linguistically meaningful.ln
To recapitulate: Moral theories posit one or more basic factors
that collectively determine the moral status of actions (here, specifi-
cally, the actions of legal officials). An expressive theory of law is a
theory such that, among the basic factors governing the actions of le-
gal officials, at least one such basic factor is "expressive" in the sense
that linguistically meaningless actions must fare identically with re-
spect to that factor.
My definition of an expressive theory accomplishes the task of
making the description "expressive" an interesting and nontrivial one.
It distinguishes between genuine expressivism and the mere ascription
of moral impact to linguistic meaning-an ascription which, again,
virtually any moral theory can warrant. Linguistic meaning has a
"moral impact," in a particular choice situation, if linguistic meaning
co-varies with some moral factor F,-if, given two actions that differ
with respect to F, the actions also differ with respect to linguistic
13 See KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS, supra note 123, at 70-105.
lA See id. at 116-25.
137 See iUL at 106-16.
133 See infra text accompanying notes 393-415 (further discussing constraints against
lying and harming).
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meaning. To return to the example at the beginning of this section:
imagine that Fi is the total number of deaths produced by an action
and that, in a particular choice situation, an action with the linguistic
meaning "Premature death is a bad thing" produces fewer deaths than
an action with no linguistic meaning. Linguistic meaning has a moral
impact in this choice situation. It matters in light of F1 whether the
agent utters "Premature death is a bad thing" as opposed to saying
nothing. But the factor Fi is not an expressive factor, since two mean-
ingless actions can produce different numbers of overall deaths. The
performance of the utterance is here morally required, not by virtue
of what the utterance means-not by virtue of the sentence-meaning
conventions that it triggers-but by virtue of its effect on the overall
number of deaths.
The definition I offer here not only makes the description, "ex-
pressive," nontrivial and interesting, but also tracks our pretheoretical
sense of what an expressive theory is. Intuitively, theories such as the
death-minimization theory, or preference-utilitarianism, or a theory
that prohibits the intentional causing of serious harm are not genu-
inely expressive because a characterization of a particular action in
terms of its linguistic meaning can always be reduced to a characteri-
zation that does not refer to linguistic meaning. Linguistic meaning
lacks basic moral relevance within such theories; the most perspicuous
description of an action will refer to its effect on overall deaths, or on
preference-satisfaction, or to the serious harm it causes, not to what it
means. My definition of an "expressive theory" is meant to serve as a
somewhat fuller and more precise articulation of this pretheoretical
intuition.
Finally, I should note that the concept of an "expressive factor,"
upon which my definition crucially depends, can be fleshed out in dif-
ferent ways. Roughly speaking, a factor F is "expressive" if it refers to
the linguistic meaning of actions. If F, is a factor that looks to whether
government's action constitutes a condemnation, and F is a factor
that looks to whether government's action constitutes a lie, while F is
a factor that looks to the overall degree of preference-satisfaction pro-
duced by government's actions, then F, and F but not F would seem
to be expressive. But what, precisely, is the feature of F and F that
makes them, and not F, "refer" to linguistic meaning?39 Shall we say
(1) that linguistically identical actions must fare identically with re-
159 Cf BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD, supra note 55, at 302-45 (summarizing
debates about how language refers to individual objects).
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spect to F, and F; or, more weakly, (2) that meaningless actions must
fare identically with respect to F, and F: I have chosen the second
and weaker option: a factor F1 is expressive, on my account, if two
meaningless actions must fare identically with respect to the factor.
The problem with the first and stronger option is that it actually ex-
cludes F: given two actions with identical linguistic content, one may
be a lie and the other not, depending on facts about the world. For
example, "grass is green" is true in a world where grass is green, but
false in a world where grass is blue, even though "grass is green"
means the same thing in both worlds.40
The formulation of "expressive factor," offered here, seeks once
more to track our pretheoretical intuitions; intuitively, F is expressive.
It also serves to make the critical assessment of expressive theories
provided below in Parts II and III particularly robust. If the larger set
of moral theories that meet my definition of "expressive theory" are
unpersuasive, then a fortiori the smaller and included set of moral
theories that meet a more demanding definition will be unpersuasive.
Cass Sunstein, in his article, On the Expressive Function of Law, con-
fronts the problem I have addressed in this section. His answer is
somewhat different from mine. Sunstein distinguishes not between
140 Certainly this is true on a traditional "correspondence" theory of truth. See
RICHARD L. KIRKIAM, THEORIES OFTRUTH: A CRrrCAL INTRODUCTION 119-40 (1992)
(describing variants of correspondence theory).
It might be objected that moral factors, such as expressive factors, are relevant for
choosing between different actions in the same choice situation, and that the putative
problem I have just identified, concerning the strong definition of "expressive factor,"
would not in fact arise as between different actions in the same choice situation. That
is: requiring that linguistically identical actions in the same choice situation fare iden-
tically with respect to an "expressive factor" does track our intuitive sense of what an
"expressive factor" involves, and does count F2 (the no-lying factor) as expressive. My
response to this objection is as follows: I agree that moral factors are relevant for
choosing between different actions in the same choice situation; my own(weak) defini-
tion of "expressive factor" should be understood to require only that meaningless ac-
tions in the same choice situation fare identically with respect to such a factor, not that
two different meaningless actions in two different choice situations do so. But the
stronger definition of "expressive factor" does, seemingly, prove problematic even with
respect to linguistically identical actions in the very same choice situation. Imagine
choosing between A1, which means "the grass will be red at noon tomorrow," andA,
which means "the grass will be red at noon tomorrow," where A, but not A2 will pro-
duce a world in which the grass will be red at noon tomorrow. ThenA2 but not A is a
lie-since A, but not A, is a false statement of fact-even though A, and A1 have the
very same linguistic meaning.
These considerations led me to employ a weaker definition of "expressive factor."
As I say below, if expressive theories in this weaker sense are unpersuasive, then aforti-
ori expressive theories in the stronger sense are. So I do not see much to lose by weak-
ening the definition.
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theories that incorporate expressive factors and theories that merely
warrant the ascription of moral impact to linguistic meaning, but
rather between (1) theories where the meaning of law has "intrinsic"
value, and (2) theories where the meaning of law merely has a "con-
sequential" effect:
I have suggested that some expressivists are concerned with norm man-
agement, whereas others are concerned with the "statement" law makes
entirely apart from its consequences.... For those who endorse the ex-
pressive function of law, the most important testing cases arise when (a)
people support laws because of the statement made by such laws but (b)
the effects of such laws seem bad or ambiguous, even by reference to the
values held by their supporters .... My basic proposition is that, at least
for purposes of law, any support for "statements" should be rooted not
simply in the intrinsic value of the statement, but also in plausible judg-
ments about its effect on social norms and ... its consequences [more
generally] 141
If by "intrinsic" Sunstein means noncausal, and by "consequential"
he means causal, then his distinction is just the causal/noncausal dis-
tinction I criticized above. If, alternatively, by "consequential" Sun-
stein means to refer to the kind of theory that I have called conse-
quentialist-roughly, a theory similar in structure to utilitarianism-
then Sunstein's distinction is problematic for a different reason. A
moral theory might be nonconsequentialist and yet still not genuinely
expressive.1 That is true, for example, of a moral theory that incor-
porates a nonconsequentialist but nonexpressive constraint against
intentional killings. The meaning of an action can have an impact
with respect to that constraint-if I tell someone the wrong thing, I
might kill him-and yet this theory is no more genuinely "expressive"
than preference-utilitarianism, which also permits linguistic meaning
to have a moral impact. So I will adhere to my own definition of an
"expressive theory."
E. Expressive Theories of Governmental Action and
Expressive Theories of Individual Action
Finally, let me draw a distinction between expressive theories of
individual action and expressive theories of law, or of governmental ac-
141 Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 20, at 2045; see also Korn-
hauser, supra note 116, at 1622-34 (drawing a similar distinction).
142 There is nothing in the concept of a nonconsequentialist or, equivalently, a
"deontological" constraint that entails expressivity. For a recent, precise account of the
structure of deontological constraints, see David McNaughton & Piers Rawling, Agent-
Relativity and theDoing-HappeningDistinction, 63 PHIL. STUD. 167 (1991).
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tion. It is particularly important to draw this distinction because the
philosopher Elizabeth Anderson has recently advanced the first kind
of theory, primarily in her book, Value in Ethics and Economics.'4 An-
derson's book has been widely cited and discussed, not only in the
philosophical literature on choice and rationality,'44but also in the le-
gal literature on expressive theories of law.1' Indeed, Anderson has
coauthored a law review article with Professor Pildes, one of the lead-
ing legal expressivists,14 and recently participated in a symposium on
Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law.147 It thus
seems to be the case that Anderson herself holds both an expressive
theory of individual action and an expressive theory of law. But in any
event, the two kinds of theories are conceptually distinct-the first
might be true and the second false, or vice versa-and Anderson's oft-
cited book is largely a defense of an individual-level theory.
48
Consider the following prdcis of the theory presented in her book:
The theory of rational action that I propose... can be called an expres-
sive theory. An expressive theory defines rational action as action that
adequately expresses our rational attitudes toward people and other in-
trinsically valuable things. According to the rational attitude theory of
value, something is valuable if and only if it is rational for someone to
value it, to assume a favorable attitude toward it. And to adequately care
about something requires that one express one's valuations in the world,
to embody them in some social reality.1
This prdcis illustrates the ambiguity of the term, "expressive," for the
theory just summarized is a different kind of theory than two other
kinds, already discussed in this Article, which are also named by that
143 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHIcs AND EcoNOMIcs (1993) [hereinafter
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND EcoNoMIcs]. For a more recent statement of An-
derson's views, see Elizabeth Anderson, Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods, in
INcoMMENsURABmT, supra note 16, at 90-109.
144 See Symposium on Elizabeth Anderson's Value in Ethics and Economics, 106 ETHIcs
508 (1996).
145 A search of Westlaw's law review database ("JLR") on April 25, 2000, turned up
109 citations to Anderson's book.
146 See Pildes & Anderson, SlingingArrows, supra note 8.
147 See Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law:
A Comment 27J. LEGAL STuD. 553, 558-62 (1998) (discussing an unpublished paper by
Anderson).
148 The final chapter of the book, on cost-benefit analysis, does incorporate some
of the elements of the expressive theory of regulation that is presented by Pildes & An-
derson, Slinging Arrows, supra note 8. See ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHIS AND
EcoNoMIcs, supra note 143, at 190-220; infra Part 11C. (discussing this expressive the-
ory of regulation).
1 ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETucs AND EcoNOMIcs, supra note 143, at 17.
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term. First, Anderson's theory is not metaethical expressivism-it is
not the kind of theory, concerning the nature of morality, defended
by Ayer, Hare, Blackburn, and Gibbard'5 -- because there is not a hint
of noncognitivism in Anderson's book. Anderson does not want to
deny the existence of moral or evaluative truth; rather, she argues that
attitudes can be truly rational and that it can be truly rational to act so
as to express them.""1 Second, the theory to which the above prdcis
refers is not, and does not entail, an expressive theory of law. To say
(a) that individuals should act to express their rational attitudes does
not entail (b) that governmental bodies should act to express govern-
mnt's rational attitudes.15 2
As I have already explained, it is problematic to characterize
multimember governmental bodies as possessing the mental states
and, in particular, the attitudes (intentions, purposes, motives, beliefs,
preferences) that are unproblematically possessed by individuals.5 3
One might structure Anderson's theory to get around this problem;
one might say that, in choosing between A1 and A2, governmental bod-
ies should choose the action with the sentence meaning that best ex-
presses the attitude (s) that it is rational for the members of these bod-
ies to hold. But why is this the appropriate course for governmental
bodies to follow? The choice between A, and A2 is a governmental
choice. It is not, or may not be, the same kind of choice that indi-
viduals face (for example, it may have much more dramatic conse-
quences for the well-being of many persons than an individual's
choice typically has). Further, individuals have their own lives to lead.
To put the point a bit more technically, individuals have their own
nonmoral projects, such as their friendships, careers, properties, or
families, that they are morally licensed to pursue, within broad moral
constraints, notwithstanding overall consequences15 4 (For example, I
150 See supra Part L.A (discussing metaethical expressivism).
151 Among other things, Anderson's book "propose[s] a pragmatic account of how
we can objectively justify our value judgments, and... defend[s] it against several lev-
els of subjectivist and skeptical criticism." ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETMICS AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 143, at 91.
152 This point is made by Richard Craswell in his article, Incommensurability, Welfare
Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1419, 1461 (1998), and by Lewis A. Kornhau-
ser, supra note 116, at 1633-34.
See supra text accompanying notes 83-89.
154 This is now a standard theme within the philosophical literature criticizing utili-
tarianism. See, e.g., SCEFFLER, supra note 123, at 14-79; BERNARD WILLIAMS, A Critique
of Utilitarianism, in SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 134, at 108-18; Thomas Nagel,
Autonomy and Deontology, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 123, at 142,
145-56; see also KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALrIY, supra note 123, at 3 (noting that or-
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am morally licensed to continue my art career, even if it would be bet-
ter for art and the world if I gave it up and served as the assistant to
you, the more artistically talented one.) By contrast, government and
government officials acting in an official capacity have no projects of
their own in this sense.1
Imagine that action A, will dramatically improve the life-prospects
of one group of persons and set back the life-prospects of a second,
while action A, will dramatically set back the life-prospects of the first
group and improve the life prospects of the second. Assume further
that individuals are, within broad constraints, licensed to assume an
attitude of loyalty to other persons or groups, and to choose actions
that express loyalty. I can give a loan to my friend, even if the new
family that just moved to town could make better use of the money.
This hardly shows that government, in choosing between A, and A2
here, should choose the action that has the sentence meaning of ex-
pressing an appropriate loyalty. First, the choice is a dramatic one,
perhaps sufficiently dramatic that even a private individual making a
choice with those consequences would be obliged to ignore her pri-
vate loyalties and decide impartially. Second, government has no
legitimate loyalties, or at least no legitimate loyalties as between dif-
ferent groups of citizens. (Assume that the A-A 2 choice affects only
citizens.) Rather, quite plausibly, government should choose between
A, and A2 in a way that is fair, or that maximizes overall well-being, or
that maximizes the resources of the least-well-off, or that satisfies some
other such nonexpressive criteria. It is fully consistent with the fact of
individual loyalty, and with the existence of a rational, even moral,
duty requiring individuals to express their loyalties, that the criteria
dinary morality confers upon agents "the option of performing (or not performing)
acts which from a neutral perspective are less than optimal").
15 See, e.g., DwORKIN, supra note 106 ("We each claim a personal point of view,
ambitions and attachments of our own we are at liberty to pursue, free from the claims
of others to equal attention, concern, and resource.... [But] [w]e allow officials act-
ing in their official capacity no such area at all.").
16 As Scheffier states:
On a plausible view [of the appropriate modification to consequentialism to
accommodate personal projects], the answer to the question of whether an
agent was required to promote the best overall outcome in a given situation
would depend on the amount of good he could thereby produce.., and on
the size of the sacrifice he would have to make in order to achieve the optimal
outcome. More specifically, I believe that a plausible agent-centred preroga-
tive would allow each agent to assign a certain proportionately greater weight
to his own interests....
SCHEFFLER, supra note 123, at 20.
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for governmental choice are nonexpressive.1
57
Conversely, an expressive theory of law does not entail an expres-
sive theory of individual action. Consider a classic example of the first
kind, namely the expressive theory of punishment. One might think
that government should condemn wrongdoing, without thinking that
individual action is about expression at all. For example, individual
lives might be about being loyal, being a good parent, being accom-
plished, not about expressing those virtues; wrongdoing might be a
matter of unjustifiably harming other individual's lives; and punish-
ment might be a collective disapproval of wrongdoing, which govern-
mental officials are required to voice, without it being the case that
any private individual is obliged to express her disapproval of the
wrongdoing (for each such individual might be morally licensed not
to do so, given the demands of her own projects).
I do not deny that there could be links, short of entailment, be-
tween expressive theories of individual action and expressive theories
of law. The arguments for the first may tend to favor the second, or
vice versa. But the linkage cannot be assumed; it needs to be shown.
Legal expressivists have failed, as yet, to show a linkage-indeed, I
know of no serious attempt to demonstrate that it exists-and for the
reasons briefly sketched out here, I am skeptical that any efforts will
succeed.ss Even if Anderson is correct on her own turf (which I do
not concede), we have not yet defended a genuine, sentence-
157 Indeed, Anderson herself acknowledges as much. See ANDERSON, VALUE IN
EThics AND EcoNoMIcs, supra note 143, at 72 ("In private life, one may of course give
the interests of the beloved priority over those of strangers. But in public life... one
may not weight the interests of the beloved more heavily....").158 . .Relatedly, legal scholars who show that individual action is expressive, and that
this affects what government should do, have not yet given us an expressive theory of
governmental action. I have in mind here Gillian K. Hadfield's recent article, An Ex-
pressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational
Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235 (1998). Hadfield claims that certain
contractual choices are rationally motivated by expressive considerations and that,
where this occurs, the sheer fact of choice does notjustify binding the promisor to his
or her promise. Rather, government needs some furtherjustification. See id. at 1261-
82. But this claim does not entail that government itself must respond to meaningful
(or meaningless) individual actions by saying something, and indeed Hadfield does
not argue that government should do so. See id. at 1282 (identifying "reliance inter-
ests" and "instrumental justifications... flowing from the value of contracting in a
given case and the risk that nonenforcement within that category poses to the stability
of contracts in other categories" as chief reasons for enforcing expressively-motivated
promises). Hadfield is not, by my classification, an expressivist about law or govern-
mental action at all. See also Adler, Introduction, supra note 17, at 1178-79 (discussing
Hadfield's article); Stephen Gardbaum, Law, Incommensurability, and Expression, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1687, 1689-95 (1998) (same).
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meaning, expressivist theory of law. Let us now consider whether such
a theory is, in fact, defensible.
II. EXPRESSWE THEORIES: THE MAIN EXAMPLES
Part I clarified the concept of an expressive theory. The claim
that the linguistic meaning of a legal utterance can have a moral im-
pact is clearly true, but also banal. For example, it is clearly true, but
also banal, that the meaning of a legal utterance may cause good or
bad outcomes, by virtue of listeners' reactions to what the utterance
says. To be sure, it is not uninteresting to specify which types of mean-
ings cause which outcomes; but the sheer claim that law's meaning can
have a causal effect on outcomes hardly produces a genuine expres-
sive theory of law. Various features of legal officials' actions can have
a causal effect on outcomes-for example, the time or geographic lo-
cation at which the actions are performed, or the perceived intelli-
gence of the officials who perform them. Yet we do not think that the
correct theory of law is a "temporal" theory, or a "location-based" the-
ory, or an "intelligence-based" theory.
Rather, a genuine expressive theory of law is a theory such that,
among the moral factors F... F constitutive of that theory, at least
one refers to the linguistic meaning of legal officials' actions. For at
least one factor , it is necessarily the case that meaningless actions
fare the same with respect to this factor.159 Further, I argued in Part I
that the only plausible expressive theories of law are sentence-
meaning theories, not speaker's-meaning theories. Actions by
multimember legal bodies can possess sentence meanings, but typi-
cally lack any speaker's meanings beyond whatever sentence meanings
they may possess.16 I will therefore use the term "expressive theory of
law" to refer, specifically, to sentence-meaning theories. A genuine
sentence-meaning theory of law is a theory such that at least one of its
factors refers to the sentence meaning of the actions that legal offi-
cials perform. For at least one factor F1, it is necessarily the case that
legal officials' actions lacking a sentence meaning will fare the same
with respect to this factor.
Are any such theories correct? Should we adopt one or another
expressive (sentence-meaning) theory of law? This Part examines the
most prominent expressive theories extant in the scholarly literature
and the case law. Section A explores expressive theories of punish-
159 See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.
160 See supra Part I.B.
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ment; the problem of punishment has been the locus for the oldest
and most sustained debate about legal expressivism. Section B looks
at expressive theories of constitutional law, specifically race discrimi-
nation and the Establishment Clause. Finally, Section C examines ex-
pressive theories of regulation. In all these areas, scholars and jurists
have presented and defended moral theories that more or less fit my
definition of a genuine expressive (sentence-meaning) theory. My
conclusions in this Part are generally skeptical. Neither an expressive
theory of punishment, nor of constitutional law, nor of regulation, is
ultimately persuasive.
A. Expressive Theories of Punishment
Any clearheaded analysis of expressive theories of punishment
should distinguish between descriptive and normative claims. I am
not the first to make this point, Tr but because it is often overlooked, it
bears reemphasis.
It may well be true that, as a descriptive matter-as a matter of so-
cial facts-there exists a separate institution which we call "punish-
ment" and which is, at least in part, expressive. The central thrust of
Joel Feinberg's oft-cited article, The Expressive Function of Punishment, is
to argue for this descriptive claim:
Both penalties and punishments are authoritative deprivations for fail-
ures; but... punishments have an important additional characteristic in
common. That characteristic... is a certain expressive function: pun-
ishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of re-
sentment and indignation, and ofjudgments of disapproval and repro-
bation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those
"in whose name" the punishment is inflicted. Punishment, in short, has
a symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.1
62
But the fact that the institution we call "punishment' is essentially ex-
pressive hardly makes out the normative claim that punishment isjus-
tifled in virtue of its expressive cast. '63 Absent some reason to think
that social and physical distinctions necessarily mark moral distinc-
tions-and surely they do not necessarily do so-it is simply a category
161 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONsIBIlY 263 (1968); TEN, supra note
27, at 42; Primoratz, supra note 28, at 187-88. Interestingly, Primoratz subtly overlooks
the point in presenting his own, purportedly normative account of punishment. See
infra text accompanying notes 203-05.
162 FEINBERG, supra note 23, at 97-98.
16 Feinberg himself is well aware of this. See id. at 98 (distinguishing between the
definition of punishment and its justification).
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mistake to conclude from Feinberg's descriptive story that a genuine
expressive theory of punishment holds true.
Let us define the following practices. Punishment,, is defined as the
infliction of hard treatment upon an offender.164 Punishment is de-
fined as the condemnation of an offender (where condemnation is
meant to cover the various kinds of negative, expressive responses that
Feinberg describes). Punishment,., is defined as the infliction of hard
treatment upon, plus the condemnation of, an offender. Feinberg's
descriptive story, if correct, shows that punishment (the institution to
which we refer by that name) equals Punishment,,. This hardly shows
that, morally, the choice among Punishment,, Punishment., and Pun-
ishment, is a function or partial function of their expressive properties.
For example, "cars" essentially involve internal combustion, "mar-
riage" essentially involves some formal commitment between the par-
ties, and "houses" essentially have walls, but these properties may not
have any foundational, moral status-they may not constitute morally
basic factors-within the correct normative theories of transportation,
friendship, and shelter)6
What adjudicates the choice between Punishment, on the one
hand, and Punishment, or Punishment,, on the other? Why is it mor-
ally obligatory, or morally better, or more legitimate, to choose the E
or E+Hvariants instead of the Hvariant as a response to wrongdoing?
Deterrence is a standardly invoked criterion by which to evaluate penal
responses.166 One penal response is better than another, qua deter-
rence, if the first response causes more future would-be wrongdoers to
refrain from wrongdoing than the second.167 Professor Kahan, in his
164 See id. at 95 ("Punishment is defined in effect as the infliction of hard treatment
by an authority on a person for his prior failing in some respect (usually an infraction
of a rule or command)." (paraphrasing definition of punishment offered by Flew,
Benn, and Hart)).
165 As C.L. Ten puts the point:
It is important, as Hart points out, to distinguish between [a] denunciatory
theory which seeks to provide a justification of punishment from the different
view that it is one of the defining features of legal punishment that it expresses
the community's condemnation of the offender's act. It is quite consistent to
adopt the latter view while believing that the punishment is unjustified and
should not be inflicted, or that the justification of punishment is in terms of
its deterrent, reformative, or incapacitative effects.
TEN, supra note 27, at 42 (citation omitted).
166 See, e.g., MIcHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEoRY oF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 84-88 (1997) (summarizing standardly offered justifications for pun-
ishment, including deterrence).
167 More precisely, one penal response is better than another, qua deterrence, if
the first causes more future would-be wrongdoers to refrain, via the right sort of causal
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recent work on punishment theory, has tried to show that considera-
tions of deterrence justify an expressive response to wrongdoing--ei-
ther imprisonment (the classic example of Punishment.H) or, in the
case of less significant offenses, "shaming" (in effect, Punishment) -as
opposed to nonexpressive alternatives such as fines and community
service. '6s As Kahan explains, "[T]he expressive [cast of punishment]
might reinforce deterrence... through preference formation. The
law can discourage criminality not just by 'raising the cost' of such be-
havior through punishments, but also through instilling aversions to
the kinds of behavior that the law prohibits."' '
Kahan goes on to discuss the specific links between public expres-
sion of disapproval for some behavior-type and the deterrence of fu-
ture instances of that behavior: preference-adaptation ("citizens form
aversions to the kinds of behavior... that the law tells them are un-
worthy of being valued"170); belief-dependent preferences ("the will-
ingness of persons to obey various laws is endogenous to their beliefs
about whether others view the law as worthy of obedience"1 7 1 ); and
goodwill (criminal punishment creates goodwill towards criminal law
as a whole, and a concomitant tendency to obey its prohibitions "when
criminal punishment confirms, rather than disappoints, shared expec-
tations about what behavior is worthy of moral condemnation"1).
But none of this, however true and important, advances one bit the
expressivist claim that Punishment, or Punishment., is justified in virtue
of what it says. Kahan's work, insofar as it focuses upon deterrence, is
simply an elaborate (and impressive) attempt to show that Punishment,
and Punishment have a causal impact upon future wrongdoing, rela-
mechanism. Certain causal mechanisms by which penal responses diminish future
wrongdoing count as "rehabilitative" or "incapacitative" rather than deterrent. See
Garvey, supra note 10, at 757 ("Specific deterrence forestalls future offenses by chang-
ing the offender's cost-benefit calculus. Rehabilitation, on the other hand, forestalls
future offenses by changing the defendant's preferences."). Unless the causal mecha-
nism is rigged so that meaningless actions always fare the same, with respect to that
mechanism-and such a mechanism would, then, not count as a plausible specification
of what we mean by "deterrence"-nothing I say here about the nonexpressive cast of
deterrence depends upon what the specific mechanism is. For example, to use Gar-
vey's proposal: the meaningless action of executing a criminal versus the meaningless
action of confiscating his property can have different impacts on the cost-benefit calcu-
lations of future, would-be wrongdoers.
168 See sources cited supra notes 9, 15.
169 Kahan, supra note 9, at 603.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 604.
1 Id.; cf. Paul H. Robinson &John M. Darley, The Utility ofDesert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
453 (1997) (arguing, on purely utilitarian grounds, that the institution of criminal
punishment should track collective perceptions of moral desert).
2]XPRESSISM: A SKEPTICAL OVERVIEW
five to Punishment,.
A deterrent account of expressive penalties, such as Kahan's, is an
excellent example of a legal theory that accords moral impact to lin-
guistic meaning but is not a genuine expressive theory. The criterion
of deterrence, because it is causal, is necessarily nonexpressive. It asks. 173
whether a particular penal response is effective in causing future
would-be wrongdoers to refrain from wrongdoing; it does not ask
whether a particular penal response means something. Two meaning-
less responses-for example, the linguistically meaningless action of
executing a criminal versus the linguistically meaningless action of
confiscating his property-can easily have different causal effects on
future wrongdoing and thereby fare differently with respect to the fac-
tor of deterrence. Deterrence is thus a hopeless place to make out a
case for a genuine expressive theory of law.174
17 One subtle objection here is that the right causal theory might itself be expres-
sive. Imagine a theory of human action such that whether Pperforms A depends upon
a number of factors, including the linguistic meaning of the utterances communicated
to P. Assume that meaningless actions fare identically with respect to this causal factor
so that the factor, and therewith the theory, is genuinely "expressive." Assume further
that the causal theory is correct. (The standard theory of human action-the be-
lief/desire theory, namely that P tends to perform A if P desires O and Pbelieves that A
leads to 0-is not "expressive" in this way, but that theory could be wrong.) Imagine,
now, that our moral theory evaluates actions in light of their causal upshots. Does not
the fact that this moral theory embeds a causal theory that (as it turns out) is expres-
sive make the moral theory itself expressive?
I think not. The causal theory, if it is correct, will not be a one-factor theory. What
P does surely depends not just on the utterances communicated to him, but also on
various other factors, for example, his beliefs or the content of the norms that he ac-
cepts. Thus, although meaningless actions will fare identically with respect to the ex-
pressive factor incorporated in our causal theory, they need not fare identically, all
things considered, in their causal upshots. (One meaningless action by government
might lead P to do one thing, while another might lead P to do something else, de-
pending on the facts other than linguistic meaning that bear upon the nonexpressive fac-
tors incorporated in the causal theory.) What matters, morally, about the meaningless
actions are the outcomes that they cause; in that respect, they can differ.
In any event, even if I am incorrect in the claim that a moral theory looking to the
causal upshots of action remains nonexpressive notwithstanding the truth of an ex-
pressive causal theory, I know of no expressivist who has attempted to defend, let alone
succeeded in defending, such a causal theory.
174 Kahan also claims, in line with a suggestion of Sunstein's, that a deterrent the-
ory is (possibly) "expressive" because it needs a criterion for valuing consequences,
which expressivism can provide. See Kahan, supra note 9, at 602 ("Without a theory for
identifying which outcomes are socially disvalued and how much, it is impossible to
know what to deter.... [O]ne could overtly draw on these [expressive] sensibilities to
identify preferred outcomes." (citations omitted)). I respond to this line of argument
below, see infra note 392.
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To be sure, criminal law is not just a matter of deterrence.17" 5 Re-
tributivism is the standard account as to why a penal response to
wrongdoing might be justified, independent of the causal efficacy of
that response in preventing future crimes. Retributivism, in turn,
comes in different versions, but the simplest and classic version says
that moral culpability (wrongdoing plus a culpable mental state on
the part of the wrongdoer) is both necessary and sufficient to justify
punishment. As Michael Moore explains:
A retributivist punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves
it. Retributivism thus stands in stark contrast to utilitarian views that jus-
tify punishment of past offenses by the greater good of preventing future
offenses. It also contrasts sharply with rehabilitative views, according to
which punishment is justified by the reforming good it does the crimi-
nal.
1 76
What, however, does the retributivist mean by "punishmenf'? Does he
or she mean to claim that moral culpability is necessary and sufficient
to justify Punishment,;' Or, does "punishment" instead refer to some
expressive variant, either Punishment, or Punishment .;
Moore himself, apparently, takes the view that moral culpability
justifies Punishment, 177  Let us call Moore's version of retributivism
"Hard Treatment Retributivism." It says that the morally culpable ac-
tor deserves Punishment,. Hard Treatment Retributivism is not, of
course, a genuine expressive theory, but it is instructive to see why the
practice of Punishment,, could be mistaken for genuine expression.
First, if penal institutions were reliable, the imposition of Punishment,
upon an actor would genuinely signal that the actor was morally cul-
pable. The actor's hard treatment would, indeed, be "meaningful"-
not in the linguistic sense of meaningful, but in the nonlinguistic, or
evidentiary, sense that Grice also described. 7s Assuming the reliability
175 See, e.g., MooRE, supra note 166, at 84 ("There is by now a familiar list of prima
facie reasons given tojustify the institution of punishment. Such a list usually includes:
incapacitation, special deterrence, general deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation,
and retribution."). Moore distinguishes between retribution and denunciation be-
cause he is not an expressivist about retribution. See infra note 177 and accompanying
text.
176 Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONs 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). See
MooRE, supra note 166, at 104-52, for an updated version of this article. See also id. at
83-103, 153-88 (providing a further definition and defense of retributivism).
177 This seems clear enough from Moore's statement that the "denunciatory," i.e.,
expressive, account of punishment is a utilitarian rather than retributivist account. See
MOORE, supra note 166, at 90; Moore, supra note 176, at 181.
178 See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
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of the penal institutions, the imposition of PunishmentH upon the actor
would constitute evidence of her culpability.7
Second, the actions of the penal officers would possess certain an-
cillary sentence meanings, extrinsic to the imposition of Punishmentr
At a minimum, their actions would possess prescriptive meanings-
where, as I explained earlier, "prescriptive meaning" is simply the
characteristic meaning of a legal utterance. s8 Punishment, would
normally be partly constituted by a package of legal rights, duties, and
so forth, and the utterances promulgating these ("The Defendant is
hereby required to serve a term of imprisonment, not to exceed
.... v") would be prescriptively meaningful. Note, however, that this
communicative feature of state PunishmentH does not yet make the case
for genuine expressivism-because we have not yet shown that those
who impose Punishment,, are morally required to do so through
prescriptively meaningful actions. Indeed, it is hard to see why
Punishment, necessitates the creation of fresh legal rights, duties, and
the like. Imagine a case in which government punishes a wrongdoer
by taking away some of his property-not by depriving him of any
rights in the property, but simply by preventing him from gaining
physical access to it. Why should not this confiscatory but
nonprescriptive response, if proportioned to the wrongdoing,
constitute a legitimate kind of Punishment, within Hard Treatment
Retributivism?
More plausibly, the legitimate imposition of Punishment, by legal
officials entails not prescriptive meaning butjustificatory meaning. The
officials will plausibly be required, not merely to have a justification
for Punishment, (namely, that the actor was a culpable wrongdoer),
but also to articulate thatjustification. So out moral theory, plausibly,
says that Punishment, must be accompanied by certain descriptive sen-
tences, explaining the wrong that the actor performed, its propor-
tionality to the hard treatment imposed, and so on. Such a moral
theory would, indeed, constitute a genuine expressive theory of law-
one which I will discuss at some length later in this Articlel8---but it is
179 SeeMichael Davis, Punishment As Language: MisleadingAnalogy forDesert Theorists,
10 LAw & PHIL. 311, 316-18 (1991) (arguing that the justified imposition of hard
treatment upon a deserving wrongdoer has nonlinguistic meaning, because it "carries
information").
180 See supra text accompanying notes 104-12.
181 Cf. JosEpH RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NoRMS 157 (Princeton Univ. Press
1990) (1975) (noting that "most sanctions consist in the withdrawal of rights or the
imposition of duties" but that "[s] ome sanctions, like capital punishment or whipping,
consist in the use of force against a person").
182 See infra notes 432-39 and accompanying text.
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quite different from the expressive theory of punishment now extant
(in all its variants) in the scholarly literature."3 To justify is to utter a
sentence conventional for performing a descriptive speech-act, while
expressivists about punishment have argued that penal officials should
utter sentences conventional for performing nondescriptive speech-
acts-sentences of condemnation or denunciation.184 To quote Fein-
berg's definition of punishment once more: "[P]unishment is a con-
ventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and in-
dignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation." i"' And
the requirement that legal officials articulate a justification for Pun-
ishment, would, presumably, be but one instance of a generic expres-
sive duty-sincejustification is plausibly required not only for criminal
penalties, but also for a wide array of individual setbacks, including
civil penalties and the denial of monetary benefits. Justificatory ex-
pressivism would not, pace the defenders of an expressive theory of
punishment, be specific to, or even exemplified by, the criminal law.
In short, neither the nonlinguistic, signaling function of Punish-
ment, within Hard Treatment Retributivism, nor the generic re-
quirement that legal officials utter sentences apt to communicate a
justification for the setbacks they impose, implies that those officials
are obliged to condemn or denounce criminal wrongdoing-that
wrongdoing should necessarily be followed by Punishment or Punish-
ment,,. How, then, does one show that? In the remainder of this Sec-
tion, I will briefly discuss the most recent and prominent attempts
within the scholarly literature on punishment to show a necessary
connection between wrongdoing and Punishment or Punishment.,
rather than merely Punishment,,. I have in mind the accounts of Rob-
18 In particular, it is quite different from the theories summarized and criticized
immediately below, namely, the theories of Nozick, Hampton, Primoratz, and Duff. See
infra text accompanying notes 187-211.
184 What about Jean Hampton, whose account is discussed below? See infra notes
189-202 and accompanying text. Does not she want government to perform some kind
of descriptive utterance? Perhaps not; perhaps she wants government to declare the
wrongdoer and victim to be of equal worth. Cf infra text accompanying note 223 (dis-
cussing whether stigmatic meaning is descriptive or declaratory). In any event, if
Hampton does want a description, that description is far from being mereIyjustifica-
tory.
FEINBERG, supra note 23, at 98.
186 Cf Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1292
(1975) (suggesting that one element of a full hearing, for procedural due process pur-
poses, is a "statement of reasons" for the decision); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and
the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044 (1984) (describing a wide array of individ-
ual setbacks that are accorded procedural due process protection under modern doc-
trine).
EXPRESSIVSM: A SKEPTICAL OVERVIEW
ert Nozick, Jean Hampton, Igor Primoratz, and Anthony Duff.187 I
submit that all of these accounts of punishment expressivism are un-
persuasive.
Nozick's account might be called "Expressive Retributivism."
While a Hard Treatment Retributivist, such as Michael Moore, claims
that the morally culpable actor deserves Punishment, the Expressive
Retributivist argues, instead, that Punishment or Punishment'H is de-
served. The Expressive Retributivist concurs in the use of the concept
of desert and in that crucial sense is a retributivist, but claims that con-
demnation, instead of or in addition to hard treatment, is what the
wrongdoer deserves. Why might that be the case? Nozick's central
idea is that the penal response must track the wrongdoing. The simple
sequence of immoral action, followed by hard treatment for the actor,
is not enough to constitute the genuine punishment that considera-
tions of moral desert require:
If S wrongfully shoots another in a canyon and the sound of the shot
causes an avalanche that maims or kills S, then this happens to S because
of his wrong act but not because of the wrongness of the act. Since an
act's moral qualities, qua moral qualities, seem to lack causal power, if
something is to happen to someone because of the moral quality of his act, this
must occur through another's recognition of that moral quality and response to
it ...
"Poetic justice" involves the wrongdoer's undergoing a consequence
that appropriately could be visited upon him in retribution but which
was not produced in that way....
Even if Nozick is correct in the premise that punishment is more than
"poetic justice--that the deserved treatment received by the wrong-
doer must be meted out, in virtue of her desert, notjust accidentally-
it is a large and unwarranted leap from this premise to the conclusion
that punishment must be expressive. Imagine a system in which penal
officials are trained in Hard Treatment Retributivism and implement
that moral view. Does not such a system fulfill the kind of tracking re-
quirement Nozick describes, just as well as a system in which penal of-
ficials are trained in Expressive Retributivism and implement that
moral view? The Nozickean premise is that wrongdoing and penal re-
sponse must be linked "through another's recognition of that moral
quality [wrongdoing] "--thus the emphasized language in the quota-
tion above-but the penal sequence where the official first recognizes
1s7 See supra note 28 (citing these accounts).
1 z NO i, supra note 28, at 369-70 (emphasis added).
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wrongdoing, then imposes nonexpressive hard treatment for the rea-
son that the treatment is deserved, instantiates quite fully the desired
linkage.
A second and quite different attempt to explain why the morally
warranted response to wrongdoing is necessarily an expressive re-
sponse is Jean Hampton's account. 9 Hampton styles herself a re-
tributivist,190 although this is arguably inaccurate. Retributivism in a
broad and fairly unhelpful sense is any theory that takes a penal re-
sponse to be justified, independent of its effect in reducing future
wrongdoing or some other effect valuable within utilitarianism. Re-
tributivism in a more specific sense is exemplified by what I have
called Hard Treatment Retributivism and Expressive Retributivism;
such views stipulate that Punishment, or Punishment or Punishment is
warranted because it is deseroed by the wrongdoer, independent of any
crime-reduction effect or any other positive effect on overall well-
being. T9 Hampton, unlike Moore and Nozick, is not particularly con-
cerned with desert. Her focus is more on restoring certain compo-
nents of the victim's personhood that are damaged by wrongdoing.
Thus, Hampton's theory might plausibly be described as an expres-
sive, compensatory theory of punishment.'92
What is the link between wrongdoing, compensation, and expres-
sion? Hampton argues as follows:
(1) Certain wrongful actions are expressive, insofar as they send a
(untrue) message about the victim's lesser moral worth. As Hampton
puts it: "[A] person is morally injured when she is the target of behav-
ior whose meaning, appropriately understood by members of the cul-
tural community in which the behavior occurs, represents her value as
189 See Hampton, supra note 28, for the most recent version of Hampton's expres-
sive account of punishment. Earlier versions are presented in Jean Hampton, An Ex-
pressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVIsM AND ITS CRrincs 1 (Wesley Cragg ed.,
1992);Jean Hampton, A New Theory of Retribution, in LABILrTY AND RESPONSIBEnY 377
(R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1991); and JEFFRIE MURPHY & JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCy 111-61 (1988).
190 See Hampton, supra note 28, at 1694.
1 See GEORGE SHER, DESERT 13 (1987) ("'Retributivism without dser... . is like
Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.'" (quoting Hugo Adam Bedau, Retribution and
the Theory of Punishmen4 75J. PHIL. 601, 608 (1978))); Moore, supra note 176, at 179
("A retributivist punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves it.").
192 Indeed, Hampton herself says as much. See Hampton, supra note 28, at 1698
("What these reflections show is that retribution [that is, the expressive response to
wrongdoing defended by Hampton] is actually a form of compensation to the vic-
tim.... [R]etributivejustice compensates victims for moral injuries.").
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less than the value she should be accorded."193 Hampton gives the
horrific example of a farmer who reacts to disobedience on the part of
his black farmhands by mutilating and burning them.
(2) The expressive cast of this kind of wrongdoing is injurious,
apart from its simple (nonexpressive) harmfulness, because it "dimin-
ishes" the victim. The victim's actual moral worth is not degraded-
wrongdoing cannot accomplish that-but an appearance of degrada-
tion, what Hampton calls "diminishment," 195 is indeed the upshot of
expressive wrong.
[E]ven when a wrongful action does not inflict a harm, it angers us sim-
ply by virtue of what the action says about the person. We care about
what people say by their actions because we care about whether our own
value, and the value of others, will continue to be respected in our soci-
ety. The misrepresentation of value implicit in moral injuries
... threatens to reinforce belief in the wrong theory of value [a theory
that takes the victim to be less worthy] by the community.
19
6
(3) Punishment, or Punishment,, is the appropriate governmental
response to the wrongdoing here described, that is, to wrongdoing
which means that the victim has lesser moral worth and which in fact
diminishes him.9  Why? Because Punishment, or Punishment,,, re-
stores to the victim the appearance of moral worth and thereby re-
verses the special injury, diminishment, produced by this kind of
wrongdoing:
[Punishment] is a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the
value of the victim denied by the wrongdoer's action through the con-
19 Id. at 1670.
194 See id. at 1675.
195 Id. at 1673.
19 Id. at 1678; see id. at 1671-85 (arguing generally that expressive wrongdoing can
diminish a victim and thereby injure him). Hampton actually describes two different
ways in which diminishment can injure the victim: by causing "damage to the realiza-
tion of a victim's value" or "damage to acknowledgment of the victim's value." Id. at
1679 (emphasis omitted). My summary of Hampton's view, and the criticism I then
offer of that view, focuses on acknowledgment-type damage, but similar criticisms
would apply to realization-type damage.
197 Hampton actually argues for Punishment,.H rather than Punishment, as does
Nozick. See id. at 1686; NOZICE, supra note 28, at 376-77. This feature of their theories
is not important for my purposes. If the expressivist shows that morality irreducibly
requires Punishment, or Punishment,, then she has indeed made out a genuine expres-
sive theory.
In addition, it bears mention that Hampton does not intend her theory to be lim-
ited to, or even exemplified by, governmental responses to wrongdoing, see Hampton,
supra note 28, at 1685, but at a minimum, the theory can be adapted to furnish an ex-
pressive theory of (governmental) punishment, as I have done here.
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struction of an event that not only repudiates the action's message of su-
periority over the victim but does so in a way that confirms them as equal
by virtue of their humanity.98
The state is required to respond to expressive wrongdoing by saying,
"The victim and the wrongdoer are moral equals," and notjust by im-
posing noncommunicative hard treatment upon the wrongdoer.
What is wrong with Hampton's argument? Premises (1) and (2)
are problematic-it is problematic that expressive wrongdoing,
Wrongdoing, is really morally distinct from nonexpressive wrongdoing
that also harms the victim's status and self-respect-but I will ignore
that point for now 99 Even granting Hampton her first two premises,
the inference from those to the conclusion, (3), is unpersuasive. The
connection between Punishment or Punishment.H and the reversal of
the victim's diminishment is too weak to make out a noncontingent
case for an expressive response to Wrongdoing, The victim's status
within the community and her concomitant self-respect have been
lowered or held down; Wrongdoing, has led the community to believe
that the victim has lesser moral worth. But it is only contingently true
that the best way for government to reverse this status harm is to com-
municate something. For example, government might more effectively
achieve equality of status between victim and wrongdoer by coercing
the payment of reparations from one to the other, or by bringing it
about that the community learns of the victim's virtues and the
wrongdoer's flaws, or by conferring upon the victim certain correlates
of status, such as wealth and political power. Diminishment, as de-
scribed by Hampton, is a matter of communal beliefs and norms;200
and what premises (1) and (2) truly imply is not (3), but rather (3'):
some governmental action (expressive or not) that best counteracts
198 Hampton, supra note 28, at 1686. See generally id. at 1685-98 (arguing for an ex-
pressive response to expressive wrongs that diminish victims).
19 See infra text accompanying notes 235-42, 286-90 (distinguishing between the
linguistic meaning of an action and its effect upon a person's social status and self-
respect).
Although Hampton defines diminishment as the appearance of degradation, see
Hampton, supra note 28, at 1673, such appearance, if injurious to the victim, will surely
involve the existence of collective norms according the victim a degraded status or, at a
minimum, the existence of shared beliefs that the victim is degraded. This is true, by
definition, for what Hampton calls "acknowledgment" damage, but it is also true for
what she calls "realization" damage. See supra note 196 (articulating these categories).
As Hampton notes, "[im]erely publishing a book proclaiming that.., whites are better
than blacks ... is to deny value and thereby do something morally offensive, but unless
other people respond to the book in some way, [the] damage is negligible and society
does not bother to respond." Hampton, supra note 28, at 1679 (footnotes omitted).
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the norms and beliefs constitutive of the victim's diminishment is the
201
appropriate response to Wrongdoingv °
Imagine that by saying, "The victim and the wrongdoer are moral
equals," the government in power would actually further degrade the
victim's status-for example, because this government is despised
within the relevant community. Premises (1) and (2) hardly warrant
the conclusion that the despised government is required to utter the
harmful sentences, or to say anything at all; yet this is, perversely, what
Hampton would oblige the government to do, if she is a genuine ex-
pressivist. Alternatively, Hampton could contend for (8') rather than
(3), but in that case she has not given us a genuine expressive (sen-
tence-meaning) theory of law. Rather, she has given us a theory that
posits the existence of status-related goals and constraints covering gov-
ernmental action. The two kinds of theories are not the same-a
point that the case of the despised government is meant to show and
to which I will return later, in discussing expressive theories of race
discrimination. 2
So much for the expressive theories of Hampton and Nozick. Igor
Primoratz has provided a third and quite different argument for the
expressive cast of penal responses. Primoratz reasons as follows:
Rules that state standards of behaviour and command categorically imply
that actions violating them are wrong, and that such actions are to be
condemned, denounced, repudiated. Expressions of this condemnation
and repudiation are the index of the validity of the rules and of the ac-
ceptance of the conviction that their breaches are wrong in society. If
actions of a certain kind can be done without bringing about such a re-
sponse from society, this indicates that no rule prohibiting such actions
is accepted as a valid and binding standard 
of behaviour.
With all due respect to Primoratz-and to Joel Feinberg, who similarly
suggests that Punishment, or Punishment,, functions to "vindicate" the
legal rules that penalize wrongdoing 2--I would suggest that the ar-
gument is transparently flawed. Legal rules can surely exist without
201 Alan Strudler has pointed out to me that Hampton may want government to
respond to Wrongdoin& by correcting the unwarranted reduction of the victim's status
and by correcting the unwarranted elevation of the wrongdoer's status, rather than
merely doing the first. Construing Hampton's view in this way, however, does not insu-
late it from the criticism I am raising, namely, that a governmental statement about
someone's worth (the victim's, the wrongdoer's, or both) is only contingently linked to
her status. I am indebted to Alan for discussions on these issues.
202 See infra text accompanying notes 235-42.
203 Primoratz, supra note 28, at 196.
204 SeeFEINBERG, supranote 23, at 104.
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the backing of a condemnatory response. Even if conduct-regulating
rules must be backed by some sanctions to exist as legal rules,25 it is
surely true that these sanctions need not be condemnatory; otherwise,
conduct-regulating rules backed by civil sanctions rather than criminal
sanctions would not exist as legal rules. If government has a reason to
respond to moral wrongdoing by imposing Punishment or Punish-
mentH rather than Punishment, that reason must be the kind of sub-
stantive reason elaborated by Nozick and Hampton, and not the false
proposition that a rule imposing PunishmentH would be legally nonex-
istent. A second, less obvious flaw in Primoratz's argument is that his
point is conceptual or descriptive rather than normative. Assume
Primoratzian existence conditions are correct; a deontic statement is
not a legal rule unless backed by condemnation. This leaves unan-
swered the question: Why is government morally required to create
legal rules (in the Primoratzian sense)? After all, government might
have nonexpressive grounds for creating legal rules (in the Primo-
ratzian sense), e.g., deterrent grounds. The fact that government, for
nonexpressive reasons, properly chooses to create such rules does not,
in itself, make out an expressive theory. But the simpler objection to
Primoratz's argument is that the existence conditions he proposes are
just wrong.
Finally, let us turn to the account of punishment proposed by An-
thony Duff. Duff's is one of the more recent versions of a moral edu-
cation theory of punishment,1°6 and he specifically wants to claim that
punishment, insofar as it is educative, is necessarily expressive. Educa-
tive theories can focus either on the good of the community-the fa-
miliar idea here is that the criminal actor should be rehabilitated so as
to prevent future wrongdoing-or on the good of the wrongdoer her-
self.0 The familiar, rehabilitative theory is clearly not a genuine ex-
pressive theory (governmental condemnation of the offender may or
may not be the best means to change the preferences and beliefs that
led her to commit a crime), and for this and other reasons Duff looks
instead to the wrongdoer's own good. "[Punishment] expresses our
concern, not merely for some further social benefit or for the restora-
tion of an abstract balance of benefits and burdens, but for the crimi-
205 But see RAz, supra note 181, at 159 (arguing that "resort to sanctions ... is not a
feature which forms part of our concept of law").
206 See Garvey, supra note 10, at 763 n.152.
207 See MOORE, supra note 166, at 85; see also Garvey, supra note 10, at 754-57, 763-65
(distinguishing between the traditional rehabilitative model of punishment and the
"educating model").
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This claim is deeply counterintuitive; whatever the purpose of the
criminal law, surely it is not (even in part) to confer a benefit upon
wrongdoers.2"9 Even granting Duff his counterintuitive premise, how-
ever, we still fail to arrive at expressivism about punishment. Duff ar-
gues that Punishment,,, educates the wrongdoer and confers a good
upon her, because it stimulates her penitence:
The purpose of punishment, like that of a penance which is imposed on
a recalcitrant sinner, is to bring the criminal to understand the nature
and implications of her crime; to repent that crime; and thus, by willing
her own punishment as a penance which can expiate her crime, to rec-
oncile herself with the Right and with her community.
Punishment is, on this conception [inter alia] communicative .... It
is communicative in that it seeks to communicate to the criminal a
proper understanding of his crime: by imposing on him some material
injury which can be seen as injurious even through the eyes of egoistical
self-interest, we hope to represent, and to force on his attention, the
harm he has done both to others and to himself; by imprison-
ment ... we give material and symbolic expression to the spiritual sepa-
ration created by his crime.
210
Duff here conflates expressivism about individual action and expres-
sivism about law. It may well be true that penitence itself is essentially
expressive. The wrongdoer, P, genuinely repents only if she expresses
her sorrow, to the victim and the community, as well as experiencing
guilt and remorse for her wrong.2 This hardly shows that the gov-
ernment must bring P to repent by condemning her, by expressing
sorrow for her, or by uttering sentences additional to the justificatory
sentences covered by the generic requirement of public justification.
Plausibly, the best way to induce penitence is simply to give the
wrongdoer the hard treatment she deserves; to describe that treat-
ment as justified; and thereby to prompt the wrongdoer, herself, first
to appreciate her moral culpability and then to act, communicatively,
upon that appreciation.
208 DUFF, supra note 28, at 234-35.
209 See MooRE, supra note 166, at 86-87 ("Such a [theory of punishment] allocates
scarce societal resources away from other, more deserving groups that want them
(such as retarded and autistic children or the poor) to a group that hardly can be said
to deserve such favoured status, and, moreover, does not want such 'benefits.'").
210 DUFF, supra note 28, at 259-60 (foomotes omitted).
211 See id. at 246-54 (discussing the expressive cast of penitence).
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B. Expressive Theories of ConstitutionalLaw
1. The Equal Protection Clause
Expressive theorizing about the Equal Protection Clause goes
back to its very origins, in Strauder v. West Virginia,212 the very first race-
related case to reach the Court under the Clause. Strauder overturned
the conviction of a black defendant by a jury from which blacks had
been excluded pursuant to an explicitly discriminatory state law. The
exclusion was taken to violate equal protection because, in part, of its
linguistic content-because it constituted an assertion of black inferi-
ority, or so the Court held. "The very fact that colored people are sin-
gled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in
the administration of law, as jurors, because of their color.., is prac-
tically a brand upon them, affixed by the law; an assertion of their in-
feriority .... "213 The expressivism evident in Strauder was carried for-
ward to the modem period by Brown v. Board of Education, which
described school segregation as causing harm to black schoolchildren
in virtue of the fact that "the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group,",1 4 and by
the constitutional scholars Charles Black and Paul Brest. Professor
Black, defending Brown against scholarly critics such as Herbert Wech-
sler, relied substantially on what Black termed the "social meaning" of
215segregation. Professor Brest gave that kind of meaning a more spe-
cific name, a name now familiar to anyone even passingly acquainted
with the literature on equal protection-"stigma"-and developed the
seminal scholarly case for an expressivist view of the Equal Protection
Clause:
A second and independent rationale for the antidiscrimination principle
[embodied by the Equal Protection Clause] is the prevention of the
harms which may result from race-dependent decisions. Often, the most
obvious harm is the denial of the opportunity to secure a desired bene-
fit-a job, a night's lodging at a motel, a vote. But this does not com-
pletely describe the consequences of race-dependent decision making.
Decisions based on assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective indiffer-
ence inflict psychological injury by stigmatizing their victims as inferior.
212 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
213 Id. at 308.
214 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (internal quotation omit-
ted).
215 See Black, supra note 32, at 426, 427. Wechsler's famous critique of Brown was
set forth in Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 31-35 (1959).
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Moreover, because acts of discrimination tend to occur in pervasive pat-
terns, their victims suffer especially frustrating, cumulative and debilitat-
ing injuries.
2 16
As this passage suggests, Brest's intent was to map the Equal Pro-
tection Clause onto an antidiscrimination principle. That principle,
he thought, was supported by certain distinctive moral considera-
tions-in particular, by the fact that state discrimination against blacks
had a special linguistic content-that were inapplicable to nondis-
criminatory laws which had a disparate impact upon blacks as a group
or which otherwise impeded black flourishing.2 17 Such a view, tightly
linking stigma with discrimination, is also reflected in the Court's cur-
rent equal protection jurisprudence, particularly with respect to the
legitimacy of affirmative action.! The Court, in defending the doc-
trinal requirement that all race discrimination (benign or not) be sub-
jected to a "strict scrutiny" test, has relied upon an expressivist ac-
count of discrimination: "Classifications based on race carry a danger
of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial set-
tings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to
a politics of racial hostility."2' 9
Is such a view of the Equal Protection Clause persuasive? First, is
the link between discrimination and stigma as tight as Professor Brest
and the current Court think? Second, and more deeply, why is it es-
pecially wrong for the state to communicate a message of black inferi-
ority? Why are stigmatizing laws worse than meaningless laws that im-
poverish blacks or that fail to secure them a fair share of resources or
welfare?
The first question is connected to a point I made in Part I: that
expressivists typically posit a further meaning to legal utterances, be-
yond the prescriptive meaning those utterances possess just in virtue
of defining legal rights, duties, etc. ° A prescriptive utterance is dis-
criminatory if it includes some reference to the race of the parties
216 Brest, supra note 32, at 8.
217 See i. at 6-12 (arguing in favor of the antidiscrimination principle); id. at 44-48
(arguing against the view that a law's racially disproportionate impact, as such, is un-
constitutional, independent of any link between such impact and past, present, or fu-
ture discrimination); id. at 11 (arguing that the Constitution does not proscribe non-
discriminatory laws that stigmatize blacks or produce "cumulative harms" for individual
blacks).
218 See supra note 37 (citing cases that link stigma with discrimination).
219 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (citation omit-
ted).
220 See supra Part L.C.
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whose rights, duties, etc. are defined.22' For example, the statute at
issue in Strauder both had prescriptive meaning and was discrimina-
tory. It read as follows: "'All white male persons who are twenty-one
years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as
jurors .... '"2 But, given such an utterance, it is a further and con-
tingent question whether the utterance is stigmatic. This is true how-
ever one analyzes the speech-act of "stigmatizing": as a declarative
speech-act ("Blacks are hereby declared to be inferior"); as a descrip-
tive speech-act ("Blacks are inferior"); or in some other way.us A dis-
criminatory prescription is stigmatic, in the sentence-meaning sense,
only if it triggers the relevant linguistic conventions and thus truly
means something like "Blacks are hereby declared to be inferior" or
"Blacks are inferior." Did the statute at stake in Strauder truly mean
that? Was it truly linguistically identical, qua stigma, to a straightfor-
ward governmental announcement that blacks "are" or "are hereby
declared to be" inferior? Even if this were true of the statutes in
Strauder and Brown, and even if it is typically true, in our racially frac-
tured society, that discriminatory statutes do possess a stigmatic mean-
ing, it is a category mistake to think that an antidiscrimination norm
can be reduced to an antistigma norm.
Affirmative action illustrates the point most clearly. As Kenneth
Karst explains:
[W]hen government acts to promote... equal citizenship values ....
quite a different equal protection issue is presented. Preferential minor-
ity admissions to state universities, racial preferences in government hir-
ing, racial preferences aimed at integrating government housing proj-
ects-all these differ in the most dramatic way from the purposeful
infliction of stigmatic harm.2
4
Laws that are drawn along racial lines but provide benefits to blacks
need not be stigmatic-and this is true, I suggest, not merely for justi-
fied affirmative action, but for unjustified affirmative action as well.
Imagine a local jurisdiction with a majority of black voters that (with-
out good remedial reason) puts in place a system of racial preferences
2 SeeAdler, supra note 47, at 112-21 (discussing concept of discrimination).
100 U.S. at 305.
22 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 32, at 67-68 (defining stigma, apparently in declara-
tive terms); supra text accompanying notes 99-100 (distinguishing between descriptive
and declarative speech-acts). Other stigma theorists, insofar as they construe stigma
linguistically, also tend to define it declaratively, as the quotations supra at note 75 sug-
gest.
24 Karst, Foreword, supra note 32, at 52.
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in government employment and contracting.us If citizens of the juris-
diction generally understand that the system of preferences is the up-
shot of ordinary interest-group politics, this time with black employees
and contractors gaining at the expense of white employees and con-
tractors, that system (albeit discriminatory and unjustified) presuma-
bly lacks the declarative or descriptive sentence meaning constitutive
of stigma.2s
This line of argument suggests that expressivism can provide, at
most, a partial and incomplete account of the Equal Protection
Clause. Intuitively, a racially discriminatory and unjustified law should
be struck down, whether or not it is stigmatic. At a minimum, placing
to one side now the case of affirmative action, it seems intuitively
compelling that a racially discriminatory and unjustified law burdening
blacks should be struck down by the Court, quite independent of
whatever (nonprescriptive) linguistic meaning the law possesses. Al-
though it is admittedly difficult to come up with a plausible example
of a discriminatory law burdening blacks that is nonstigmatic, it is
equally counterintuitive-I suggest-to think that the constitutional
validity of a burdensome, discriminatory law should hinge upon its
(nonprescriptive) linguistic meaning. And there are strong argu-
ments to support this intuition, which I have elsewhere articulated. 7
Race is, in general, morally irrelevant; a law that picks out this morally
irrelevant characteristic, stigmatic or not, ought to be invalidated by
the Court under the Equal Protection Clause if insufficient grounds
exist to justify the discrimination.
The expressivist's best response here is to offer a disjunctive ac-
count of the Equal Protection Clause: a law is unconstitutional, under
the Clause, if it (1) stigmatizes blacks or (2) does not do so, but unjus-
tiflably discriminates on racial lines. s On this disjunctive account,
This was how the Supreme Court viewed the affirmative action program struck
down in Croson. See 488 U.S. at 498-508.
26 Conversely, a law can be stigmatic without being discriminatory. Charles Law-
rence forcefully argues that the nondiscriminatory law upheld by the Court in Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)-a qualifying test for the D.C. police force that black
applicants failed in disproportionate numbers-almost surely sent a message about
black inferiority, given the status accorded police officers in our society and the kind of
cognitive skills tested. See Lawrence, supra note 32, at 369-76.
27 SeeAdier, supra note 47, at 115-20.
22 A law's disparate impact upon blacks will not, under current equal protection
doctrine, suffice to render the law unconstitutional, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976), but it is surely open to argument that current doctrine is, in this respect,
misconceived. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL &
PuB. An'. 107, 157 (1976) (arguing that a law or practice that "aggravates... the sub-
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stigma and discrimination are no longer assumed to track each other
perfectly or even particularly well; stigma is seen not as a rationale be-
hind the antidiscrimination rule, but instead as a freestanding crite-
rion for invalidating statutes. As Charles Lawrence has suggested:
[Reviewing courts should] evaluate governmental conduct to see if it
conveys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial signifi-
cance. The court would analyze governmental behavior much like a cul-
tural anthropologist might: by considering evidence regarding the his-
torical and social context in which the decision was made and
effectuated. M
But now we reach the second and deeper question I raised above.
What is morally distinctive about stigma? Why should this expressive
factor be understood as a freestanding component of our best theory
of the moral criteria applicable to government action?
Here are what seem to be the standard scholarly moves in answer-
ing that question and, in effect, defending an expressivist account of
the Equal Protection Clause:
(1) Stigma is tied up with status. Blacks have a second-class status,
insofar as the proposition that blacks are inferior is generally believed
(or, more stringently, insofar as the treatment of blacks as inferior is
supported by a social norm). A stigmatic law maintains or aggravates
the second-class status of blacks:
[T]he harms from stigma are not merely psychological. The society also
acts toward the stigmatized person on the basis of the stigma... [W]e
construct a stigma-theory, an ideology to explain his inferiority and ac-
count for the danger he represents. Having done so, we allow ourselves
to feel justified in treating the victims of stigma as less than fully human;
if they are treated unequally, they are only getting what they "deserve. 
zuo
(2) Status is morally distinct because of its link with self-respect.
Self-respect is a component of the good life, a prerequisite for the
good life, or both. In any event, self-respect is partly social. A person
thought inferior by her fellows cannot possess, or at least predictably
will not possess, full self-respect. In short, first-class status is a neces-
sary condition for full self-respect:
ordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group" violates the Equal Protection
Clause). The expressivist who thinks that disparate impact (or something like that)
constitutes a sufficient ground for unconstitutionality, independent of discrimination
or stigma, can simply add a third disjunct to the binary account set forth in the text.
The addition of that disjunct, or any additional ones, does not affect the criticisms of-
fered here of the "stigma" disjunct.
Lawrence, supra note 32, at 356.
2" Karst, Foreword, supra note 32, at 7 (first internal quotations omitted).
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When someone is a member of a group that is systematically subordinate
to others, and when the group characteristic is highly visible, insults to
self-respect are likely to occur nearly every day. An important aspect of a
system of caste is that social practices produce a range of obstacles to the
development of self-respect, largely because of the presence of the
highly visible but morally irrelevant characteristic that gives rise to lower-
231
caste status.
(3) The moral criterion of equality, constitutionalized in the Four-
teenth Amendment, incorporates, as an irreducible component, the
principle-call it the anticaste principle, or the antisubordination
principle-that all persons shall have first-class status. Stigma is there-
fore morally and constitutionally distinct:
Stigmatization is the process by which the dominant group in society dif-
ferentiates itself from others by setting them apart, treating them as less
than fully human, denying them acceptance by the organized commu-
nity, and excluding them from participating in that community as
equals. If the equal protection clause guarantees the right to be treated
as an equal, the constitutional claim in question can be reduced to [or at
least contain as an irreducible component] a claim to be free from
stigma.2
This general line of argument has been developed by Brest him-
self and, subsequently, by a number of the leading scholars on the
constitutional status of race, particularly Kenneth Karst, Charles Law-
rence, Cass Sunstein, and, most recently and extensively, Andrew
Koppelman.23 These scholars do not necessarily share Brest's view
that stigma and discrimination are tightly linked, but they do all seem
231 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 2430. Professor Koppelman articulates the claim just
as succinctly.
The most obvious harm caused by stigma is that of internalized self-hatred, [a]
degenerating sense of nobodiness .... [H]uman beings ... whose daily expe-
rience tells them that almost nowhere in society are they respected and
granted the ordinary dignity and courtesy accorded to others will, as a matter
of course, begin to doubt their own worth.
KOPPELMAN, supra note 32, at 61 (internal quotations omitted).
232 Lawrence, supra note 32, at 350 (footnotes and internal quotations omitted).
To quote Professor Sunstein, whose article on the subject is entitled The Anticaste Pfin-
dpla
[I]n American constitutional law, an important equality principle stems from
opposition to caste.... The controlling principle is that no group may be
made into second-class citizens. Instead of asking "Are blacks or women simi-
larly situated to whites or men, and if so have they been treated differently?"
we should ask "Does the law or practice in question contribute to the mainte-
nance of second-class citizenship, or lower-caste status, for blacks or women?"
Sunstein, supra note 32, at 2428-29.
23 See supra note 32.
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to agree with him that stigma is distinctively wrong as a moral and
constitutional matter. Indeed, that proposition has become a shibbo-
leth in the academic literature.24
So where does the argumentjust sketched go awry? It goes awry, I
suggest, at the same juncture that Jean Hampton's expressive theory
of punishment does:2 3 5 in equating stigma with status harm or, more
generally, in equating the meaning of governmental decisions with
their cultural impact. Although Hampton uses esoteric terms like
"moral injury" and "diminishment" instead of "status" and "second-
class citizen," her focus is really the same as that of the stigma theo-
rists: on the harm to status and, concomitantly, self-respect caused by
certain acts of wrongdoing.23' But it is only contingently true that a
statement by the government ("The victim and wrongdoer are moral
equals") will correct that type of harm; similarly, it is only contingently
true that a statement by the government ("Blacks are inferior to
whites" or "Blacks are hereby declared to be inferior to whites") will
cause it. A governmental decision is stigmatic if it invokes the right
kind of linguistic convention, specifically a descriptive or declarative
one. But the utterance of the appropriate description or declaration,
even by government, is neither necessary nor sufficient for status
harm. In short, constitutional scholars such as Brest, Lawrence, Karst,
Koppelman, and Sunstein have given us a powerful, cultural theory of
the Equal Protection Clause,23 7 but the cultural and moral factor that
these scholars make salient-status-is not an expressive factor in the
sense delineated in Part I.
The proposition that a governmental action can cause status harm
to blacks without stigmatizing them is, I think, fairly hard to deny.
Richard McAdams, one of the leading norms scholars, has argued at
length and with rigor that private race discrimination is a mechanism
by which whites enhance their status at the expense of blacks.us
McAdams's work is relevant here because it implies that a legal prohi-
bition on private discrimination will elevate black status quite inde-
pendent of what that prohibition itself means. For example, a prohi-
See, e.g., LAURENcE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONsTiTlTONAL LAW 1477 (2d ed.
1988) (arguing that the stigma rationale for the decision in Brown v. Board of Education
is the "most obvious" and "most'persuasive").
235 See supra text accompanying notes 189-202 (criticizing Hampton).
M See Hampton, supra note 28, at 1671-85.
237 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 32, at 136 ("[T]he purpose of antidiscrimination law
is to help destroy the cultural processes by which certain groups are constituted as hav-
ing an inferior status.").
See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note 44.
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bition can elevate black status by improving the economic position of
blacks or by forcing whites to come into contact with blacks, thereby
disabusing whites of certain false beliefs.29 Conversely, a state's repeal
of antidiscrimination laws (or its failure to enact such laws in the first
place) would cause status harm to blacks, even if the repeal or
nonenactment symbolized nothing. Another plausible example of
status impact without linguistic content is affirmative action. A stan-
dard defense of affirmative action programs is that they increase the
wealth, power, and professional standing of individual black benefici-
aries, thereby improving the status of blacks as a group.24° The idea
here is that dampening racial skews in certain indicia or components
of status, namely wealth, power, and professional standing, will ame-
liorate status differences between racial groups; there need not be a
further claim that governmental decisions changing the skews are
themselves meaningful.
The converse proposition-that governmental action can stigma-
tize without causing status harm-is, at first, much harder to accept. I
should note that the truth of this converse proposition is not crucial
for my case against expressivism. As long as stigma, albeit a sufficient
condition for status harm, is not a necessary condition for status
harm-as long as the set of status-harmful statutes includes some
meaningless statutes, such as the meaningless statutes mentioned in the
preceding paragraph-a moral theory of the Equal Protection Clause
grounded ultimately on status and self-respect will not be a genuine
expressive theory. What matters, within such a theory, is the effect of
governmental action on certain collective beliefs and norms. Mean-
ingless actions can fare differently with respect to the specified beliefs
and norms, and the most perspicuous description of a governmental
action, within this theory, will refer just to its cultural effect, not to its
linguistic meaning-for a linguistic description would miss the case of
an action that is linguistically meaningless but has a negative cultural
impact, namely, lowering the status of blacks, and thereby causes
29 See id. at 1081.
In sum, law may correct the market failure of discrimination in three ways:
by raising the costs and lowering the productive returns of certain forms of
subordination; by increasing the racial diversity of socially connected
groups; ... and by symbolizing a consensus that the rationalizations for the
subordination strategy are, in fact, mere rationalizations.
Id. Notably, only the last of McAdams's three mechanisms attaches a symbolic content
to antidiscrimination law itself.
240 For a recent statement of this view, see Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative
Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855, 867-72 (1995).
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status harm.
In any event, I suggest that the converse proposition is correct.
Stigma is not even sufficient, let alone necessary, for status harm.
Imagine a weakened government that, in the vain hope of appealing
to white voters, begins to play the "race card" by sending subtle and
not-so-subtle messages of black inferiority. Do we want to say that
such a government inevitably exacerbates or reinforces a system of ra-
cial castes? Presumably, the cultural impact of those messages is con-
tingent on additional factors, such as whether white voters are even
listening to what the weakened officials are trying to tell them. The
voters may be too alienated from politics to listen or to care; they may
discount either all governmental messages or all messages from this
particular government.
The distinction I am emphasizing here, between cultural impact
and linguistic meaning, is obscured in the scholarly literature on
equal protection given a persistent equivocation about the definition
of "stigma." Sometimes, "stigma" is defined in terms of cultural impact:
"Systematic differences [between whites and blacks] help produce
frequent injuries to self respect-the time-honored constitutional no-
tion of 'stigma.' ... [S] tigma is part of what it means to be a member
of a lower caste."24' On this definition, a stigmatic law is sufficient as
well as necessary for status harm, but the conceptual link between
stigma and language is severed. Conversely, if stigma is defined in
linguistic terms-if a governmental action is "stigmatic" just insofar as
it possesses a particular descriptive or declarative meaning-then
"stigma" is neither necessary nor sufficient for status harm, and a
stigma-based account of the Equal Protection Clause, albeit a genuine
expressive account, is unpersuasive.
242
241 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 2430, 2432; see also Karst, Foreword, supra note 32, at
49-53 (suggesting that stigma is better conceptualized in terms of cultural impact
rather than in terms of "purposeful stigmatizing action" by government).
242 Might the theory presented and criticized in this subsection, as well as the paral-
lel theory developed in the Establishment Clause context, see infra text accompanying
notes 281-285, be modified such that stigma in the linguistic sense is linked directly
with self-respect-rather than indirectly, via status-and thereby be rendered immune
to the objections I have advanced? Would that not be a viable and genuinely expres-
sive (linguistic) theory? It would be genuinely (linguistically) expressive, but it would
not, I think, be viable. The described modification would, indeed, make irrelevant my
point that governmental stigma and social status are only contingently linked; but it
would involve the implausible claim that a person's self-respect is necessarily degraded
by a linguistically stigmatic governmental utterance even if his status remains first-class
(say, because the uttering officials are despised or ignored). It is the implausibility of
this claim that, I think, has motivated expressivists about the Equal Protection Clause
to build status into their accounts, as an intermediate link. I am indebted to Seth Kre-
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The arguments I have developed in this subsection leave open the
possibility that stigma (in the linguistic sense) might play a doctrinal
role within the doctrines implemented by constitutional reviewing
courts pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause. Perhaps all of the fol-
lowing hold true: (1) the linguistic meaning of a governmental action
is not morally relevant, per se, within our best moral theory of the
Equal Protection Clause; (2) the effect of a governmental action upon
black status and self-respect is morally relevant, per se, within our best
moral theory of the Equal Protection Clause; (3) a cultural impact test
would be very difficult for reviewing courts to administer; (4) stigma
tracks cultural impact reasonably well, and a stigma test would be eas-
ier to administer than a cultural impact test; therefore, (5) a stigma
test should be part of Equal Protection Clause doctrine.243 In general,
legal doctrines can refer to the linguistic content of the activities that
they cover, whether or not the moral factors governing and animating
those doctrines refer to linguistic content. Law need not directly in-
corporate morality.
2"
But I would not count the case where nonexpressive morality
leads to expressive doctrine (constitutional or otherwise) as a case of
genuine expressivism. For example, a preference-utilitarian might
support laws prohibiting "libel" or "sedition" or "obscenity," but that
hardly makes her an expressivist. "Expressivism," as I use the term,
marks out something special about morality itself, not about the host
imer for clarifying discussions on these issues.
Does my view of the Equal Protection Clause mean that government has no reason
not to stigmatize when the stigma does not cause status harm? No. Sometimes, stig-
matic laws will be discriminatory. And when they are not, government will still have a
reason (although not a constitutional reason) to refrain from stigma: either that the
stigmatic utterance is simply unjustified (for presumably such an utterance, status-
harmful or not, is morally suboptimal in one way or another) or that the stigmatic ut-
terance constitutes a lie and therefore implicates the no-lying constraint. See infra text
accompanying notes 404-15 (discussing this constraint).
243 Among contemporary legal scholars, Frederick Schauer is well known for his
forceful and prolific analysis of the way in which moral reason can and does obtain for
legal doctrines not to directly incorporate moral criteria-for example, because actors
have limited epistemic abilities, because they cannot be fully trusted, because of the
exigencies of coordination, and so on. See, e.g., FREDERICK SC AUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BAsED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND
IN LIFE (1991). Relatedly, there is now a well-accepted distinction in the philosophical
literature between moral criteria and morally justified decision procedures. See, e.g.,
DAvID O. BRINK, MORAL REAISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 216-17 (1989).
244 At least on a positivist account of the nature of law. See supra note 106 (distin-
guishing between positivist and natural law accounts, and citing sources).
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of doctrines, practices, and institutions that our moral view will then
inform. It is fair to use the term in this special, restricted sense-not
only because many expressivists have used it thus, but also, and more
importantly, because the task of developing a moral view is logically
and practically prior to the task of evaluating doctrines, institutions,
and practices. We need, first, to know what the criteria for evaluation
are-specifically, whether those criteria, or at least some of them,
make essential reference to linguistic meaning. I have argued that the
moral criteria or factors animating the Equal Protection Clause do not
thus refer. At bottom, a law violates constitutional equality by virtue of
the fact that it unjustifiably discriminates on racial lines, by virtue of
the fact that it causes status harm to blacks, or perhaps by virtue of
other nonexpressive properties (for example, its disparate impact on
blacks),24 5 but not by virtue of the fact that it possess a particular de-
scriptive or declarative sentence meaning.
2. The Establishment Clause
A second area of constitutional law and scholarship where expres-
sivism has been particularly important is the Establishment Clause. In
recent years, the symbolic content of governmental action challenged
under this clause-whether the action constitutes an "endorsement"
of a particular religion or of religion in general-has come to play a
significant role in Supreme Court doctrine. This focus on symbolism
stems from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch v. Don-
nelly, where she proposed a modification to the then-standard test for
Establishment Clause cases, the so-called "Lemon test."246 In Lemon v.
Kurtzman, the Court held that the proper standard was a three-
pronged test, requiring that "[flirst, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; [and] finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with relig-
ion. ' 2 47 Justice O'Connor suggested that the "purpose" prong of
Lemon should be modified to ask whether government intended to
communicate a message of endorsement or disapproval and that the
"effect" prong should be modified to ask whether such a message was,
in fact, sent:
The meaning of a statement to its audience depends both on the in-
245 See supra note 228.
246 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor,J., concurring).
247 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citation omitted).
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tention of the speaker and on the "objective" meaning of the statement
in the community. Some listeners need not rely solely on the words
themselves in discerning the speaker's intent: they can judge the intent
by, for example, examining the context of the statement or asking ques-
tions of the speaker. Other listeners do not have or will not seek access
to such evidence of intent. They will rely instead on the words them-
selves; for them the message actually conveyed may be something not ac-
tually intended....
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's ac-
tual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong
asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice
under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.
An affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged
practice invalid.248
O'Connor's proposal here maps nicely onto the two Gricean cate-
gories of linguistic meaning: speaker's meaning and sentence mean-
ing.249 What she, in effect, proposed in Lynch was that governmental
action endorsing religion, in either the speaker's-meaning or the sen-
tence-meaning sense of "endorsement," should be held unconstitu-
tional under the Establishment Clause. Soon thereafter, in School Dis-
trict v. Bal the Court itself incorporated "endorsement" into its
Establishment Clause analysis--stating that "an important concern of
the [Lemon] effect test is whether the symbolic union of church and
state effected by the challenged governmental action is sufficiently
likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations
as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their
individual religious choices" °--and has done so numerous times
since.25 1 Most recently, in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v.
Pinette, both the plurality opinionZ3 and all of the dissenting and
concurring justices argued for some kind of "endorsement" analysis
248 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
249 See supra Part I.B (explicating these two kinds of linguistic meaning).
2W 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985); see also id. at 389 (stating that if government "identifi-
cation [with religion] conveys a message of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion, a core purpose of the Establishment Clause is violated" (citing Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 688 (O'ConnorJ., concurring))).
251 For summaries of the doctrinal evolution of the endorsement analysis, with cita-
tions to the Supreme Court case law, see Epstein, supra note 117, at 2124-37; and Kent
Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995
Sup. Cr. REV. 323, 359-80.
252 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
20 The portion of Justice Scalia's opinion that discussed endorsement was for a
plurality of the Court; it was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy
and Thomas. See id. at 763-70.
See id. at 772-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
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within Establishment Clause doctrine.25
As Pinette reveals, the precise doctrinal function of "endorsement"
remains uncertain. This uncertainty is connected to the larger uncer-
tainty about the fate of Lemon. A majority of justices currently sitting
have criticized the Lemon test-the Court in recent years has regularly
failed to invoke it-but the test has not been officially overruled or
replaced, and no majority of the Court has yet coalesced on a re-
placement test. ,5 6 Nonetheless, if Pinette is any indication, "endorse-
ment" will continue to figure in the Court's current, unsettled juris-
prudence and will likely be part of whatever official replacement for
Lemon eventually emerges.
Does this make sense? Why should the constitutionality of legal
officials' actions under the Establishment Clause be a function of what
the actions mean? My focus here will be on the sentence-meaning,
not the speaker's-meaning construal of "endorsement." In Part I of
this Article, I adduced some general considerations against speaker's-
meaning theories of law,28 and I suggest that those considerations
hold good here. PaceJustice O'Connor, official actions (at least the
actions usually at stake in Establishment Clause cases, those of legisla-
tures, city councils, or other multimember bodies) have no speaker's
meaning beyond whatever sentence meaning they might have. Pro-
fessor Steven Smith has elaborated this and other criticisms of the
speaker's-meaning component of Justice O'Connor's proposal in
Lynch. I will therefore train my attention on the sentence-meaning
component
Note, to begin, that an expressive or linguistic test can function, at
best, as only one portion of Establishment Clause analysis, not as the
whole of it. Lynch suggests to the contrary,. 9 as have some constitu-
ment); id. at 797-815 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See gnerally Greenawalt, supra note 251, at 370-75.
25 See also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 227-28, 235 (1997) (considering
whether an educational program, challenged under the Establishment Clause, consti-
tutes a "symbolic union" between government and religion, and concluding that it
cannot be viewed as an "endorsement of religion").
256 See Greenawalt, supra note 251, at 323-29, 359-61 (summarizing the demise of
Lemon).
257 See supra text accompanying notes 83-89.
28 See Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neu-
trality and the "No Endorsement"Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 283-91 (1987).
Specifically, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Lynch suggests that all but the no-
'entanglement" aspect of Establishment Clause doctrine can be reduced to an en-
dorsement analysis. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-89.
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260tional scholars, but the suggestion seems quite implausible. A paral-
lel problem was noted above in our discussion of the "stigma" inter-
pretation of the Equal Protection Clause-some discriminatory and
thereby unconstitutional laws might be nonstigmatic 1-and, in the
Establishment Clause context, the problem is considerably more seri-
ous and obvious. A wide variety of laws can surely constitute "the es-
tablishment of religion" without being linguistically equivalent (in the
sentence-meaning sense) to the utterances "Government endorses Re-
ligion R' or "Government endorses religion in general."
Lynch itself involved the display of an undeniably symbolic object,
a creche, by the government.262 Assume that, in this kind of case, the
constitutionality of the governmental action is indeed a function of its
semantics.26 Even so, such cases are only a fairly small portion of the
Establishment Clause case law.26 A much larger portion consists of
265cases involving aid to religious institutions. If cases about accom-
20 See Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberak The Religion Clauses, Liberal
Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 151, 171-82
(1987) (arguing that "neutrality" should be the basis for Establishment Clause analysis
and construing neutrality as nonendorsement); Loewy, supra note 76, at 1049-52 (sup-
porting Justice O'Connor's proposed reformulation of the Lemon test in terms of en-
dorsement); William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986) (arguing that Establishment Clause cases
cannot be decided in light of objective principles, given inherent tensions in the area,
and that establishmentshould therefore be generally understood in symbolic terms).
261 See supra text accompanying notes 220-27.
262 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671-72.
263 See Greenawalt, supra note 251, at 370 (stating that "a reading of [Pinette] sug-
gests that all Justices agree that endorsement is the proper inquiry if the government
itself erects a crhche, cross, or menorah on its property").
26 Besides Lynch and Pinette the only other Establishment Clause case involving
the display of a symbolic object by the government or on government property (as in
Pinette) is County ofAllegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). Even if one (plausibly) in-
cludes the public prayer cases in the "symbolic" category along with cases like Lynch,
Pinette; and Allegheny, such that endorsement is both necessary and sufficient for an Es-
tablishment Clause violation within this category, the category is still much smaller (in
sheer number of cases at the Supreme Court level) than the school aid cases, let alone
the totality of the remaining Establishment Clause cases. Obviously, the proportion of
Supreme Court cases in a particular category is not conclusive evidence of the propor-
tion of cases in that category in the lower courts or the proportion of Establishment
Clause controversies overall (adjudicated or not) within the category; but it is good
evidence, absent a reason to think that the Supreme Court sample is skewed. In this
instance, I am aware of no reason to think that "symbolic" cases should constitute a
significantly larger portion of the lower-court cases, or of Establishment Clause contro-
versies overall, than of the Court's docket.
2 "Aid" here means aid, financial or other, that is not purely symbolic, such as a
grant of textbooks or of government-employed teachers' services. See, e.g., Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993);
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266 267modation for religious actors, cases about public prayer, cases
about the delegation of power to religious bodies,6 and cases about
the need for government officials to make decisions concerning relig-
ious doctrine 269 are also included, the power of the "endorsement" test
seems yet smaller. I suggest that, in all of these areas, on any plausible
view of the Establishment Clause-whether a separationist view, a neu-
tralist view, an accommodationist view, or a view focused on govern-.270
mental coercion -- government actions that lack the sentence mean-
ing of "endorsement" might nonetheless be unconstitutional. As
Michael McConnell puts it:
Strict separationists will take the position that any provision of financial
or other assistance to religion is an endorsement. Advocates of "facial
neutrality" will take the position that any action that "singles out" relig-
ion for special treatment... is an endorsement. Accomodationists will
say that benefits to religion that are either facially neutral or that
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Muel-
ler v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub.
Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968).
266 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327
(1987); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Walz v. Tax Comm'n
of NewYork, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
26 By "public prayer" I mean the use of prayer or other religious texts in schools,
legislatures, or other public fora. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The cases involving religion in the school curricu-
lum might be put in or near this category. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578
(1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
268 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
269 See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
270 Good exemplars of these views are Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court 29 U. CIII. L. REv. 1 (1961) (neutralism-specifically, a defense of facial
neutrality); Douglas Laycock, Formal Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990) (neutralism); Michael W. McConnell, Accom-
modation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CZr. REV. 1 (accommodationism); Michael Stokes Paul-
sen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993) (coercion); and Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CEI. L. REV. 195 (1992) (separationism).
The line between certain variants of neutralism, such as Laycock's, and accommoda-
tionism is a thin one.
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accommodate the free exercise of religion are neutral in their symbolic• . .271
effect, and that anything less would be an expression of disapproval.
I do not think McConnell is right that the concept of endorsement is
necessarily parasitic on nonexpressive accounts of the Establishment
Clause. Government "endorses" religion in the linguistic or expres-
sive sense when it invokes the relevant linguistic convention for per-
forming the speech-act of endorsement: when it utters a linguistic
statement the content of which is "we endorse religion" or "we sup-
port religion" or something like that. But I do agree with McConnell
that any plausible view of the Establishment Clause will include factors
such as separation, coercion, neutrality, or accommodation that can-
272not be reduced to linguistic meaning.
To see the point, consider the neutralist defense of the endorse-
ment test offered by Professor Donald Beschle. Beschle argues as fol-
lows: "The essential core of liberal neutrality as applied to the religion
clauses.., should be the principle that government may not endorse
one set of religious beliefs over another, endorse religion over irrelig-
ion, or irreligion over religion."2 3  Does Beschle really mean this?
Imagine a spending measure that grants funds directly to certain
churches, identified by name, and only to those churches. Surely this
law is nonneutral, 274 and it seems that Beschle himself would concede
27 McConnell, supra note 104, at 150-51.
272 The endorsement concept is not necessarily parasitic on nonexpressive ac-
counts of the Establishment Clause, but it is possibly parasitic-it can be formulated so
that state action endorses religion if and only if that action is nonexpressively unjusti-
fied-and perhaps McConnell is correct that the formulations influential within the
Supreme Court case law are indeed parasitic in this way. Cf. Wallace v.Jafiree, 472 U.S.
38, 76, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in thejudgment) (asserting that "[tihe
relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative his-
tory, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of
[religion]" where such an observer is, inter alia, "assume[d] ... [to be] acquainted
with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes").
273 Beschle, supra note 260, at 182.
274 More precisely, the law is nonneutral apart from the special case where the
church names are good proxies for nonreligious characteristics, such as the character-
istic of being particularly well-suited to provide certain services. See McConnell, supra
note 104, at 144-45 (noting that "Congress made a large grant to the Roman Catholic
Church a few years ago for the purpose of assisting illegal aliens in applying for am-
nesty... [because] the Catholic Church is uniquely positioned to reach them"). The
accomodationist might object that religious characteristics can themselves be founda-
tionally relevant, rather than mere proxies-a law that singles out and thereby accom-
modates religious practices can be justifiably targeted at religious liberty and nothing
else, or so the accomodationist will argue-but it is hard to see how a law granting
funds only to certain churches could be ajustifiable accommodation and in that sense
'neutral." See id. at 185 ("[T]he taxpayer has a right to insist that the government not
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as much, for he says elsewhere that "aid to only one or any number of
chosen religions to the exclusion of others would be impermssible."275
But it is an open question whether the law is linguistically equivalent
to a statement by government, "We endorse religion B," or to any
other (nonprescriptive) statement at all. The churches might want
material aid rather than endorsement,276 and the legislature might ei-
ther frankly admit as much or make it clear from context that this was
277simply pork-barrel politics.
The better account of neutrality-the one that explains why the
spending measure, despite its meaninglessness, violates the Establish-
ment Clause-is not an expressive account, but a justifwatory account.
Liberal neutrality in general constrains the types of moral or evalua-
tive propositions with reference to which government decisions can be
defended, classically propositions about the relative goodness of ways
of life.276 Liberal neutrality in matters of religion means, specifically,
that propositions such as "Religion R is the one true religion" or "Re-
ligion R constitutes a better way of life than Religion S" are unavail-
able to justify government decisions. The liberal neutralist in the jus-
tificatory sense will, to be sure, count a government endorsement of
religion as nonneutral and unconstitutional; but she will also count
meaningless action as unconstitutional just insofar as that action is in-
defensible relative to a suitably constrained set of moral propositions.
Liberal neutralism in the justificatory sense is, therefore, not a genu-
ine expressive theory of law. Beschle's neutralism is, but it is an im-
plausible variant of neutralism (as the spending example is meant to
suggest).
give tax dollars to religion qua religion, or in a way that favors.., one religion over
another.").
275 Beschle, supra note 260, at 184.
276 Thus Smith comments:
To be sure, some politicians do seek to attract the votes of religious persons by
sending messages endorsing religion. But other supporters of governmental
assistance to religious interests or institutions may often attempt, if only for
tactical reasons, .to provide such assistance in disguised forms carefully crafted
to avoid endorsing religion .... [I]t would be disingenuous for the supporters
of such measures to deny that they hope to help, or to advance religion. But
their concern-and their intent in backing such measures-is apparently to
extend material assistance to religion, not to send messages endonring religion.
Smith, supra note 258, at 288.
277 For example, the aid provision might be included in an omnibus, end-of-session
spending bill full of targeted benefits for various kinds of interest groups.
278 See infra text accompanying notes 423-27 (presenting ajustificatory account of
liberal neutrality); cf. Laycock, supra note 270 (presenting a different account of Estab-
lishment Clause neutrality).
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In short, the "endorsement" test is, at best, nested within a dis-
junctive account of the Establishment Clause that includes reference
to nonexpressive factors as well as to the sentence meaning of a gov-
ernmental action. The expressivist can claim at best that a law violates
the Establishment Clause if the law (a) breaches relevant nonexpres-
sive factors such as neutrality, coercion, etc. or (b) triggers a linguistic
convention for performing the speech-act "Government endorses Re-
ligion 1' or "Government endorses religion in general.
Will this kind of disjunctive account prove successful? Note, to
begin, that the second, expressive prong of the disjunctive structure
risks collapsing into the first. For example, if the factors listed under
(a) include neutrality (and not just, say, coercion), then it is difficult
to see what further analytic work is done by the endorsement test.
Seemingly, the set of "endorsements" is wholly subsumed within the
set of governmental actions that are nonneutral, and thus prong (b)
seems quite superfluous. 20 Let us, however, bracket this issue. (Per-
haps the expressivist can say that nonneutral endorsements, as op-
posed to meaningless acts of nonneutrality, are particularly bad; or
perhaps the first, nonexpressive factor is more limited in scope than
neutrality.) The deeper problem that the expressivist must address is
what motivates prong (b). Why does the linguistic meaning of a gov-
ernmental action figure in the best or most perspicuous description of
that action, within the context of the Establishment Clause? What is
morally distinctive about "endorsement"?
Interestingly, Justice O'Connor's answer to this question tracks
279 See Karst, supra note 76, at 517 ("Problems both definitional and institutional
embarrass the effort to make the endorsement of religion into a generalized legal test
governing the whole range of Establishment Clause issues.... [These] problems di-
minish, however, when the case at hand involves an official governmental display of a
religious symbol."). Justice O'Connor herself now concedes as much. See Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773-74 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Establishment Clause cannot be reduced to a single test
and apparently proposing that "endorsement" be given a more limited role than in
Lynch v. Donnelly: "the endorsement inquiry captures the fundamental requirement of
the Establishment Clause when courts are called upon to evaluate the constitutionality
of religious symbols on public property"); Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718-
21 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the Establishment Clause cannot
be reduced to a single test).
28 The claim I am making here is not that the property of endorsement is necessar-
ily parasitic upon nonexpressive properties, see supra text accompanying notes 271-72
(criticizing this claim), but rather that any governmental action genuinely "endorsing"
religion-in a genuine, linguistic way-is likely unconstitutional in virtue of some non-
expressive property, specifically nonneutrality, that could attach to meaningless actions
as well. It is hard to imagine how a law could possess the linguistic meaning "We en-
dorse Religion 1' or 'We endorse religion in general" and still be neutral.
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very closely the expressivist account of the Equal Protection Clause of-
fered by Paul Brest and others, as well as the expressive theory of pun-
ishment offered by Jean Hampton. Just as equal protection expressiv-
ists such as Brest focus on stigma, and just as Hampton focuses on the
reversal of victim "diminishment," so O'Connor argues that endorse-
ment makes second-class citizens of those persons who do not share
the endorsed religious beliefs. Thus her oft-quoted concurring analy-
sis in Lynch: "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite
message."281 The idea, once again, is that a governmental message can
affect the status and concomitant self-respect of certain persons. En-
dorsement of religion R or of religion in general, causes status harm
to nonbelievers.
This has been the standard defense of the endorsement test, not
just by Justice O'Connor, but also by its advocates within the legal
academy. Gary Leedes asserts that the Establishment Clause and the
endorsement test "prohibit[] the federal and state governments from
subverting a citizen's status in the political community because of his
or her creed or lack of religious commitment.' r Arnold Loewy ar-
gues that the test "is well suited to preventing successful government
attempts.., to impose a 'badge of inferiority' on our religious minori-
ties." 83 Kent Greenawalt suggests that it seeks "to avoid feelings of ex-
clusion and dominance."28 4 And Kenneth Karst, a leading stigma
theorist within the Equal Protection Clause context, has simply ex-
tended his theory to include the Establishment Clause:
In the generation of lawyers that has so decisively repudiated Jim Crow,
two lessons are clear.... First, governmental expression has a consider-
able capacity to alienate outsiders. Second[,] ... this form of alienation
is, in itself, a harm of major proportion. When government sponsors the




281 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). My Westlaw search, on
April 25, 2000, discovered some 198 law review articles citing this language or a por-
tion thereof.
282 Leedes, supra note 76, at 469.
283 Loewy, supra note 76, at 1069.
284 Greenawalt, supra note 251, at 374.
285 Karst, supra note 76, at 512. Marshall, supra note 260, defends endorsement on
different grounds, namely the incoherence of any objective approach to the Estab-
lishment Clause. See id. at 531-33. If this is true, it is unclear what would justify the
Court in invalidating endorsements. Why notjust declare the clause an inkblot?
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But the difficulty with this line of argument, once more, is that the
semantics of some governmental utterance are not equivalent to its
status (or more broadly its cultural) impact. Government endorses
religion when it invokes a particular linguistic convention; it changes a
person's status when it changes the prevalent beliefs about his inferi-
ority or equality, or the prevalent treatment of him motivated by be-
liefs about his inferiority or equality, or the beliefs or treatment that
are appropriate pursuant to existing social practices. The two are as
different as, in general, law and social norms are. A governmental ac-
tion with the linguistic meaning constitutive of endorsement is neither
necessary nor sufficient to cause status harm to the nonbeliever-to
damage his standing as a full member of the political community.
Professor Smith, perhaps the leading scholarly critic of the en-
dorsement test, has quite vigorously pursued this particular line of
criticism.2m As for necessity, Smith gives the example of state laws that
excluded clergy from serving in state legislatures, laws that were quite
prevalent until struck down by the Court in 1978.
These laws plainly affected some persons' political standing on the basis
of religion; the exclusionary laws made those persons ineligible for legis-
lative office simply because they had chosen a religious vocation. On the
other hand, whether the laws communicated approval or disapproval of
religion is debatable .... Such a law might reflect disapproval of relig-
ion, implying that ministers are unfit for public office. Conversely, the
law might suggest approval of religion; it might evince a belief that minis-
ters are too virtuous ... to be sullied and distracted by mundane political
pursuits. Or the law might reflect neither approval nor disapproval of
religion, but merely a belief that both religion and politics are better off
287when kept apart.
As for sufficiency, Smith points out that "[cieremonial uses of
prayer [by governmental officials] may communicate support or ap-
proval for religious beliefs [,] [b]ut.. . no one loses the right to vote,
the freedom to speak, or any other [political] right[s]. "2 s This is
probably too strong an assertion. I would think that ceremonial
prayer, or some other endorsement without prescriptive meaning
(that is, without any effect on legal rights, duties, etc.), could, in the
286 See Smith, supra note 258, at 306 ("To be sure, a law diminishing or elevating
the political standing of citizens on religious grounds might also endorse or disapprove
of religion, and vice versa. But those consequences of such a law are practically and
analytically distinct.").
287 Id. at 306.07 (footnotes omitted).
28S Id. at 307.
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right circumstances, diminish and alienate nonbelievers." 9 But what
about an endorsement of religion R, uttered by a government under
the control of legislators from that religion, when the vast majority of
the citizenry are nonbelievers? (Imagine that the Unification Church
succeeds in converting a majority of the legislature.) Or, more plau-
sibly, what about an endorsement of religion , or of religion in gen-
eral, uttered by a government about which citizens are generally disil-
lusioned, and whose officials are generally viewed as corrupt and
petty? The expressivist must either insist on counting that statement
as a distinctive moral wrong, notwithstanding its cultural irrelevance,
or she is no longer an expressivist in the sense that links "expression"
to language and linguistic meaning.9
C. Expressive Theories of Regulation
An expressive theory of regulation, or at least the outline of such a
theory, is presented in scholarship by Professors Sunstein, Pildes, and
Anderson, particularly Sunstein's article Incommensurability and Valua-
tion in La,29 a joint article by Pildes and Anderson entitled Slinging
292Arrows at Democracy; and a joint article by Sunstein and Pildes enti-
tled Reinventing the Regulatory State293 This theory is less well developed
than the expressive theories of punishment and of constitutional law
discussed above in Parts II.A and II.B. Anderson, Pildes, and Sunstein
are (quite understandably) more concerned to criticize the standard,
nonexpressive account of regulation than to develop a specific, ex-
pressivist alternative. Nonetheless, their inchoate theory is worth con-
sidering here, both because of its potential import, and because the
289 See generally Epstein, supra note 117, at 2124-54 (arguing that ceremonial deism
makes outsiders of nonbelievers, and thereby violates the Establishment Clause).
20 Here, as in the case of the Equal Protection Clause, the notion of endorsement
might play a doctrinal role without constituting a morally basic factor. See supra text ac-
companying notes 24-45 (distinguishing between expressive cast of moral theory and
expressive cast of doctrine). But again, the existence of a moral case for linguistic
meaning to play a doctrinal or, more generally, a legal role is not, yet, genuine expres-
sivism. See id.
291 Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation, supra note 16.
Pildes & Anderson, SlingingArrows, supra note 8.
29 Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, supra note 8. I say "particu-
larly" because these scholars have written widely, and the theory sketched here is, not
surprisingly, evidenced in some of their work beyond these three articles. See, e.g.,
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND EcoNoMIcs, supra note 143, at 190-220; Richard H.
Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium,
89 MicH. L. REv. 936 (1991); Sunstein, Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation, supra
note 16.
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arguments that they offer to support it are, in certain respects, quite
different from those developed in the expressivist literature on pun-
ishment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Establishment Clause.
Numerous passages in the articles just mentioned suggest that
Anderson, Pildes, and Sunstein are indeed genuine expressivists-that
they characterize the moral factors applicable to governmental regula-
tion as including some irreducibly expressive factors. Consider the
following statement from Reinventing the Regulatory State.
[One] problem with [cost-benefit] approaches is that they necessarily
focus on the quantitative or material effects of policies. They cannot
take into account what we will call the expressive dimensions of legal and po-
litical choices. By expressive dimensions-what might be understood as
cultural consequences of choice-we mean the values that a particular
policy choice, in the specific context in which it is taken, will be gener-
ally understood to endorse. Policy choices do not just bring about cer-
tain immediate material consequences; they also will be understood, at
times, to be important for what they reflect about various value commit-
ments-about which values take priority over others, or how various val-
ues are best understood. Both the material consequences and the ex-
pressive consequences of policy choices are appropriate concerns for
policymakers.
Pildes and Sunstein continue: "A society might protect endangered
species partly because it believes that the protection makes best sense
of its self-understanding, by expressing an appropriate valuation of
what it means for one species to eliminate another." 5 Similarly,
Pildes and Anderson have this to say about the inadequacy of a non-
expressive, consequentialist account of the criteria bearing on regula-
tory choice:
Some public values are "hierarchically" incommensurable with others,
meaning that the incomparably higher regard for one value over the
other is expressed by refusing certain types of trade-offs between the two.
Social choice theory cannot represent the relations of hierarchically in-
commensurable values because an individual's attitudes toward them
cannot be captured in terms of a single consequentialist preference
294 Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatoy State, supra note 8, at 66. To be
sure, the quoted phrase, "what might be understood as cultural consequences of
choice," cuts against an interpretation of Pildes'and Sunstein that equates "expressive"
with "linguistic," and in favor of an interpretation that equates it with "cultural."
Nonetheless, the overall quotation here, as well as other references to "expression" in
Reinventing the Regulatory State, is sufficiently ambiguous on this score that the linguistic-
meaning variant is, at the least, a plausible reading of the theory that Sunstein and
Pildes mean to present. My criticisms are directed towards this variant and are not
meant to show that a cultural-impact theory of regulation is similarly unpersuasive.
295 Id. at 69.
2000] 1449
1450 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREViEW [Vol. 148:1363
ranking. Any description of options in terms of their consequences
alone, apart from their expressive significance, will exclude some of the
concerns individuals have that influence their choices.2
6
Pildes and Anderson point to "life" and "money" as examples of moral
considerations whose connections cannot be captured in a nonex-
pressive framework. They argue that "the best way to express the hi-
erarchically superior value of life over money is not in a consequen-
tialist, lexical preference ranking of 'life' over 'money,' but by the
principle to express respect for life under all circumstances. On its
face, this principle inherently involves expressive concerns ....
More specifically, I suggest, Anderson, Pildes, and Sunstein all
seem to endorse the following three propositions.
(1) Pluralism
There is a plurality of values. As Sunstein puts it: "[H]uman val-
ues are plural and diverse.... [W] e value things, events, and relation-
ships in ways that are not reducible to some larger and more encom-
passing value." 8 Similarly, Pildes and Anderson argue for "value
pluralism," which they characterize as "the view that public values-
those values at stake in political choice-ought to be understood to be
diverse in a particular and profound way."2
(2) Expressive constraints
Public officials, in particular regulators, are constrained to express
an appropriate evaluative view-an appropriate understanding of what
values (or some values) require, and of how values (or some values)
relate. Pildes and Sunstein state: "Policy choices do not just bring
about certain immediate material consequences; they also will be un-
derstood, at times, to be important for what they reflect about various
value commitments-about which values take priority over others, or
how various values are best understood."3°° And Pildes and Anderson
have the following to say about the hierarchical, expressive structuring
of values: "When higher values are at stake, particular kinds of com-
parisons with lower values are considered inappropriate, immoral, or
unjust-comparisons that would express a degradation or depreciation
of the higher values.'°1
26 Pildes & Anderson, SlingingArrows, supra note 8, at 2146.
2 Id. at 2151.
298 Sunstein, Incommzensurability and Valuation, supra note 16, at 780.
Pildes & Anderson, SlingingArrows, supra note 8, at 2143.
300 Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatoy State, supra note 8, at 66.
301 Pildes & Anderson, SlingingArrows, supra note 8, at 2150.
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(3) Incommensurability
Because the criteria for regulatory choice are, in part, irreducibly
expressive, no nonexpressive scale for integrating the plural values
bearing upon choice will capture all the relevant considerations. Op-
tions are incommensurable, relative to such scales (for example, relative
to the money scale employed by cost-benefit analysts).°2 As Sunstein
puts it "Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot
be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our consid-
ered judgments about how these goods are best characterized."3' 3
Since a cost-benefit metric, as standardly defined, incorporates only
nonexpressive considerations, regulatory options implicating expres-
sive constraints will be incommensurable by that metric:
CBA [cost-benefit analysis] approaches cannot adequately capture all
the expressive dimensions of policy choices.... CBA deals with the ma-
terial or quantitative dimensions, not the interpretive and expressive
ones. CBA examines alternative end states; it compares, for example,
how much it would cost to reach a state in which health was protected to
a certain degree against a particular risk. It cannot take account of the
meaning of the transition-the values the transition will be socially un-




What is distinctive about the views of Anderson, Pildes, and Sun-
stein, and what (I think) justifies the claim that they are offering a
common, expressivist theory of regulation, is the union of these three
components: (1) pluralism, (2) expressive constraints, and (3) in-
commensurability.
So where does the theory go wrong? Note, to begin, that it is a
mistake to infer the second component of the theory from the first.
To the extent that Anderson, Pildes, and Sunstein mean to claim such
an inference, they are mistaken. The plurality of values does not im-
ply that expressive criteria govern, or partly govern, regulatory choices
implicating plural values. Pluralism, as such, is fully consistent both
with expressivism and with the absence of any expressive factors.s05
302 SeeAdler, Introduction, supra note 17, at 1170, 1177-80 (describing the multiple
meanings of "incommensurability," and suggesting that incommensurability in one
sense means "the failure of a particular kind of scale ... to track the comparative worth
of ogtions").
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation, supra note 16, at 796 (emphasis de-
leted).
M4 Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatoy State supra note 8, at 70.
S05 The fact and implications of pluralism are discussed throughout the philo-
sophical literature on incommensurability, seeAdler, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 17,
at 1383 n.47 (citing literature), but particularly in MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND
CONFLIC'NGVALUES (1990) andJOHN KEKES, Tre MoRAITY oF PLURALISM (1993).
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To see this point, consider the following. First, a "value" might be
defined in a fairly standard way as a nonexpressive criterion for rank-
ing the outcomes that actions produce-a criterion such that mean-
ingless or linguistically identical actions can fare differently with re-
spect to the criterion.""6 "Physical pleasure" or "human longevity" or
"the preservation of endangered species S1" constitute "values" in this
fairly standard sense: two meaningless or linguistically identical ac-
tions, by government, can produce world-states that differ with respect
to the aggregate amount of physical pleasure, the extent of premature
death, or the number of members of species S. It is very hard to see
why the sheer plurality of values, thus defined, should give rise to ex-
pressive constraints. Universe, is a monistic universe; only one nonex-
pressive criterion for ranking outcomes obtains. Universe2 is a plural-
istic universe; several nonexpressive criteria for ranking outcomes
obtain. Why should the shift from Universe to Universe trigger the
emergence of expressive constraints?07
M6 SeeKornhauser, supra note 116, at 1604 (defining "value" in roughly this sense).
One might quibble with my definition and say that values in a standard sense are pos-
sibly (not necesarily) nonexpressive, that outcome criteria may or may not have an ex-
pressive cast-for example, the value of "government's saying -'!--but this qualifica-
tion does not materially change my argument. Assume a definition of value such that
values may or may not be expressive. Once more, the pluralism/monism debate turns
out to be orthogonal to the debate about expressivism. A monistic universe can be ex-
pressive, or not, depending on whether its one value is expressive; and the same is true
of a pluralistic universe, depending on whether one or more of its several values are
expressive.
30 The expressivist might respond that, absent expressive factors, there is simply
no way to make trade-offs between plural values (i.e., plural, nonexpressive criteria for
ranking outcomes). Let us put the argument this way: "If expressive constraints did
not exist, then Global Incomparability would be true. Outcome O* could not be
ranked as all-things-considered better than outcome 0 unless O* was better than 0
with respect to each and every value V ..... V. But Global Incomparability is mas-
sively counterintuitive. Therefore, expressive constraints exist." This is the best argu-
ment that I can imagine for inferring expressivism from pluralism. However, the ar-
gument is wrong. Global Incomparability is massively counterintuitive but it is untrue
that, apart from expressive considerations, there is no way to make warranted trade-
offs between plural values. See, e.g., THOMAS HuRKA, PERFECTIONISM 84-98 (1993) (ar-
guing against Global Incomparability); LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUAIflY 141-56 (1993)
(same); Adler, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 17, at 1402-04 (same); Ruth Chang, In-
troduction, in INcOMMENsURABILITY, supra note 16, at 14-17 (same); James Griffin, In-
commensurability: What's the Problem?, in INcOMMENSURABILIY, supra note 16, at 38-40
(same); Donald Regan, Value, Comparability, and Choice, in INCOMMENSURABIrIT, supra
note 16, at 134-39 (same).
Imagine that 0*saves 10,000 lives relative to 0, but that 0 increases the number of
habitats of an endangered species, relative to O*. Surely we can say that 0* is, all
things considered, better than 0, quite apart from what 0 "says" about life. Imagine
that the OO* choice is subsumed by no linguistic conventions; it has no sentence
EXPRESSIVISM: A SKEPTICAL OVERVIEW
Second, a "value" might be defined in a less standard way, such
that any value is identical to or includes an expressive constraint. For
example, a value V might be the following: a hybrid of (1) a nonex-
pressive criterion for ranking outcomes and (2) an expressive obliga-
tion, to the effect that actors communicate an appropriate view about
what V requires. But if this is what values involve, then once more, it
is not clear why pluralism has anything to do with expressivism. If
monistic Universe contains a single, partly expressive value-say, the
value of life, understood to incorporate a requirement that actors
communicate respect for life-then expressive constraints do obtain in
Universe, as they also do in pluralistic Universe,, which includes both
the value of life as well as other values.
In short, if values are (standardly) defined as nonexpressive crite-
ria for ranking outcomes, then the pluralism/monism debate is or-
thogonal to the expressivism debate, in that-regardless of whether
values are plural or single-it remains a further and contingent ques-
tion whether expressive constraints obtain. If values are (nonstan-
dardly) defined as equaling or incorporating expressive constraints,
then expressivism is true in both pluralistic and monistic worlds. In
either event, the fact of pluralism-and I would agree with Anderson,
Pildes, and Sunstein that values are, in fact, plural10 -- does not ad-
vance the case for expressivism.
A parallel point can be made about the incommensurability com-
ponent of the Anderson, Pildes, and Sunstein theory. Incommen-
surability is surely an upshot of expressivism. If the moral criteria for
regulatory choice are, in part, irreducibly expressive, then, indeed, no
nonexpressive scale for ranking governmental actions will capture all
meaning, apart from its prescriptive meaning. Surely, still, O* is better than 0. Nor
should we be tempted to say that 0 necessarily symbolizes or expresses contempt or
disregard for human life-that its meaning is more than a contingent matter of lin-
guistic conventions-for the only sense in which it necessarily expresses contempt or
disregard is that it purchases a meager gain in environmental preservation at the ex-
pense of a massive loss in life. It necessarily possesses this "meaning" in the Gricean,
signaling sense, only because meager gains to the first value are less important than
massive losses to the second value quite apart from the linguistic meaning of that
choice.
It is true or at least quite plausible that in a universe of plural, nonexpressive, out-
come criteria, some choices would be unguided. Call this "Local Incomparability." See
generally Chang, supra, at 13-27 (summarizing arguments for incomparability, particu-
larly Local Incomparability); Kornhauser, supra note 116, at 1599-1622 (discussing the
connection between pluralism and incomparability). But this is not particularly unset-
dingor weird and does not get us from pluralism to expressivism.
See, e.g., KEKES, supra note 305 (arguing for plurality of values); STOCKER, supra
note 305 (same); Chang, supra note 307, at 14 (citing sources on this issue).
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the relevant moral considerations. Further, incommensurability may
well be an upshot of pluralism. The existence of plural values may al-
ways lead to incomparability-to options that are neither better, nor
worse, nor precisely equally good with respect to the totality of val-
ues-and no scale of any kind can represent the incomparability of
options. 9 Anderson, Pildes, and Sunstein are correct in drawing the
connection from expressivism and pluralism to incommensurability.
But the demonstration of that connection does nothing to advance
the case for expressivism. We still need to know why, to begin with,
governmental actors are subject to expressive obligations-why they
are constrained to communicate an appropriate understanding of
what values (or some values) require, and how values (or some values)
relate.
I should stress that Anderson, Pildes, and Sunstein may not intend
to make the claim that expressivism follows from pluralism, incom-
mensurability, or a combination thereof. Whether they do is unclear
to me. In any event, the claim is spurious.
What else, if anything, do Anderson, Pildes, and Sunstein have to
say in favor of expressive constraints? First, there is some apparent
reference to Anderson's expressive theory of individual action, pre-
sented in Value in Ethics and Economics.31' But as I argued in Part I, the
inference from an expressive theory of individual action to an expres-
sive theory of governmental action is a false one.3 11 The central idea
in Anderson's expressive theory of individual action is that individuals
have relationships with particular others, which relationships persons
act to express. "Practical reason demands that one's actions ade-
quately express one's rational attitudes toward the people and things
one cares about."31 2 Yet government has no special relationship to
particular persons, excepting (perhaps) its special relationship to citi-
zens as against noncitizens1 3 -and even this is different from the
509 More precisely, pluralism plausibly leads to Local Incomparability. See supra
note 307.
310 See ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS, supra note 143; Pildes & Sun-
stein, Reinventing the Regulatory Stat, supra note 8, at 69 (discussing individual behav-
ior); Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation, supra note 16, at 822-23 (same); id. at
821 n.141 (claiming to be "indebted" to Value in Ethics and Economics).
s1 See supra Part I.E.
312 ANDERSON, VALUE N ETHICS AND ECONOMICS, supra note 143, at 18.
313 Cf DwORKIN, supra note 106, at 195-215 (describing the attitude of "equal con-
cern" that fellow citizens owe to each other and concluding that "nothing in this ar-
gument suggests that the citizens of a nation state, or even a smaller political commu-
nity, either do or should feel for one another any emotion that can usefully be called
love").
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kinds of familial or affectionate relationships that are central to Value
in Ethics and Economics, since government's relationship with citizen P
is not a relationship with him, come what may, but with him under the
description "citizen," which evaporates once that description no
longer obtains.
A possible response, I suppose, is that governmental officials
might be obliged (1) to adopt one or another attitude towards some
person, and (2) to act to express that attitude, even though those offi-
cials have no special relationship to that person. For example, gov-
ernmental officials are plausibly obliged to adopt an attitude of respect
towards all persons, citizens and noncitizens alike. Still, it remains the
case that the set of attitudes appropriately adopted by governmental
officials is much smaller than the set appropriately adopted by indi-
viduals. Consider the following exemplary list of "basic evaluative atti-
tudes" presented at one point in Value in Ethics and Economics: "love,
respect, consideration, affection, honor, and so forth."314  I would
think it improper for governmental officials to be motivated, in that
capacity, by love or affection, and at least problematic for them to be
motivated by consideration and honor.
If there is only a small range of attitudes that governmental offi-
cials appropriately adopt, then the theory of rationality propounded
in Value in Ethics and Economics-rational action is action that ex-
presses the attitudes appropriately held by the actor-is implausible as
a theory of rational (or moral) action by government "Express your
appropriate attitudes" (or that injunction together with the injunc-
tion, "Refrain from expressing inappropriate attitudes") is surely not
the only moral injunction binding upon governmental officials.31s In-
314 ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHIcS AND ECONOMICS, supra note 143, at 20.
315 Lest I be accused of adopting an idiosyncratic and unfair reading of Value in
Ethics and Economics, I would refer the reader to John Broome's review of the book. See
John Broome, Review, 9 RATIO (NEW SERIES) 90 (1996). Broome interprets Value in
Ethics and Economics as proposing that "the aim of actions is to express valuations [with]
'expression' ... to be taken literally." Id. at 92. He then goes on to object:
I cannot believe this theory. When I value something, what does my value
demand of my actions? Sometimes, no doubt, it demands expression .... But
much more often values demand to be achievecL When I hand a child a life-
jacket as she gets on my boat, I dare say that expresses my concern for her
safety. But I do not do it for that reason. I do it because it makes her safer; it
helps to achieve the value of safety.... If I were alone in the world, with no
one to express my values to, I would still need to act rationally so as to achieve
my values. Anderson has picked out one important but minor role of actions
and treated it as the whole.
Id. I happen to think that Broome's point constitutes a fatal criticism of the theory of
individual rationality proposed in Value in Ethics and Economics, but whether or not that
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deed, a close reading of the Anderson, Pildes, and Sunstein articles on
regulation suggests that the authors do not really intend to apply the
Value in Ethics and Economics theory to governmental action, because
the articles concede that expressively identical or meaningless gov-
ernmental actions can differ in goodness or rightness."' 6 We might
adopt a weaker expressive theory of governmental action-namely,
governmental actors must (1) comply with applicable nonexpressive
requirements and (2) act to express the rational attitudes (e.g., re-
spect) that they do appropriately hold-but this is not the theory ad-
vanced by Value in Ethics and Economics, l7 and not a theory that the
Pildes, Anderson, and Sunstein articles discussed here attempt to de-
fend.18
A second, brief argument for expressivism comes with an invoca-
is true, I think it constitutes conclusive grounds against extending Value in Ethics and
Economics to governmental action: government is obliged to achieve values, notjust to
express them. At the very least, this is true if "express" is used in the way I am using it
in this Article, to refer to the communication of linguistic meaning.
There is some possibility that Value in Ethics and Economics is using "express" and
.expressive" in a different, nonlinguistic sense. If so, the "expressive" (nonlinguistic)
theory presented by Value in Ethics and Economics presents no challenge whatsoever to
my claim that "expressive" (linguistic) theories of regulation and, more generally, of
law are unpersuasive.
316 See, e.g., Pildes & Anderson, SlingingArrows, supra note 8, at 2153 ("In evaluating
options, we look not only at the consequences of our choices-the actual combinations
of safety and money achieved by them-but at the expressive significance of making
these choices in the context at hand." (emphasis added)); id. at 2145-46 (providing an
exemplary list of values, which suggests a conceptualization of values as equaling or
including nonexpressive criteria for ranking outcomes or actions: "[m]ost interesting
individual or collective decisions implicate a wide diversity of values [such
as] ... respect[ing] rights, fulfill[ing] duties, satisfy[ing] needs, carry[ing] out prom-
ises, improv[ing] welfare, and follow[ing] through on the special projects and com-
mitments that we have collectively decided to undertake"); Pildes & Sunstein, Reinvent-
ing the Regulatory State, supra note 8, at 66 (stating that "[b]oth the material
consequences and the expressive consequences of policy choices are appropriate con-
cerns for policymakers"); id. at 74-75, 127 (suggesting that policy assessment might be
performed in two stages, with quantitative cost-benefit analysis undertaken at the first
stage and expressive issues considered at the second); Sunstein, Incommensurability and
Valuation, supra note 16, at 824 ("I do not claim that the expressive effects of law ...
are decisive or that they cannot be countered by a demonstration of more conven-
tional bad consequences.").
317 See Broome, supra note 315, at 92.
318 Pildes has recently disclaimed interest in the actual attitudes or other mental
states held by governmental officials. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. The
Pildes and Anderson article under discussion here itself does so, at least in the context
of statutory interpretation. See Pildes & Anderson, Slinging Arrows, supra note 8, at
2207-08 ("Apart from the ways in which they are mediated by [Congress's] institutional
practices [e.g., the practice of issuing a committee report to accompany a statute], in-
dividual subjective purposes do not have any particular role in the construction of col-
lective purposes and public meanings expressed in statutes .... ").
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tion of the value of "integrity." Pildes and Sunstein suggest that
[T]here is a... ground for endorsing the expressive function of law
[which] is not about social effects [i.e., instrumental effects on social
norms] in the same sense. To understand this idea, it is helpful to start
with the personal interest in integrity.... [W]e might say that individual
behavior is not concerned solely with states of affairs, and that if it were,
we would have a hard time making sense of important aspects of our
lives. Personal integrity, commitment, and the narrative continuity of a
life matter enormously as well. 19
Do Pildes and Sunstein really intend to say that, if one regulatory
choice is better justified than another on nonexpressive grounds, gov-
ernment might nonetheless be all-things-considered justified in choos-
ing the latter because of considerations of governmental integrity,
commitment, and narrative continuity? Perhaps they do; after all,
Ronald Dworkin has famously argued for integrity as a virtue of legal
systems.3' But Dworkin's "integrity" is nonexpressive-it is about legal
decisions truly cohering with each other, not about decisions express-
ing the importance of coherence 22-and Pildes and Sunstein do not
begin to show that, pace Dworkin, governmental integrity, commit-
ment, and narrative continuity are best understood symbolically.
A third attempt to demonstrate the existence of expressive con-
straints comes with the invocation of deontological rules. Pildes and
Sunstein, after discussing the virtues of personal integrity, commit-
ment, and the narrative continuity of a life, proceed to observe that
"someone might refuse to kill an innocent person at the request of a
terrorist, even if the consequence of the refusal is that many more
people will be killed. Our responses to this case are not adequately
captured in purely consequentialist terms." 34 This is absolutely cor-
319 Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatoy State, supra note 8, at 69; see also Sun-
stein, Incommensurability and Valuation, supra note 16, at 822-23 (similarly arguing for
connection between expressivism and personal integrity).
320 See, e.g., DwoRxIN, supra note 106, at 175-275.
3 Although Dworkin does refer to the "expressive value" of integrity, see id. at 189,
190, I take the accomplishment of this value to derive from (indeed, to reduce to) the
satisfaction of the nonexpressive requirements of fit, coherence, and so on that
Dworkin groups under the rubric of integrity. For Dworkin, the internal coherence of
a community's laws expresses its identity as a community of principle. This is quite dif-
ferent from saying that integrity demands certain statements by lawmakers. See, e.g., id.
at 190 ("[T]he expressive value [of integrity] is confirmed when people in good faith
try to treat one another in a way appropriate to common membership in a community
governed by political integrity... even when they disagree about exactly what integrity
requires in particular circumstances.").
32 Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, supra note 8, at 69; see also Sun-
stein, Incommensurability and Valuation, supra note 16, at 822-23 (similarly invoking
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rect. The rule against killing is the paradigmatic example of a non-
consequentialist moral constraint. That constraint is both deeply
plausible-indeed, we ought not kill-and nonconsequentialist in
form, since we are prohibited from killing one person even to prevent
five killings.3 But unless deontological constraints such as the no-
killing constraint are, at bottom, rules against saying something, it is a
non sequitur to leap from the genuine existence of such constraints to
the conclusion that expressive factors also obtain.
In fact, there are strong arguments against an expressivist account
of deontological constraints. For example, I may not intentionally
cause your death, nor may the government intentionally cause your
death, even to prevent five future killings, and even if the killing of
you has zero symbolic content.314 The no-killing constraint is a con-
straint upon doing harm, or upon intentionally causing harm, not
upon expressing disrespect for life. This issue is pursued at greater
length in Part III, where I argue in a general way that the consequen-
tialism/deontology debate is orthogonal to the debate about expres-
S. • M325sivism.5
Finally, and most extensively, Pildes and Anderson argue that the
relation of "higher" values (such as the value of life) to "lower" values
(such as the value of money) is captured by an expressive requirement
that actors must never communicate disrespect for the higher value
(e.g., by comparing it to the lower value in the wrong sort of way).
They defend this claim through a detailed examination of the Ford
Pinto case:
After Ford recognized that the peculiarly designed location of the
Pinto's gas tank subjected drivers and passengers to substantially greater
than usual risks of burn injuries or death in low-speed, rear-end colli-
sions, Ford... [conducted] a cost-benefit analysis in which a $200,000
value was assigned to a human life .... Ford then calculated the total
costs of repairs for all vehicles at $11 per vehicle, found these repair
costs to be substantially greater than the benefits of avoiding deaths and
bum injuries, and declined to make any repairs.326
deontological rules).
32 See KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS, supra note 123, at 70-105 (discussing the no-
killing prohibition); id. at 70-152 (discussing deontological constraints).
This example is designed to fall under both of the leading accounts of the no-
killing prohibition, namely as the central case of a constraint against doing harm (as
opposed to merely allowing harm) and, alternatively, as the central case of a constraint
against intendingharm (as opposed to merely doing or allowing harm nonpurposively).
See id. at 100-05 (discussing and contrasting these two accounts).
32 See infra text accompanying notes 393-415.
526 Pildes & Anderson, SlingingArrows, supra note 8, at 2150-51.
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Pildes and Anderson conclude that the public outrage against Ford is
best understood "to reflect an [expressive] set of judgments, not
about whether trade-offs between safety and expense should ever be
made, but about what it meant to make that particular trade-off in the
particular context in which it [was] made."
27
This is a false dichotomy. There are numerous nonexpressive ac-
counts of the public's justified moral outrage about the Pinto affair,
other than the implausible and incorrect view that life takes lexical
priority over money. Ford's valuation of life, $200,000, was at least ten
times too low2 so that the decision not to repair might well have
been wrong even in straight utilitarian terms. Further, because Ford
was marketing the car to consumers unaware of the defect, non-
utilitarian (and nonexpressive) considerations of desert and responsi-
bility might have required Ford to repair it even if doing so harmed
Ford stockholders more than it helped auto consumers.32 Finally, if
consumers were significantly poorer than stockholders, distributive
considerations might have come into play.330
Indeed, Pildes and Anderson fail to show that Ford's decision had
expressive content-that it implicated linguistic, sentence-meaning
conventions or had a real, Gricean speaker's meaning. They claim
that "given the background of social and legal understandings against
which Ford executives had acted, Ford's particular trade-off expressed
contempt for human life.... To market deliberately or refuse to recall
a dangerously defective good expresses contempt for human
life... [particularly] when the defect is concealed from consumers.
'M
The reference to contempt, here, just makes the account needlessly
complicated. We go from background rules constraining certain be-
havior, to an inference that Ford's breach of those rules "meant" con-
tempt, to outrage at the contempt. Why not say that Ford acted wrong-
fully by breaching the rules-by deliberately marketing a defective
327 Id. at 2151.
s28 See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 51-74 (1992) (surveying the large body of empirical litera-
ture valuing death and injury risks in dollars, and concluding that a reasonable dollar
value of life is in the range of $3 to $7 million).
32 See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, RiSKS AND WRONGS 303-28, 324 (1992) (describing
and defending conception of correctivejustice such that "the duty of wrongdoers... is
to repair the wrongful losses for which they are responsible"); SHER, supra note 191
(discussing the nonutilitarian factor of desert).
M See, e.g., SCHEFFLER, supra note 123, at 26-40 (sketching a nonutilitarian variant
of consequentialism that incorporates distributive criteria for ranking states of affairs).
331 Pildes & Anderson, SlingingArrows, supra note 8, at 2151.
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product whose defects were concealed-and that the outrage was a
response to this wrongdoing?
This suggests a further critique of the kind of expressive con-
straints that Anderson, Pildes, and Sunstein propose. Not only do
they fail to present a persuasive argument for the proposed con-
straints; there is also reason to think that, by virtue of the particular
form the constraints take, such an argument would be very difficult to
provide. Remember: government is purportedly constrained to ex-
press an appropriate view as to "which values take priority over others,
or how various values are best understood."3 2 I will interpret this,
perhaps unfairly, as an expressive constraint governing the descriptive
content of governmental choices. If cognitivism about morality is
true-and I understand Pildes, Anderson and Sunstein to be, at bot-
tom, cognitivists333-then statements about the relative priority of val-
ues, and about the best understanding of values, will be descriptive
statements.
So government is purportedly constrained to utter an appropriate
description of public values. Further, I take it, this expressive con-
straint is not subsumed by the generic constraint against lying nor by
the generic requirement that government justify its decisions.3 4 Al-
though a moral theory that prohibits "lying" or obliges legal officials
to "articulate a public justification" for their actions is indeed a genu-
ine expressive theory-the property of being a lie or being ajustifica-
tion are expressive properties, since only linguistically meaningful ac-
tions can possess these properties-Anderson, Pildes, and Sunstein
seem to be proposing something considerably more robust.
Thus, there will be some cases in which a regulatory decision is
fully justified on nonexpressive grounds, is accompanied by an utter-
ance correctly describing those grounds, is not accompanied by any
untruths, and yet still expresses an inappropriate valuation. But how
could this be? What space is left for expressive criteria prohibiting or
requiring descriptive utterances? Either (1) government is prohibited
from making certain true descriptive statements or (2) government is
required to make certain true statements that are not demanded by
the generic justification requirement. But (1) is deeply unappealing.
Surely Anderson, Pildes, and Sunstein do not mean to prevent gov-
M2 Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, supra note 8, at 66.
33 See supra text accompanying notes 67-68 (defending the claim that legal expres-
sivists are best seen as cognitivists, not metaethical expressivists).
334 See infra text accompanying notes 404-11, 432-39 (discussing these require-
ments).
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emiment from stating the truth about what values require or about
how values relate. So the Anderson/Pildes/Sunstein constraint seems
to be a superjustification requirement, along the lines of (2): Gov-
ernment must utter some descriptive statement beyond the statement
identifying the nonexpressive criteria that bear upon and justify its
decision. But what would be the content of that additional statement?
Descriptive statements which do not serve to justify government's de-
cisions and are not required by the nonexpressive criteria themselves
(for example, because the statements enhance overall well-being or
equality) would seem to be utterly inert and superfluous.
Let me close by emphasizing, once more, that Anderson, Pildes,
and Sunstein do not present a fully developed expressive theory of
regulation. Perhaps, when fully developed, it could withstand the
criticisms I have here adduced.33 But it is in any event useful to de-
lineate the serious difficulties that such a theory would need to con-
front. My discussion is intended to do that. Notably, Sunstein himself
seems now to be persuaded that the difficulties are insurmountable.
In his article On the Expressive Function of Law, which was published
subsequent to Incommensurability and Valuation and Reinventing the
Regulatory State, he concedes that "at least for purposes of law, any
support for 'statements' [by government] should be rooted not simply
in the intrinsic value of the statement, but also in plausible judgments
I should note two themes that have generally emerged in Pildes' work on consti-
tutional law, and that he might perhaps want to deploy in order to bolster an expres-
sive theory of regulation. These are the notions of "expressive harm" and of "exclu-
sionary reason." See Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra note 4, at 733-60. As for
the first- I have already argued, in my discussion of the Equal Protection Clause and
the Establishment Clause, that there is only a contingent connection between the
stigmatic content of governmental utterances and the occurrence of harm to a per-
son's self-respect (mediated by a change of her status); and I argue more generally be-
low that moral theory, insofar as it is focused on well-being and harm, is not expressive.
See supra text accompanying notes 235-42, 286-90; infra text accompanying notes 337-
75. As for exclusionary reasons: it is not completely clear to me whether Pildes in-
tends his "exclusionary reason" account as an argument in favor of an expressive the-
ory of constitutional law or as a separate account. In any event, I do not see how the
fact that governmental officials are constitutionally excluded from acting on certain
reasons (if indeed they are) supports expressivism in the linguistic sense under consid-
eration here. To say that a particular reason is excluded for a particular person is ei-
ther to make a motivational claim (that the person ought not act on the reason, or give
it weight in her deliberations, or something like that) or ajustificatoy claim (that the
reason has no weight in justifying the person's action). It does not follow (without
more) that the person is required to engage in, or to refrain from engaging in, a par-
ticular act of linguistic communication. See Heidi Hurd, ChallengingAuthority, 100YALE
L.J. 1611, 1618-44 (1991) (discussing Raz's concept of an exclusionary reason); Mi-
chael S. Moore, The Works ofJoseph Raz: Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons, 62 S. CAL. L.
REV. 827, 849-59 (1989) (same).
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about its effect on social norms and hence in 'on balance' judgments
about its consequences."316 For the reasons I have here presented, I
think that Sunstein's current views, not his former ones, are correct.
III. WHY ExPREssIVE THEORIES ARE UNPERSuASIVE:
A GENERAL ARGUMENT
Part II described and criticized the genuine expressive theories of
law that possess some significant degree of scholarly development and
salience: the diverse attempts to show that linguistic meaning is a
morally irreducible component of punishment; expressivism about
constitutional law, specifically about the Equal Protection Clause and
the Establishment Clause; and the expressive theory of regulation de-
veloped, at least in outline form, by Professors Anderson, Pildes, and
Sunstein. But even if my criticisms of all these particular theories are
cogent, expressivism might remain a viable option. The criticisms
might be weaker, or just inapplicable, with respect to an expressive
theory governing some other area of law or possessing some otherjus-
tificatory structure.
This Part tries to undercut that possibility. I will contend that a
genuinely expressive account, whatever its scope or structure, is mor-
ally implausible. The various critical themes running through my dis-
cussions of punishment, constitutional law, and regulation will reap-
pear here, in a more general and systematic way, and will be joined by
new arguments. I take the following approach: I construct a progres-
sively refined and sophisticated picture of the moral criteria governing
(or plausibly governing) legal decisions, starting from the simple core
of preference-utilitarianism and then adding new moral considera-
tions or refining existing ones. In this process, I attend carefully to
whether, at any point, the developing theory becomes genuinely ex-
pressive. The answer, I claim, is that it never does.
Preference-utilitarianism is the paradigm of a moral theory that is
not genuinely expressive. Expressivists standardly criticize preference-
M6 Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 20, at 2045; see also Sun-
stein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 21, at 965 ("Laws with expressive justifica-
dons are most plausibly defended on the ground that they will in fact affect social
norms and move them in appropriate directions.").
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utilitarianism; indeed, they standardly take it as their main foil.37
Utilitarianism is the view that all agents (including governmental
agents) are required to maximize overall well-being. Preference-
utilitarianism consists of that view, plus the specific claim that well-
being consists in the satisfaction of preferences ms The preference-
utilitarian compares two possible actions, A* and A, of a governmental
official, by asking the following: Does the world-state produced by A*
(call it 0*) better satisfy preferences, overall, than the world-state
produced by A (call it 0)? There is some question within preference-
utilitarianism as to how one conceptualizes and measures the overall
satisfaction of preferences when the preferences of different persons
conflict-when one person prefers 0* to 0 and another prefers 0 to
0".339 Whatever the answer to that question, however, it seems clear
that a preference-utilitarian view does not involve "expressive factors,"
as I defined them in Part I, and is therefore not a genuine expressive
theory.
The sole moral factors within a preference-utilitarian theory are
the preferences of individual persons. Whether A* is better than A is
solely a function of what P, prefers, what P prefers, and so on. Yet P's
preference (and P2's preference, and P's preference, etc.) is not an
expressive factor because its satisfaction or frustration does not neces-
sarily depend (even partially) upon what A* and A mean. A prefer-
ence can fix upon any feature of world-states; it need not fix exclu-
sively, or even partly, upon linguistic features!" ° For example, P
37 See supra note 130.
33 For a discussion of utilitarianism, and specifically preference-utilitarianism, see
the sources cited supra note 134. For more technical discussions of the nature of a
preference, see PREFEREN ES (Christoph Fehig & Ulla Wessels eds., 1998); ROBERT
AUDI, ACTION, INTENTION, AND REASON 35-55 (1993); S.L. HURLEY, NATURAL REASONS
55-83 (1989); RichardJ. Arneson, Liberaliscm, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportu-
nity for Welfare, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFP. 158, 161-64 (1990); and Arthur Ripstein, Preference,
inVALUE, WELFARE AND MORA.nY 93 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1993).
S39 SeegeneralyINTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster &John E.
Roemer eds., 1991) (providing a comprehensive discussion of methods for comparing
well-being of different persons, with a significant focus on the problem of comparison
given a preference-based view of well-being); Daniel Hausman, The Impossibility of Inter-
personal Utility Comparisons, 104 MIND 473 (1995) (summarizing and criticizing propos-
als for comparing preference-satisfaction of different persons).
so SeeJAEGWON KIM, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 13-14 (1996) (describing "desires," i.e.,
preferences, as a basic kind of "propositional attitude" and explaining that
"[p]ropositions are said to constitute the 'content' of the propositional attitudes").
Although other, less basic kinds of propositional attitudes may be restricted in their
possible content, it seems clear that preferences are not. In particular it seems quite
clear that preferences are not restricted in their possible content to linguistic proposi-
tions.
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might prefer simply that his basic biological needs be satisfied.
Clearly, the "need-satisfying" property of a governmental action is dis-
tinct from its linguistic properties. A* and A can fare differently with
respect to the satisfaction of P1 's needs, even though both A* and A
are meaningless.
Let us now begin to enrich our moral theory. The view that well-
being consists in the satisfaction of preferences is simply one position
(and a highly controversial one at that) in the space of possibilities.
Views of well-being can be divided into the following categories: (a)
preference-based views; (b) hedonic views; (c) objective-list views; and
(d) mixed views.3' Hedonic views postulate that well-being consists in
the realization of one or more types of pleasurable mental states or
the avoidance of one or more types of painful mental states.3 Objec-
tive-list views postulate that well-being consists in the realization of ob-
jective goods such as friendship, intellectual or aesthetic accomplish-
ment, recreation, religion, or participation in communal life.m
Mixed views combine elements of the various pure views; for example,
one might plausibly hold that a person is better off with some world-
state if and only if she better realizes the balance of objective goods in
that state and prefers (or comes to prefer) that state.
Let us hold fixed, for now, the utilitarian cast of our moral theory.
341 For comprehensive, philosophical discussions of the nature of well-being, see
JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 7-
72 (1986); L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS AND ETHIcS 45-137 (1996). The cate-
gorization I adopt here is close but not identical to the categorizations adopted by
Sumner or Griffin, which in turn are close but not identical to each other. See also Mo-
zaffar Qizilbash, The Concept of Well-Being 14 EcoN. & PHIL. 51 (1988) (providing a re-
cent overview of literature on well-being).
342 See GRIFFIN, supra note 341, at 7-10 (discussing hedonism as a variant of a "men-
tal-state" view of well-being); SUMNER, supra note 341, at 81-112 (discussing hedonism).
$43 Specifically, these are goods whose realization does not entail the satisfaction of
a preference or the realization of a pleasurable mental state. For a defense of the need
for this qualification, see Matthew D. Adler & Eric Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 201 (1999):
[W]e must distinguish between objective goods that entail pro-attitudes, and
objective goods that do not. 'Recreation' or 'play' is an objective value that,
presumably, entails a pro-attitude. I'm not truly playing a game if I'd prefer
not to be. A theory of well-being predicated solely on these kinds of [prefer-
ence]-entailing goods is [not a genuine objective-list theory].
A theory predicated on preference- or pleasure-entailing goods would, on the catego-
rization adopted here, count as a mixed theory. For general discussions of objective-
list theories, see SUMNER, supra note 341, at 45-80, and GRIFFIN, supra note 341, at 40-
72. See alsoJOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 85-90 (1980) (proposing
a particular mix of objective goods); GEORGE SHER, BEYOND NEUTRALrY:
PERFECnONISM AND POLITICS 199-201 (1997) (same).
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government is still required to maximize overall well-being. If the in-
corporated view of well-being is changed from a preference-based view
to a hedonic, objective-list, or mixed view, does the moral theory be-
come expressive?
Clearly, it does not become expressive just by virtue of adding he-
donic elements to the theory. The pleasure-related features of a gov-
ernmental action, like the preference-related features, are not linguis-
tic features. Pleasure, within the hedonic account, means a distinctive
positive feeling that is intrinsic to a mental occurrence and that ob-
tains even if the occurrence is dispreferred or lacks objective value.3 4
The paradigm instances are the pleasures caused by stimuli such as
scratching an itch, being massaged, taking a hot bath, quenching a
thirst, using a recreational drug, urinating, defecating, and sexual
arousal and orgasm. What these sensations have in common, in virtue of
which we distinguish them from physical pain, is just the fact that they
feel good. When asked to characterize the peculiar feeling tone of sen-
sory pleasure (or pain) we find, like Bentham, that we have little to say.
You either recognize what the intense rush of sexual release has in
common with the warm glow induced by a backrub, and what differenti-
ates them both from backache or neuralgia, or you do not.M
A hedonic-utilitarian government, choosing between actions A and
A*, would have some basic list of hedonic factors (F.. . F".) by which
to evaluate the world-states (0 and 0*) that the actions would pro-
duce. But these factors will refer to different types of feelings or sen-
sations that persons have in 0 and 0*, not to the linguistic meaning of
A and A*. The closest we could bring a hedonic theory to genuine
expressivism would be to define some hedonic factor, F,, as the "expe-
rience of government saying [some particular thing]." Yet even this
highly rigged and artificial variant of hedonic utilitarianism would not
be genuinely expressive, because two meaningless actions might pro-
duce different experiences of linguistic meaning among the population,
depending upon their beliefs about which linguistic conventions exist,
346their degree of attentiveness to governmental actions, and so on.
M" 'Pleasure" is sometimes understood to entail preference, but pleasure in the
sense that permits a distinction between preference-based and hedonic views of wel-
fare-pleasure, meaning a positive sensation-does not have this entailment. See gener-
ally SUMNER, supra note 341, at 98-112 (discussing the possible connections and dis-
tinctions between "pleasure" and "preference"). Similarly, "pain" within the hedonic
account means a distinctive negative feeling that is intrinsic to a mental occurrence and
that obtains even if the occurrence is preferred or posseses objective value.
3 Id. at 106.
U6 For the classic discussion (and criticism) of the way in which hedonic views
make well-being depend upon the experiences of welfare subjects, see ROBERT
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Objective-list theories of well-being, or mixed theories incorporat-
ing objective goods, seem to be a much more promising route for the
expressivist. Objective goods, or at least some of them, are plausibly
culturaL They plausibly depend, in part, upon social norms, social
forms, or some other such social practices. And there seems to be a
much stronger connection between the linguistic meaning of a gov-
ernment's utterances and social norms, forms, or practices, than be-
tween the linguistic meaning of a government's utterances and indi-
vidual preference-satisfaction or hedonic experience. Perhaps the
best example of a welfare theory of this kind, incorporating both ob-
jective goods and a cultural or social understanding of those goods, is
the theory articulated by the well-known moral and legal philosopher,
Joseph Raz. Raz claims that "[i]n large measure our well-being con-
sists in the (1) whole-hearted and (2) successful pursuit of (3) valu-
able (4) activities."347 In turn, he argues that the existence of a "social
form" or "social practice" supporting some activity is, generally, a nec-
essary condition for its value. "[V]aluable activities and pursuits de-
pend on social practices for their availability and, to a degree, even for
their existence.... 348 Raz gives the example of bird-watching:
Bird watching seems to be what any sighted person in the vicinity of
birds can do. And so he can, except that that would not make him into a
bird watcher. He can be that only in a society where this, or at least
some other animal tracking activities, are recognized as leisure activi-
ties .... Much of the interest that people have in goals of these kinds is
available to them because of the existence of suitable social forms.
34 9
In short, "[a] person's well-being depends to a large extent on success
in socially-defined and determined pursuits and activities."
3 50
The sentence meaning of legal decisions surely is one standard
mechanism by which law can influence social practice, specifically the
kind of social practice that Raz calls a "social form." In turn, Raz tells
us that objective values-objectively valuable activities-cannot be re-
NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974).
4 JOSEPH RAz, Duties of Well-Being, in ETHIcs IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 3, 3 (1994).
348 Id. at 18 n.17. In some respects, the views about well-being set forth by Raz in
this article are different from the earlier views presented in RAz, supra note 109, at 288-
320. The two works are consistent, however, in emphasizing the importance of social
forms or practices. I therefore cite the two interchangeably here. See alsoJoseph Raz,
Mixing Values, 65 PROC. OF THE ARUSTOTELAN SOcY 83 (1991) (similarly emphasizing
social forms and practices). See generally Roger Crisp, Raz on Well-Being 17 OXFORDJ.
LEGAL STuD. 500 (1997) (presenting a critical analysis of Raz's views, with a particular
focus on The Morality of Freedom).
49 RAZ, supra note 109, at 311.
350 Id. at 309.
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alized without supporting social forms. Crudely, we could say the fol-
lowing: The degree to which a particular value V is realized in a given
world-state depends both on whether people successfully perform the
relevant activity and on whether the matching social form exists.
Whether 0*is better than Owith respect to the value of bird-watching
is a partial function of whether the social form, bird-watching, exists in
O or O* To put the point a bit more formally, each objective value
has a cultural subvariable, such that two world-states identical with re-
spect to social forms fare identically with respect to the subvariable.
Given the intimate link between the sentence meanings of A and A*
and the social forms that exist in 0 and 0*, is not this Razian objec-
tive-list version of utilitarianism very close to a genuine expressive the-
ory?
Close, perhaps, but not close enough. The linguistic meaning of gov-
ernmental expression is not the same as its cultural impact. I emphasized
this point repeatedly in Part II while discussing specific expressive
theories.35' I am now making the same point more abstractly and sys-
tematically here. Imagine that governmental action A* has the sen-
tence meaning "Bird-watching is a valuable activity" and that action A
is meaningless. A*could lead to an outcome in which the social form,
bird-watching, is reinforced; it could have no impact; or it could, per-
versely, undermine the form if, for example, bird-watching is mainly
practiced by hippies and "counterculture" types who despise what the
352
government says.
The burgeoning literature on law and social norms is of some
relevance here.353 Social norms are not quite the same thing as what
Raz calls "social forms." Social norms are a social practice by which
activities (existing apart from the practice) are regulated. As one lead-
ing norms scholar states, "[B]y norms this literature refers to informal
social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of
ss1 See supra text accompanying notes 199-202, 235-42, 286-90.
352 Technically, given my definition of an expressive factor (as a factor such that
meaningless actions necessarily fare the same with respect to it), the example just pro-
vided does not prove that a Razian theory is nonexpressive. It is possible that: (1) the
status of meaningful A* versus meaningless A with respect to factor F depends upon
further facts beyond the linguistic meaning of the two actions, even though (2) mean-
ingless A and meaningless A'necessarily fare the same with respect to F See supra text
accompanying notes 139-40 (discussing different ways in which "expressive factor"
could be conceptualized). I have nonetheless used this example, here, for the sake of
expository variety; an example of meaningless actions faring differently with respect to
the cultural subvariable of Razian objective-list utilitarianism could readily be con-
structed.
M See supra note 44 (citing the literature on law and norms).
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an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal
sanctions, or both."3 " Fencing your enclosure, for example, is fencing
your enclosure whether or not there is a norm against it. The condi-
tions for a particular behavior to count as "fencing your enclosure" do
not include the existence of a no-fencing or pro-fencing norm. By
contrast, social forms are a social practice by which activities are
wholly or partly constituted5 5 Bird-watching without the form is not
the same as bird-watching with it; that is just Raz's point. Nonetheless,
both norms and forms are different kinds of social practice; legal
scholars have discussed, at some length, the way in which law affects
norms; and this should be at least suggestive for the less examined
question: How does law affect social forms?
Notably, the law-and-norms scholarship generally confirms the
claim I am making here-that the meaning of a governmental utter-
ance has only a contingent connection to the shape of social practice.
A full discussion of the scholarship would take us far afield; I will sim-
ply mention the scholars who have developed some kind of general
theory of the connection between law and norms. Robert Ellickson,
whose seminal book, Order Without Law, sparked the entire field, basi-
cally views norms as efficient equilibria in iterated prisoners' dilemma
games.3 16 In a one-shot prisoners' dilemma, the equilibrium outcome
is socially inefficient. By contrast, in an iterated game, the equilib-
rium outcome can be efficient, because the threat of retaliation from
other players in subsequent rounds can deter individual players from
choosing actions leading to an inefficient outcome. Ellickson argues
that members of "close-knit group[s] develop and maintain norms
whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members
obtain in their workaday affairs with one another"35 7 -norms that are
efficient within the group. Law changes these norms by changing the
game-theoretic structure upon which the existence of an efficient
equilibrium depends:
[T]he number of players involved in an inning of a game, the number of
innings in which current players later expect to encounter each other,
54 McAdams, Origin, Developmen supra note 44, at 340.
35 The distinction I am drawing here is, of course, just John Searle's well-known
distinction between "regulative" and "constitutive" rules. See SEABLE, supra note 82, at
33 ("[R]egulative rules regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of be-
havior, ... [while] constitutive rules... create or define new forms of behavior....");
see alsoJOHN SEARLE, T CONSTRUc'ION OF SOCIAL REALry 27-29 (1995) (reiterating
this distinction).
35 See E.ICESON, supra note 44, at 156-83.
357 Id. at 167 (emphasis omitted).
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the time span within which the players expect those innings to occur, the
quality of the players' information, and the distribution of power among
the players.35
None of these factors, with the possible exception of the players' "in-
formation," has any particularly strong causal connection (let alone a
conceptual one) with the meaning of governmental utterances. As
Ellickson explains:
Basic rules of land tenure.., can significantly influence both the
number of parties involved in land disputes and the frequency of those
parties' encounters.... [T]he subdivision of a commons into private
parcels abets cooperation by reducing the number of people concerned
with localized externalities....
Foundational laws can also lengthen a person's perceptions of the
time span .... For instance, neighbors who own usufructuary inter-
ests... are likely to have less permanent relationships than neighbors
who have life estates ....359
Even the informational factor, which concerns the information that
people end up possessing, should be distinguished from the informa-
tion that government provides to them (that is, the descriptive con-
tent of governmental utterances). For example, Ellickson cautions
lawmakers against "imposing new regulatory burdens on the collec-
tion and dissemination of truthful, publicly available information
about past behavior."3
Robert Cooter has a somewhat different picture of norms-unlike
Ellickson, he argues that the existence of a norm involves the pun-
ishment of nonconformers by "norm-enforcers" who have "internal-
ized" the norm36ibut he ends up reaching broadly similar conclu-
sions about the mechanisms by which law changes norms. Cooter
points specifically to the role of law in changing the information that
group members possess and in changing the close-knit nature of
S9 Id. at 284. See generally id. at 280-86 (summarizing interaction between law and
norms).359 Id. at 284-85.
360 Id. at 286.
361 See Cooter, supra note 44, at 953-57. By "internalized," Cooter means, roughly,
that the enforcers prefer to conform independent of the threat of external sanction.
See id. at 956-57. The article cited here is an elaboration of earlier work on norms by
Cooter. See id. at 953 n.38 (citing Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex
Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1643 (1996) and Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market Modernization of Law, 16
INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 141 (1996)).
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362groups.
Information looms particularly large in the account offered by
Richard McAdams, who claims that norms involve a preexisting moral
consensus among some portion of the population, which becomes
widely known and is then informally enforced by the withdrawal of
public esteem from norm-violators.an Yet McAdams, like Ellickson3u
and Gooter,365 recognizes that government can facilitate or undermine
the spread of information required for a consensus to be known, not
just by providing the information itself, but also by changing the legal
regime governing information acquisition. For example, McAdams
argues in favor of a legal regime protecting private, sexual informa-
tion on the grounds that this kind of regime weakens unwelcome
norms governing sexual practices, such as the norm against homo-
sexualitysw
Eric Posner advances quite a different model of norms than do El-
lickson, Gooter, or McAdams.36 Unlike Gooter and McAdams, Posner
denies that the existence of a norm involves its "internalization" by the
group in which the norm exists or some subset thereof, or a consensus
among the group or a subset thereof that the disfavored behavior is
morally wrongs6 Unlike Ellickson, Posner conceptualizes norms as
equilibria in so-called "signaling" games rather than in iterated pris-
oners' dilemmas.369 (In these "signaling" games, "good types," whose
preferences make them well-suited to cooperate with other parties,
take actions to signal their preference structure, while "bad types,"
whose preferences predispose them to cheat those with whom they in-
teract, attempt to mimic the "good types.") Nonetheless, Posner's
362 See Cooter, supra note 44, at 972-78.
5W See McAdams, Origin, Development, supra note 44, at 355-75.
364 See supra text accompanying note 360.
365 See Cooter, supra note 44, at 974 ("Informal punishment of transactional wrongs
fails when broadcasting [information about the wrong] costs too much relative to the
value of a stem reputation. One remedy is to lower the cost of stigmatizing wrongdo-
ers .... ."). This formulation suggests that a (meaningless) legal change that allows pri-
vate parties to "stigmatize" wrongdoers more freely would be one type of remedy
Cooter is envisioning here. See also id, at 974-75 & nn.88-89 (arguing that the threat of
an employee suit for wrongful discharge undermines an employer's ability to broadcast
information about the employee's unsatisfactory performance to prospective employ-
ers).
366 See McAdams, Origin, Development supra note 44, at 427-32.
367 See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27J.
LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998).
36 See id. at 797 & n.53.
S69 See id. at 767-72.
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model strongly supports the view of the connection between norms
and governmental expression for which I am arguing here: govern-
mental actions can create, reinforce, or dissolve norms without those
actions themselves possessing linguistic meaning. Posner notes that
law can change the equilibria in signaling games by "modify[ing] the
cost of sending a signal," by "modify[ing] the payoffs from coopera-
tion," and by "modify[ing the] beliefs [of those attempting to distin-
guish between "good" and "bad" types] about the proportion of types
in the population;"'T° none of these mechanisms entails that law itself
is expressive.
Finally, Larry Lessig, in his work on "social meaning," stresses that
the state has "behavioral" as well as "semiotic" techniques for chang-
ing the social meaning of actions. Lessig writes:
We can isolate two such behavioral techniques .... The first is a
regulation designed to inhibit a certain behavior that would otherwise aid
in the construction or reinforcement of a disfavored social meaning.
Segregation, for example, is both an instance of racial harm and a be-
havior that reinforces the social meaning of inequality. Prohibiting seg-
regation is a way of undermining practices that reinforce social mean-
ings of stigma and inequality.
Another example makes the point more directly. Under the Fair
Housing Act, it is illegal for a real estate broker to indicate, whether
asked or not, what the racial makeup of a community is when a buyer is
purchasing residential property... [Such] restrictions attempt to re-
duce the number of economic decisions made on the basis of race....
... The second technique is to induce actions that tend either to un-
dermine or to construct a particular social meaning.... Political ritual is
the easiest case, and Barnette [in which the government was prohibited
from requiring schoolchildren to stand and salute the flag] serves as a
helpful guide through this example.37
Lessig's work may be most directly relevant here, because Lessig insists
that his focus is on "social meaning," not social norms. Perhaps this
370 Id. at 778; see also id. at 789 (summarizing the effect of law on signaling equilib-
ria).
571 Lessig, supra noie 22, at 1013-14. The "semiotic" techniques are generally de-
scribed id. at 1009-12, while the "behavioral" techniques are generally described id. at
1012-14.
s7 More precisely, Professor Lessig has clarified in subsequent works that the con-
cept of "social meaning" at issue in The Regulation of Social Meaning supra note 22, is
distinct from the concept of "social norms" as that concept is typically understood by
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distinction is better cast as the distinction between social forms and so-
cial norms. I am skeptical that the kinds of activities Lessig generally
focuses upon, such as sexual practices or smoking,373 possess linguistic
meaning;374 more plausibly, the activities are formalized, in that such ac-
tivities are partly constituted by their cultural cast. Smoking is not the
same activity as putting wrapped tobacco in your mouth; practicing
safe sex is not the same as using prophylactics in a society that lacks
sexual rituals.
If this assertion is correct, and Lessig is indeed best construed as
analyzing the effect of law on social forms, then Lessig's analysis di-
rectly illuminates the question at stake here: Is Razian (social form-
based) objective-list utilitarianism a genuine expressive theory of law?
The answer, that analysis suggests, is no. Just as the work of Professors
Ellickson, Cooter, Posner, and McAdams supports the view that the
linguistic meaning of government's utterances has at best a contin-
gent connection to the shape of social norms, so the work of Professor
Lessig supports the view that the linguistic meaning of government's
utterances has at best a contingent connection to the shape of social
forms.
To sum up: No version of utilitarianism is genuinely expressive.
The utilitarian compares two governmental actions, A* and A, by ref-
erence to the total well-being contained in the world-states 0* and 0
that those actions would produce. More specifically, preference-
utilitarianism evaluates 0* and 0 in light of the preferences P,... P of
individual persons; hedonic utilitarianism evaluates the two states in
light of fundamental feeling-types F. . . F; and objective-list utilitarian-
ism evaluates the two states in light of objective values V... V,. But
neither the P, nor the F1, nor the V are genuine expressive factors, be-
cause actions A* and A can fare differently with respect to a P, or an
F, or a V, even though neither action is meaningful-even though
neither possesses linguistic meaning. This is true notwithstanding the
fact that certain variants of utilitarianism may be genuinely social or
cultural in the sense that the comparative worth of O* and 0 may be a
other legal scholars, in particular, law-and-economics scholars. See Lawrence Lessig,
The New Chicago School 27J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 680-85 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Social
Meaning and SocialNorms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2182-86 (1996).
373 See Lessig, supra note 22, at 1019-34.
374 See id. at 951 ("Any society or social context has what I call here social mean-
ings--the semiotic content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within
a particular context."). This assertion suggests the linguistic-meaning reading of "so-
cial meaning." Lessig, however, quickly goes on to say that his concern is "to find a way
to speak of the frameworks of understanding within which individuals live," id. at 952,
which suggests the social-form reading.
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partial function of social or cultural factors, factors that make refer-
ence to the social practices (norms, forms) that exist in 0* and 0.
Preference-based and hedonic utilitarianism are neither genuinely so-
cial nor genuinely expressive. Objective-list utilitarianism may be
genuinely social, but-given the contingent connection between the
linguistic meaning of A* and A, and the kind of social practices that
exist in 0* and 0-it is not genuinely expressive either.3 5
Expressivism will not emerge within utilitarianism, even within its
cultural or social variants. Our moral theory must be further en-
riched. How do we do that?
Let us now consider consequentialist theories that are not utilitar-
ian. A moral theory is consequentialist if it has the same general
structure as utilitarianism: if it evaluates actions solely in light of the
world-states, or outcomes, that the actions produce.3 76 Utilitarianism is
the specific variant of consequentialism that uses the criterion of over-
all well-being to rank world-states. Other, nonutilitarian variants of
consequentialism employ other criteria: either they omit the criterion
of overall well-being and replace it with some other(s), or they retain
that criterion but supplement it with other(s). Does the move within
consequentialism from utilitarian to nonutilitarian variants trigger the
emergence of genuine expressivism?
37 What about incorporating into utilitarianism an expressive theory of individual
well-being modeled roughly on Elizabeth Anderson's expressive theory of individual
rationality? Anderson herself is hardly a utilitarian, but might it not be possible to em-
ploy her theory for utilitarian purposes and to stipulate that government should
maximize overall well-being, with each individual's well-being defined as some function
of what that person says? Yet even this sort of theory would not be a genuinely expres-
sive theory of law or governmental action. Imagine, for example, that individual lives
are better, ceteris paribus, to the extent that individuals express love for close friends
and family. Factor E, measures the extent to which that expression of love occurs; the
world is better with respect to E, to the extent that appropriate love is appropriately
expressed, and worse, to the extent that it is not expressed (or that inappropriate love
is expressed). Yet E, looks to the totality of what loving and nonloving individuals say
about love, not merely to what government says about love or anything else. Thus, de-
pending on the facts, government's saying, "The only thing 'free love' is free of is love"
or, "Just say no" might augment, decrease, or have no effect upon E,. Conversely, a
theory that looked essentially to what the government said would not be a utilitarian
theory (except if it were based on an utterly implausible view of individual well-being
as depending solely on what the government said).
See generally sources cited supra note 123 (defining and debating consequential-
ism). A particularly precise definition of consequentialism is provided by McNaughton
& Rawling, supra note 142.
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One plausible source of variation, within consequentialism, con-
cerns the proper distribution of well-being. Utilitarianism employs an
aggregative approach: 0* is better than Ojust in case total well-being
in 0* is greater than total well-being in 0. Other variants of conse-
quentialism employ nonaggregative approaches. For example, egali-
tarian consequentialism says that 0* is better than Ojust in case well-
being in 0* is spread more equally than well-being in 0. 3 7 Maximin
consequentialism says that 0* is better than Ojust in case the worst-off
person in 0* is better off than the worst-off person in 0. s78 One hy-
brid sort of consequentialism says that the comparison of O* and 0 is
a function both of the total well-being in the two worlds and of the
degree to which well-being is spread equally in the two worlds. This
sort of variation along the dimension of distribution, however, does
not change the nonexpressive cast of consequentialism. Well-being is
still what is being distributed, and how each person fares with respect
to well-being remains a function of her preferences, her feeling-states,
or the objective values she realizes, not the linguistic content of gov-
ernment's actions. For A* to fare better than A with respect to the to-
tal amount of well-being, the equality of well-being, the well-being of
the worst-off, or any combination of these factors, it is not necessary
that A* or A be subsumed under a linguistic convention matching ac-
tions to sentence meanings.
A second plausible dimension of variation, within consequential-
ism, concerns the item that is being distributed. What characterizes
377 More precisely, the theory just described is egalitarian welfarist consequential-
ism. Another variant of egalitarian consequentialism is egalitarian resourcist conse-
quentialism, which is concerned with equalizing primary goods rather than welfare
itself. Similarly, the term "maximin consequentiaism" that I will use in a moment is
technically "maximin welfarist consequentialism." See infra text accompanying notes
379-82 (distinguishing between consequentialistviews that focus on welfare and conse-
quentialist views that focus on primary goods). On the possibility of egalitarian conse-
quentialism, see KAGAN, NORMATIvE ETHncs, supra note 123, at 48-54. The best discus-
sion of the various egalitarian criteria for ranking outcomes is LARRY TEMKIN,
INEQUALrY (1993).
378 As Samuel Scheffler explains:
I believe that there are... a number of consequentialist conceptions capable
of accommodating the objection based on distributive justice.... [One such]
view identifies the best state of affairs from among a set [as follows].... Given
two states of affairs... the better state of affairs is the one that maximizes the
position of the worst-off group. If the two states of affairs are identical in this
respect, the better state of affairs is the one that minimizes the number of
people in the worst-off group (by relocating them upward). If the two states
of affairs are identical in both of these respects, then the better state of affairs
is the one that maximizes the position of the next worst-off group, and so on.
S HEFFLER, supra note 123, at 26-27.
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utilitarianism as a distinct moral view is both its aggregative approach
and the fact that it aggregates well-being rather than something else.
John Rawls has famously argued that a moral theory should focus on
the distribution of primary goods, rather than well-being.379 The nonu-
tilitarian cast of A Theory ofJustice is bidimensional: Rawls moves (1)
from an aggregative to a maximin approach to distribution, and (2)
from well-being to primary goods as the basis for determining the po-
sition of the least well-off.
The difference principle [i.e., maximin] ... introduc [es] a simplifi-
cation for the basis of interpersonal comparisons. These comparisons
are made in terms of expectations of primary social goods .... [which]
are things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he
wants.... With more of these goods men can generally be assured of
greater success in carrying out their intentions and in advancing their
ends, whatever these ends may be. The primary social goods, to give
them in broad categories, are rights and liberties, opportunities and
powers, income and wealth. ([Another] very important primary good is
a sense of one's own worth .... 38o
Rawlsian primary goods bear particular mention here, given the
recurrent role that the primary good of self-respect ("a sense of one's
own worth") has played within expressive theories. In Part II, I de-
scribed the role of self-respect within Jean Hampton's expressive theory
of punishment, within expressive theories of the Equal Protection
Clause, and within the view that the Establishment Clause prohibits
the "endorsement" of religion. s" Self-respect is linked to social forms
and norms-it is plausibly a necessary condition for full self-respect
that I lack the social status of an inferior; that I am a first class rather
than an nth-class citizen-but these social practices, constitutive of
self-respect, are conceptually distinct from the linguistic meaning of
government's utterances. I made this point, in a general way, when
37 SeeJOHN RAWns, A T-EORYOFJUSTICE 90-95 (1971).38 Id. at 92; see also KOPPELMAN, supra note 32, at 205 (discussing Rawlsian self-
respect, with specific reference to stigma). Other prominent scholars have pursued
Rawls's lead and argued that the "currency" ofjustice is primary goods, or something
close to that, rather than well-being. See G.A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare,
Goods, and Capabilities, in THE QuALITY OF LIFE 9 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen
eds., 1993); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 283 (1981); Nagel, supra note 154, at 142-72; Thomas Scanlon, The Moral Ba-
sis of Interpersonal Comparisons, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra
note 339, at 17-44; Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUA=it OF LIFE, su-
pra, at 30.
581 See supra Parts IIA-B.
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discussing Razian objective-list utilitarianism.ss2 The same point holds
true in explaining why a nonutilitarian variant of consequentialism
that focuses on primary goods rather than welfare is not genuinely
expressive. Government does not necessarily create or undermine the
self-respect of some persons (the worst off, or anyone else) by valoriz-
ing or stigmatizing them, or by saying anything else.
A third plausible dimension of variation, within consequentialism,
concerns the function of desert.m A desert claim takes the following
form: a given state or event is deserved by some person in virtue of
some feature of hers, such as her prior wrongdoing, her diligent ef-
forts, her free choice, her athletic, musical, or other nonmoral merit,
or her moral virtue. To give some standard examples:
1. Jones deserves his success; he's worked hard for it.
3. Walters deserves the job; he's the best-qualified applicant.
4. Wilson deserved to be disqualified; he knew the deadline for applica-
tions was March 1.
5. Jackson deserves more than minimum wage; his job is important and
he does it well.
6. Baker deserves to win; he's played superbly.
8. [Applebaum] deserves his twenty-year sentence; he planned the
murder.
10. Winters deserves some compensation; he's suffered constant pain
since the shooting.
11. Lee deserves a reward; he risked his life.
13. Gordon deserves some good luck; he's had only bad. U
4
An expressive account of desert might in theory stipulate either that
the desert-basis is sometimes expressive, or that the deserved outcome
is sometimes expressive, or both. In all of the above examples, how-
ever, the desert-basis is nonexpressive-what matters is that the person
worked hard, possessed the best qualifications, ignored the predict-
able outcome, executed an important job, performed a meritorious
action, committed culpable wrongdoing, and so forth, not that she
M See supra text accompanying notes 351-75.
-W See KAGAN, NORMATIvE ETHIcS, supra note 123, at 54-59 (discussing the possibil-
ity of injecting considerations of desert into consequentialism).
&84 SHER, supra note 191, at 7. Sher uses "Anderson," not "Applebaum," in the
original, but since I refer to Professor Elizabeth Anderson at various points in the Arti-
cle, I use "Applebaum" here to avoid confusion.
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said something-and in any event the expressive cast of the desert-
basis does not make the case for an expressive theory of law. Gov-
ernment's role, if any, is in meting out deserved states or events. So
let us focus on the kind of expressive, desert-based theory that con-
strues the deserved outcome to be expressive.
On this kind of theory, the occurrence of some desert-basis (such
as hard work, good qualifications, voluntary risk-taking, practical ac-
complishment, meritorious action, or culpable wrongdoing) improves
the consequential evaluation of certain statements. Those statements
are ascribed greater value than if the desert-basis had not occurred.
For example, the statement "We praise Baker, who was the best pianist
in this competition" might be accorded intrinsic value, conditional
upon Baker's actually being the best pianist in the group. If he is, a
laudatory statement is "deserved" and counts as a good thing quite
apart from any further beneficial consequences the statement may
have. Similarly, the statement "Applebaum is condemned" might be
accorded intrinsic value, conditional upon Applebaum's being a
wrongdoer-this is, in effect, what Robert Nozick's expressive and de-
sert-based theory of punishment does.3s Or, a statement such as
"Winters deserves to be compensated by Fred" might become intrinsi-
cally valuable in virtue of the fact that Fred injured Winters. A state-
ment such as 'Jones is a success!" might become intrinsically valuable
in virtue ofJones's hard work.
One problem with this kind of view is that it has limited scope; it is
intuitively plausible for the cases of meritorious action and culpable
wrongdoing, but not for the further cases delineated in the above list
of examples. What the injured Winters, intuitively, deserves is not a
statement, but whatever it takes to redress the injury that Fred caused
to him. Likewise, whatJones deserves is success; what Walters deserves
is the job; what Wilson deserves is disqualification. Another problem
is that the expressive account of desert is ad hoc, even within the lim-
ited domain of meritorious and wrongful action. Applebaum does,
intuitively, deserve condemnation and not merely hard treatment-to
return to the discussion in Part II, he deserves Punishment,.+, not
merely Punishment---but, as we have seen, existing attempts to justify
Ms See supra text accompanying notes 187-88 (discussing Nozick's theory).
Arguably, the account has intuitive plausibility for the case of meritorious char-
acteras well as meritorious action. See SHE-, supra note 191, at 132-49 (analyzing desert
claims that arise from virtue). But if so, the expressivist account of the meritorious
character case is subject to my criticisms of expressivism regarding the desert-claims of
bad and good actors.
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this intuition are unpersuasive. Robert Nozick argues that wrongdo-
ers deserve PunishmentB, not merely Punishment, because Punish-
ment+, tracks wrongdoing. I suggested in Part II that the argument
was fallacious. Poetic justice (the landslide falling on the murderer)
does not track wrongdoing, but a reliable system of Punishment, would
do so, even granting Nozick his controversial premise that desert en-
tails tracking. 8
What about an expressive, desert-based account of meritorious ac-
tion? Given the rough symmetry between meritorious and culpable
action, it is hard to see why that account should succeed where an ex-
pressive account of punishment and wrongdoing fails. If wrongdoers
do not, in fact, deserve condemnation-and no one has yet shown
that they do-then why assume that good-doers deserve praise?m  At
most, government and private actors are under generic requirements
of veracity and justification that apply, inter alia, to cases of culpable
wrongdoing and meritorious action.m9 If Applebaum deserves Pun-
ishment, (hard treatment), and if, further, government has a generic
moral reason to furnish a justification for its decisions, then govern-
ment has a moral reason both to inflict hard treatment upon Apple-
baum and to utter a statement describing his desert-basis (the fact of
his culpable wrongdoing). Similarly, if government has a generic rea-
son not to lie, and if Baker really was the best pianist in the competi-
tion, then government has a moral reason not to award the prize for
"Best PianisC to anyone other than Baker (insofar as the conferral of
this award upon anyone else involves the false assertion that the re-
cipient was better than Baker). As George Sher explains:
"By... appealing to veracity, we can justify the desert-claims that arise
when persons display merit in conventionally structured contexts."390
He elaborates:
If awarding a prize or grade in accordance with fixed rules amounts to
making an assertion about how well the recipient has performed, then
deviating from those rules must amount to making a false assertion about
this. Hence, whatever is wrong with making such false assertions must
also be wrong with departing from the rules.... [I]f someone who
promulgates, referees, or judges a contest knowingly deviates from the
87 See supra text accompanying notes 187-88 (criticizing Nozick's expressive ac-
count of punishment).
3W See S-Ea, supra note 191, at 111 (noting the symmetry between desert-claims of
wrongdoers and meritorious actors).
389 See id. at 115-18 (considering the extent to which the principle of veracity ex-
plains desert-claims of meritorious actors).
390 Id. at 117.
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rules, and thus makes (or contributes to the making of) a false assertion
about a performer's merit, he arguably does violate his obligation of ve-
racity. 9
Note, however, that the generic "expressive" duties of truth-telling and
justification are not limited to the case of a deserving actor-these ob-
ligations would come into play even where no desert-basis has oc-
curred-and that the statement required or proscribed by these duties
is a descriptive statement, not the statement of praise or condemnation
purportedly triggered by merit or wrongdoing. 2
We have thus far considered two types of moral enrichment that
might be thought to trigger the emergence of an expressive theory:
391 Id. at 116 (citation omitted).
392 Cass Sunstein suggests that expressive considerations may enter consequential-
ism via the role of "expressive norms" in ranking states of affairs.
We might be tempted to suppose that people can avoid expressive concerns
entirely and that it is possible to assess law solely on the basis of conse-
quences .... But this is not actually possible. The effects of any legal rule can
be described in an infinite number of ways. Any particular characterization or
accounting of consequences will rest not on some description of the brute
facts; instead it will be mediated by a set of (often tacit) norms determining
how to describe or conceive of consequences. It is possible to see a large part
of the expressive function of law in the identification of what consequences
count....
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 20, at 2048. This seems to be a
kind of metaethical expressivism: whether outcome O is better than 0 depends upon
whether, in light of existing norms-for-conceiving-consequences (norms for the prac-
tice of moral evaluation), 0* is better. I doubt that Sunstein really means to espouse
metaethical expressivism, and in any event there are strong arguments against such a
view. If the goodness or badness of consequences has moral weight (prima facie or
conclusive), then morally good or bad consequences are not simply the consequences
that we all approve as good or bad (in light of norms, or otherwise). See supra text ac-
companying notes 61-68 (arguing against noncognitivism and against the noncognitiv-
ist construal of Sunstein and other legal expressivists). But even leaving this point
aside-even assuming that the moral goodness or badness of 0 and 0* is, at bottom,
reducible to their status pursuant to social norms-for-conceiving-consequences-it
seems incorrect that this status, in turn, has any conceptual connection to the linguistic
meaning of governmental utterances. For example, a particular activity might be so-
cially disfavored (both as a matter of general belief, and pursuant to the social norms-
for-conceiving-consequences, such that the flourishing of the activity is not conven-
tionally counted as a world-improvement), notwithstanding the efforts of a (progres-
sive or reactionary) government to speak out in favor of that activity. No metaethical
expressivist I know of thinks that "X is morally required/prohibited/permitted/
good/bad" reduces to "X is legally required/prohibited/permitted/good/bad" or to
"government says that Xis required/prohibited/permitted/good/bad."
20001 1479
1480 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:1363
first, the enrichment that occurs within utilitarianism when we move
from a preference-based view of well-being to other, more sophisti-
cated views; second, the move from utilitarianism to a more nuanced
kind of consequentialism, which looks not merely to the maximization
of well-being but in addition (or alternatively) to considerations of
equality, primary goods, and desert. But expressivism does not yet
seem to have emerged. Perhaps, then, the best way to construct an
expressive theory is by rejecting consequentialism entirely: by moving
from a theory that enjoins agents to maximize good consequences
(however defined), to a theory that incorporates deontological con-
straints, such that agents are proscribed from breaching these con-
straints even where their breach would produce good consequences
overall.
39 3
Deontological constraints do indeed surface within the literature
on expressive theories of law. For example, as we have seen, Pildes
and Sunstein attempt to defend an expressive theory of regulation by
appealing to deontological constraints:
[T]here is a second ground for endorsing the expressive function of law,
and this ground is not about social effects .... [S]omeone might refuse
to kill an innocent person at the request of a terrorist, even if the conse-
quence of the refusal is that many more people will be killed. Our re-
sponses to this case are not adequately captured in purely consequential-
ist terms.
3 94
393 For general discussions of the nature and plausibility of deontological con-
straints, see KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS, supra note 123, at 70-152; NOZICE, supra note
346, at 26-53; SCHFFLER, supra note 128, at 80-114; Richard Brook, Is Smith Obligated
that (She) Not Kill the Innocent or that She (Not Kill the Innocent): Expressions and Ration-
ales for Deontological Constraints, 35 S.J. PHIL. 451 (1997); F.M. Kamm, Non-
Consequentalism, the Person As an End-in-Itself and the Significance of Status, 21 PiL. &
PUB. AT. 354 (1992); McNaughton & Rawling, supra note 142; and Nagel, supra note
154, at 156-67.
394 Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, supra note 8, at 69. Pildes and
Sunstein describe this scenario with language suggestive of deontological options,
rather than constraints. See id. ("[I]ndividual behavior is not concerned solely with
states of affairs, and... if it were, we would have a hard time making sense of impor-
tant aspects of our lives. Personal integrity, commitment, and the narrative continuity
of a life matter enormously as well." (footnote omitted)); see also SCHEFFLER, supra note
123, at 41-79 (discussing and defending deontological options); Nagel, supra note 154,
at 150-56 (same). But the particular example of killing one to save five is generally
seen to implicate constraints rather than options, see, e.g., SCHErLR, supra note 123,
at 80-114 (discussing "agent-centered restrictions," i.e., constraints); and in any event, I
think it much more plausible that government is subject to deontological constraints
than that government is entitled to deontologica options, see supra text accompanying
notes 153-58 (arguing that government lacks its own "projects," of the kind that op-
tions protect).
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The deontological constraint invoked here-the prohibition on kill-
ing one person, even to save more than one person-is indeed a plau-
sible element of morality that cannot be captured within a consequen-
tialist framework and that plausibly applies to governmental actions,
not just the actions of private individuals. Government is constrained
from killing an innocent person, even if that action will avert a greater
number of deaths or killings overall or is consequentially warranted in
some other way.3"
Note, however, that the existence of a deontological constraint
covering governmental actions does not yet produce an expressive
theory of government or of lawmaking-it simply produces a noncon-
sequentialist theory. A deontological constraint simply identifies a
particular type of action, the performance of which is prohibited not-
withstanding better consequences overall. Unless the constrained ac-
tion is characterized in linguistic terms, deontology is no more an ex-
pressive theory than simple or sophisticated consequentialism. For
example, imagine that the prohibition on killing an innocent person
is best captured by a constraint on intentional, serious, nondefensive,
and undeserved harming.95 Each agent is generally constrained from
intentionally producing a significant setback to another person's in-
terests, unless the harm is deserved or the agent acts in self-defense;
and the requirement not to (intentionally) kill an innocent person is
seen as a specific application of this more general constraint. Such a
constraint is nonexpressive because the prohibited actions are charac-
terized in terms of nonlinguistic properties: what matters about an
action is whether it causes serious harm (and if so, whether it was per-
formed nonintentionally, defensively, or by virtue of the harmed per-
son's desert), not what the action means. The utterance of a statement
might constitute a prohibited harming (if, for example, a governmen-
tal official utters a statement directing a subordinate to shoot the vic-
tim), but so might the performance of a meaningless action (if, for
example, the official himself shoots the victim), and, clearly, it is quite
possible that two meaningless actions will fare differently with respect
to the no-harming constraint.
In short, the existence of deontological constraints is useful for
395 See, e.g., KAGAN, NoRMATnvE ETHIcs, supra note 123, at 71 ("Intuitively, at least,
most of us have little doubt that it is morally forbidden to chop up an innocent person,
even if this is the only way to save five other innocent people from death. Some acts
are morally off-limits; they are forbidden, even if the results would be good.").
396 Cf id. at 70-105 (discussing how a prohibition on killing one to save five might
be specified in light of distinctions between doing and allowing harm, intending and
foreseeing harm, defensive and offensive harm, and/or related distinctions).
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the expressivist only if she can further show that such constraints (or
at least some of them) are "expressive factors" in the sense that I de-
scribed in Part I-only if she can further show that at least some of the
constraints characterize actions by reference to linguistic meaning.
Sunstein and Pildes do not attempt to make this further showing; they
simply, and inconclusively, point to the existence of deontological
constraints" Similarly, Dan Kahan leaps from the fact that noncon-
sequential gradations of wrongdoing exist to the conclusion that an
expressive theory of wrongdoing is correct.
[C]ompare the actions of a white supremacist who kills an African-
American out of racial hatred and a mother who in anger kills a man
who has sexually abused her child. Both acts are wrong, and their con-
sequences are in some sense equivalent-there is one dead person in
each case. Nevertheless, the racist's killing is more worthy of condemna-
tion precisely because his hatred expresses a more reprehensible valua-
tion than does the mother's 
anger.
Assume Kahan is correct that no consequentialist account of the
difference between the white supremacist and the avenging mother is
available.'" He still needs an argument that the best deontological
account of the difference is an expressive account. An expressive con-
straint could explain the difference-perhaps there is a special con-
straint against making insulting and degrading statements, which is
breached by the supremacist but not by the mother 40 -but alterna-
tively, and more simply, one might say that the supremacist has both
killed the victim and damaged the status and self-respect of other
blacks. On this alternative account, a nonexpressive action that was
equally harmful as the supremacist's expressive action, in terms of the
death and/or status harms the two actions produced, would be an
401equal deontological wrong. My aim here is not to defend this par-
397 SeePildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, supra note 8, at 69.
398 Kahan, supra note 9, at 598.
39 It is far from clear that no consequentialist account is persuasive. For example,
there might be a contingent, causal connection between the expressive content of the
supremacist's action and the status and self-respect of blacks; self-respect, in turn,
could well play a role within a consequentialist moral theory. See, e.g., supra text ac-
companying notes 379-82 (discussing the link between stigma, status, and self-respect
in the context of nonutilitarian consequentialism).
4ooThis is, in effect, what Jean Hampton argues. See Hampton, supra note 28, at
1671-85 (developing an expressive account of the distinction between wrongdoing and
mere harm-doing).
401 More precisely, an action that was equally harmful in these or other deontologi-
cally significant ways and that had the further, nonexpressive characteristics needed to
trigger a deontological constraint, e.g., the requisite intentionality on the actor's part,
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ticular, alternative account of Kahan's example, but rather to make
the conceptual point that deontology has nonexpressive variants as
well as the expressive variants presupposed by Kahan, Pildes, and Sun-
stein.
Indeed, the standard theory of deontology is, centrally, a nonex-
pressive theory. Return to the central and paradigmatic case that
deontological theorists have focused upon-the case of killing one to
save five. Two purported constraints are standardly offered to cover
this case. The first is a constraint on intending harm (with further
qualifications to cover self-defense, deserved harm, and so forth), such
that harmful actions or omissions which are merely foreseen but not
intended are not covered by the constraint. The second is a con-
straint on doing harm (again with suitable qualifications), such that
harmful actions, foreseen or intended, are prohibited, but harmful
omissions, even intended ones, are not.
°2
The basic moral factor of harming, shared by both proposals, is
not an expressive factor, nor are the further factors of intentionality
and act/omission. Given two meaningless actions, one can be harm-
ful and the other not. Given two meaningless actions, one can be in-
tentional and the other not. Given two meaningless behaviors, one
can constitute an action and the other an omission.
Nor is it plausible to think that the standard proposals can be re-
placed with a constraint that makes expression a necessary condition
for a deontological violation. The view that deontological constraints
prohibit only actions with a given meaning is clearly mistaken. At cer-
tain points, Jean Hampton seems to adopt such a view. For example,
she states that "[i ] t is because behavior can carry meaning with regard
to human value that it can be wrongful.""' If Hampton means to
claim, here, that a meaningless action cannot be nonconsequentially
wrongful, then she is clearly incorrect. Consider the action of inten-
tionally shooting an innocent victim at close range, where the actor
neither implicates a sentence-meaning convention nor, in fact, pos-
sesses a speaker's meaning. Surely the occurrence of such an action is
logically possible: sentence-meaning conventions might not be trig-
gered; the actor might not possess the further mental states, beyond a
would be deontologically wrong and equally so; an equally harmful action that did not
have those further characteristics would not be deontologically wrong; and a differen-
tially harmful action with those further characteristics would be a differentially serious
deontological wrong.
402 See KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS, supra note 123, at 94-105 (presenting and ana-
lyzin4g these two proposals).
Hampton, supra note 28, at 1670.
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bare intention to kill, necessary to constitute a speaker's meaning; the
action might directly cause the innocent victim's death. Surely, too, if
any deontological constraints exist, then one covering this action
does.
This leaves the options of (1) retaining the standard no-harming
constraint but building in an expressive factor, such that a harmful ac-
tion is worse if it says the wrong thing or (2) creating a second and
separate expressive constraint, such that a harmless action (one per-
missible under the main no-harming constraint) can violate this sec-
ond one if the action says the wrong thing. Indeed, there is a fine ex-
ample of these options in the philosophical literature: the irreducible
prohibition against lying, understood either in the form of (1), as the
proposition that a lie makes intentional or active harming worse than
such harming would be otherwise; or in the form of (2), as an inde-
pendent constraint against lying even if the lie is harmless.4  Either
way, an expressive feature of actions-the fact that the action is a lie,
that it has a descriptive meaning that turns out to be false-is pro-
posed to have genuine, deontological significance.45
Is this proposal persuasive? Is there truly an irreducible prohibi-
tion on lying, or rather just the basic constraint on intentional or ac-
tive harming, applicable both to lying and to nonmeretricious harm-
ing? As Shelly Kagan explains:
We certainly know that in the typical case telling a lie is haiful ....
Knowing the truth is an extraordinarily valuable means of achieving
one's goals. When you tell a lie, you virtually always rob someone of a
crucial ingredient-information-that they need to accomplish whatever
it is that they wanted to accomplish .... Sooner or later, the person is
likely to act on the misinformation you've given them, or fail to act when
they should have acted, and the result will typically be frustration and
disappointment.... So if we already have a constraint against doing
404 For a discussion focused on the possibility of a deontological constraint against
lying, see CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 54-78 (1978), and KAGAN, NORMATIVE
ETHICs, supra note 123, at 106-16. For more general discussions of the moral status of
lying, see F.G. BAILEY, THE PREVALENCE OF DECEIT (1991); SISSELA BOK, LYING:
MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IFE (1978); CHPsTINE M. KoRSGAARD,
CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 335-62 (1996); and Alan Strudler, Incommensurable
Goods, Rightful Lies, and the Wrongness of Fraud, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1529 (1998).
405 Actually, we can debate whether the anti-lying constraint is genuinely expres-
sive. If, for example, it prohibits all actions designed to cause false beliefs in some tar-
get, then the constraint is nonexpressive, because agents can intentionally cause false
beliefs through nonlinguistic means. But I will ignore this point and assume that the
anti-lying constraint, if it exists, is indeed expressive, by constraining only linguistic ut-
terances that are untrue or cause false beliefs.
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harm, we can easily derive from it a [reducible] constraint against telling
lies.4" 6
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to take a stance on the
deontological status of lying. Note, however, that even if an irreduci-
ble prohibition on lying does exist, that prohibition supports a very
different kind of expressive theory than those advanced to date in the
legal literature. First, the theory is generic: it applies to all official ac-
tions, not merely actions of a particular kind of legal official or actions
subsumed within a particular area of law. (This is by contrast with the
expressive theories of punishment, the Equal Protection Clause, and
the Establishment Clause, all of which posit constraints or require-
ments considerably narrower than the generic no-lying constraint.)
Second, it is a prohibitory theory rather than a mandatory one. The
no-lying constraint does not oblige official actors to perform certain
utterances, but merely, and less demandingly, to refrain from certain
ones, namely lies. 417 (This is by contrast with the expressive theory of
punishment, which demands an affirmative act of condemnation in
response to wrongdoing, and the expressive theory of regulation,
which demands an affirmative statement describing the values that
bear upon a regulatory choice.4 ") Third, the no-lying constraint is fo-
cused on descriptive meaning rather than on directive, declarative,
expressive, or commissive meaning. (This is by contrast with the ex-
pressive theories of punishment and of the Establishment Clause,
which focus, respectively, on the expressive acts of condemnation and
endorsement, and, perhaps, with the expressive theory of the Equal
Protection Clause, if "stigma" is understood as a declarative rather
than descriptive type of meaning.4° )
I find it highly implausible that the sheer action, by a legal official,
of uttering a prescriptive statement-that is, the sheer action of creating
legal rights, duties, liabilities, immunities, or other legal positions-
routinely possesses a further descriptive content beyond whatever de-
scriptive content inheres in its prescriptive meaning. I also find it
highly implausible that the no-lying constraint, such as it may be, is
06 KAGAN, NORMATIE ETHICS, supra note 123, at 108.
407 SeeSHER, supra note 191, at 112.
[0]n most interpretations, th[e] principle [of veracity] is negative rather than
positive. It requires that we not say what we know to be false, but it does not
require thatwe say everything we know to be true. Unless others have special
rights to our information, usually we may simply remain silent.
Id
408 See supra text accompanying notes 162, 300-01, 332-33.
409 See supra text accompanying notes 162, 223, 249-55.
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implicated by whatever descriptive meaning does inhere in prescrip-
tive meaning. (Every legal utterance may include the descriptive
rider, "It is morally required that _," and that rider may be routinely
false,410 but the upshot cannot be that our legal system must grind to a
halt-that officials must cease creating legal rights, duties, and so on.)
This suggests that the no-lying constraint, albeit generic, is not really a
constraint on lawmaking at all. Rather, it is a constraint on the further
utterances of all governmental officials-on their utterances that lack
prescriptive meaning altogether and that merely describe. In effect, it
is a constraint on the contents of the Congressional Record and the
House and Senate Reports (not the U.S. Code), on the contents of
the Federal Register (not the Code of Federal Regulations), and on
the contents of the judicial reporters (not the legal orders thatjudges
issue to litigants). A moral theory incorporating the no-lying con-
straint is, indeed, a genuinely expressive theory, but it is not yet a
genuinely expressive theory of aw.
411
To be sure, it could be the case that morality incorporates multi-
ple expressive constraints: both the no-lying constraint plus addi-
tional constraints that significantly limit prescriptively meaningful ut-
terances. This is, however, an esoteric view of deontology-the only
expressive constraint that deontologists standardly accept is the no-
lying constraint 12-and there is reason to doubt that the view can be
successfully defended.1 3 Deontological constraints are rooted in the
separateness of persons-in the fact that the would-be victim, pro-
tected by the constraint, has her own life to lead and should not be
sacrificed even for the sake of the greater good.
The victim feels outrage when he is deliberately harmed even for the
greater good of others, not simply because of the quantity of the harm
but because of the assault on his value of having my actions guided by his
evil....
The five people I could save by killing him can't say the same, if I re-
410 See supra text accompanying notes 111-12 (discussing possible conceptions of
prescriptive meaning to accommodate the Razian point that law claims de facto
authority).
41 Might a similar objection hold good against all of the other variants of expres-
sivism that I have analyzed in this Article? I have not generally pursued the issue with
respect to these variants because I have generally advanced the logically prior, and
considerably more robust, claim that the expressive factors posited by these variants do
not exist.
412 SeeNagel, supra note 154, at 157 (listing constraints).
413 For one attempt to defend an expressive constraint in addition to the no-lying
constraint, see Hampton, supra note 28, at 1671-85.
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frain. They can appeal only to my objective acknowledgment of the im-
personal value of their lives. That is not trivial, of course, but it still
seems less pressing than the protest available to my victim... as the pos-
sessor of the life I am aiming to destroy. 4
This motivates the main deontological constraint against harming,
and perhaps the constraint against lying-insofar as lying, quite apart
from harming, is understood as a special breach of the victim's auton-
omy. Additional factors (for example, intentionality or the ac-
tion/omission distinction) are brought into play so as to limit the
scope of the main constraint and give the actor adequate space to live
her own life, or, conversely, to pick out those harmful actions where
her agency is distinctly involved. Beyond all this, does the separate-
ness of persons license an additional expressive constraint? Why
would it? The linguistic meaning of an action is linked only contin-
gently to its harmfulness (even in the oft-used case of stigmatic harm);
linguistic meaning may be essentially linked to an infringement of
autonomy,415 but the no-lying prohibition would seem to exhaust that
consideration; and it is quite obscure how the need to protect the ac-
tor's own projects, or to highlight her agency, would give rise to ex-
pressive factors. The considerations of harm, autonomy, and agency
that underlie deontological constraints are not, I think, likely to prove
a fertile ground for expressivism.
I now turn, briefly, to a final source of enrichment of moral the-
ory: the introduction of political considerations into moral theory. By
this, I mean those considerations that pertain exclusively to govern-..• 416
ment or to other political associations. The dimension of enrich-
414 Nagel, supra note 154, at 167. Notably, Nagel is here defending his particular
version of the no-harming constraint-incorporating the distinction between inten-
tional and merely foreseen harms, rather than between acts and omissions-but pre-
sumably any defender of a no-harming constraint will offer a similar defense (one that
appeals in some way to the separateness of persons).
415 See KoRSGAARD, supra note 404, at 358 ("If we value the Kantian ideal of free
and non-manipulative relations among rational beings .... we must learn to be truthful
and straightforward with one another....").
416 To be sure, as I have emphasized throughout this Article, any expressive theory
of law will posit factors that apply to the actions of legal (or other governmental) offi-
cials. The fact, if it is one, that individuals rationally or morally act to satisfy certain
expressive (linguistic) requirements does not yet show that government does. Seesupra
Part I.E (distinguishing expressive theories of individual action from expressive theo-
ries of governmental action). One response is to argue that the moral requirements
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ment, here, is orthogonal to the consequentialism-deontology dimen-
sion. Political considerations may mean distinctive consequentialist
considerations (such that the outcomes that government should pro-
mote are distinct from the outcomes that ordinary individuals should
promote), distinctive deontological constraints (additional to those
governing private actors), or both.
There is a burgeoning scholarly literature, exemplified by John
Rawls's book, Political Liberalism, on the existence and shape of politi-
cal considerations.417 This literature focuses specifically on the special
moral obligations attendant upon government in virtue of the plural-
ity of moral and evaluative views held by citizens. As Rawls puts it
How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society
of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though in-
compatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?... How is it
possible that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines may live together and all affirm the political... regime?418
The literature on this problem has had relatively little impact on the
debate about legal expressivism. For the most part, expressivists have
defended their views with reference to moral concepts (such as desert,
stigma, or status) that figure in straight moral theory or at least have
close analogues there.419 It is at least worth asking, however, whether
Rawlsian or quasi-Rawlsian concepts such as "public reason," "liberal
neutrality," or "deliberative democracy"-concepts that truly are
unique to governmental action-might prove a fruitful basis for ex-
applicable to individual actors (for example, deontological norms or the injunction to
maximize good consequences) also apply to legal officials or other governmental ac-
tors. That is, in effect, what the expressive theories considered up to this point do. A
different approach is to suggest that there are moral requirements distinctive to gov-
ernmental actions-what I am here calling "political considerations"-and that such
requirements are expressive.
417 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). One part of this literature is com-
prised of direct critical responses to Rawls. For some examples, see the symposia on
Political Liberalism in 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1813 (1994); 105 ETHICS 4 (1994); 75 PAC.
PHIL. Q. 165 (1994); and 7 RATIO JURIS 267 (1995). Another part is comprised of
works of normative theory that, like Political Liberalism, adduce "political considera-
tions" as I have defined them here. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIALJUSTICE IN
THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); GERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFCATORY LIBERALISM: AN ESSAY ON
EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITIcAL THEORY (1996); KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE
CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995). See generally FRED D'AGoSTINO, FREE
PUBLIC REASON: MAKING IT UP AS WE Go (1996) (surveying this literature).
418 RAWLS, supra note 417, at xviii.
419 For one exception, see Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra note 4, at 735-36
(defending an expressive account of constitutional rights, grounded in part on the
proposition that constitutional "rights are the means for enforcing the differentiations
of political authority characteristic of liberal societies").
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pressivism.
I doubt they do. Imagine, as Rawls posits, that citizens hold dif-
ferent and "reasonable" moral views. Why would this fact of reason-
able moral pluralism give rise to expressivism about governmental ac-
tion, where straight moral reasoning does not? Note, to begin, that
expressive factors will not emerge within political theory by virtue of a
simple convergence between the differing moral views.42' One person
holds reasonable moral view M, while another person holds reason-
able moral view M, M is nonexpressive; it includes no expressive fac-
tors. Is it unreasonable by virtue of that? Not if the arguments to this
point have been cogent. I have argued that morality (apart from the
problem of accommodating plural views) is in fact nonexpressive.4 A
fortiori, a nonexpressive moral view is reasonable. Therefore, M, and M,
will not converge upon expressivism. This is true even if M itself is
expressive-if expressivism is, to some extent, a reasonable view for
citizens to hold. The proposition that the factors applicable to gov-
ernmental action are partly expressive may be part of M, but it is not
part of M, and so that proposition is not one upon which the two
views will converge.
What about consensus rather than convergence? M, might not di-
rectly support expressivism, but the holder of M, might come to un-
derstand that-given the very fact of disagreement with M, about the
truth of expressivism, or about other matters-the best consensus view
between M, and M is in some way expressive. Call this consensus view
M*. We now need an argument for the proposition that M* is expres-
sive notwithstanding the nonexpressive cast of M. This is where the
idea of neutrality comes into play.4 Plausibly, M* includes the re-
quirement that government remain neutral between M, and M. In
turn, neutrality might be understood in expressive terms. It might be
cashed as a constraint on governmental endorsement of M or M,
As we saw in Part II, this is how Donald Beschle construes neutral-
ity in the context of the Establishment Clause. The Clause, he claims,
prohibits government from uttering statements to the effect that one
religion is true, correct, or governmentally approved. The problem
with Beschle's construal of Establishment Clause neutrality is that the
420 On the distinction between political theories that posit a convergence between
differing citizen views and theories that describe citizens as reaching a consensus, see
D'AGOSINO, supra note 417, at 30-33.
421 See supra text accompanying notes 337-415.
M Neutrality looms large in Ackerman's version of political liberalism. See, e.g.,
ACKERMAN, supra note 417, at 10-12, 349-69.
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nonexpressive transfer of resources from one church to another, a
transfer (let us assume) that is justifiable only in light of the transferee
church's doctrine, counts as perfectly neutral and permissible.4
Generalizing, an expressive conception of the neutrality constraint in
M* will permit government to take any actions (even those exclusively
supported by M1 and wholly at odds with M2, or vice versa) that do not
have the linguistic meaning of endorsing, favoring, or supporting M,
or M, That seems much too lax.
In Part II, I sketched out a competing and nonexpressive concep-
tion of neutrality: governmental decisions must be justifiable relative
to a suitably constrained set of moral propositions, excluding some
(or, at the limit, all) of the moral propositions upon which M, and M 2
disagree, and in particular excluding the proposition that M, or M2 is
true.42 4 This conception precludes governmental endorsement of M,
or M 2, but it also properly precludes nonexpressive actions that are
unduly biased towards M, or M, For example, if M, contains one view
of the good life, and M 2 contains another,2 then M* plausibly prohib-
its government from coercing the holder of M 2 to follow the life-plan
sketched out by M, even if that view is more likely to be correct than
the view contained by M 2.4
6 This constraint will apply to governmen-
tal actions vis-A-vis the holder of M 2 that have no (nonprescriptive)
linguistic content, such as the straight, nonexpressive coercion of the
holder of M 2 to follow the M, life.
a 7
Neutrality is not the only idea that might be used in the
42 See supra notes 273-77 and accompanying text (presenting and criticizing
Beschle's view).
424 See supra text accompanying note 278.
42 The purported requirement that government remain neutral between different
conceptions of the good life has been particularly emphasized by political theorists in
recentyears. For an overview and critique, seeSBER, supra note 843.
426 This is so even if, on the M, view, the holder of M 2 is made better off notwith-
standing the coercive intervention. On some views of welfare, coercive interventions
can be welfare-improving. Cf Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 3, 5
(Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983) ("What justifies the absolute prohibition of interference in
primarily self-regarding affairs"-if there is one--"is not that such interference is self-
defeating and likely (merely likely) to cause more harm than it prevents, but rather
that it would itself be an injustice, a wrong...."). The point here is that, whether or
not M1 is the kind of view that counts the coercive intervention as welfare-improving
for the M2 holder, M*prohibits the intervention.a7 Even if this particular variant of the neutrality constraint is incorrect, the point
remains that the right conception-whatever it is-will surely recognize that a gov-
ernmental action without a biased or nonneutral linguistic meaning can still be biased
or nonneutral.
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construction of Mt Alternately, one might appeal to the idea of a hy-
pothetical contract.
The requirement that government enjoy the consent of the governed is
deeply rooted in our political culture and is arguably central to liberal-
ism. The most powerful and systematic elaboration of this requirement
in recent years has come from liberals who are also contractualists. Con-
tractualist liberals argue that governmental arrangements are justified
only if they could or would be accepted by signatories to a hypothetical
contract.
Perhaps the holder of M, and the holder of M, under the right condi-
tions, would reach a contract M* that includes expressive constraints
on government notwithstanding the absence of such constraints in M,
A full argument to the contrary would be beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle; it would require a specification of the contracting scenario,
something that remains much disputed in the political theory litera-
ture. Notably, however, the scholars (such as Rawls or Scanlon 0 )
who have undertaken the hypothetical-contract exercise in detail have
not ended up with expressive conceptions of M*. For example,
Rawls's M* is fundamentally concerned with the distribution of pri-
mary goods and with the scope of individual liberty, not with the con-
tent of governmental language.43'
Yet a third idea available in the construction of M* is the idea of
deliberative democracy.42 Hypothetical contractualists generally focus
on governmental outcomes, not on the processes by which those out-
comes are reached. s But it might plausibly be argued that M* gov-
erns processes as well as outcomes-that political institutions are re-
quired by M* to "instantiate the ideal" of "democratic deliberation in
which participants are free and equal,' 4 4 quite apart from the efficacy
of those institutions in assuring fair distribution, the protection of lib-
428 Paul J. Weithman, Contractualist Liberalism and Deliberative Democracy, 24 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 314, 314 (1995).
42 See D'AGOsnNo, supra note 417, at 38-55.
4" SeeT.M. SCANLON, WHATWE OWETO EACH OTHER (1998).
41 See RAWLS, supra note 417, at 289-371.
432 See generally DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (ion Elster ed., 1998); DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS (James Bohman & William Rehg eds.,
1997); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACYAND DISAGREEMENT (1996).
433 SeeWeithman, supra note 428, at 315 (noting that contractualists, at least appar-
ently, are subject to the criticism that they are committed to an "instrumental assess-
ment of institutional possibilities for recognizing political rights and liberties:
[c]ontractualists think these possibilities are to be assessed by their effectiveness at
promoting ends of which contracting parties would approve").
434 Id.
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erties, or the other outcomes required by M* If, in turn, the proce-
dural requirements of deliberative democracy include a requirement
of public justification-of reason-giving-then an expressive require-
ment of sorts has indeed been introduced into M*
Plausibly, deliberative democracy does require public justification.
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson contend that "[t]he reasons
that officials and citizens give to justify political actions, and the in-
formation necessary to assess those reasons, should be public."45 They
defend this claim as follows:
First, only public justifications can secure the consent of citizens ....
Second, making reasons public contributes to the broadening of moral
and political perspectives that deliberation is supposed to encourage....
Third, reasons must be public to fulfill the potential for mutual respect
that deliberation seeks by clarifying the nature of moral disagreement.
Finally, the self-correcting character of deliberation-its capacity to en-
courage citizens and officials to change their minds-would be under-
mined if reasons for policies could not be openly discussed.46
But this expressive requirement (like the veracity requirement
mentioned above) is quite different from the purported requirements
hitherto described by expressivists.47 First, like the veracity require-
ment, the justification requirement is descriptive and generic. Sec-
ond, also like the veracity requirement, it presumably does not nor-
mally constrain the legal rights, duties, powers, liabilities, and other
positions imposed by government, but rather applies to the descrip-
tive sentences uttered by government along with (or instead of) the
creation of legal positions. Prescriptive utterances such as "No person
shall drive more than fifty miles per hour" or "Christians are exempt
from generally applicable requirements that burden their religious
practices" or "No person of African descent shall marry a person of a
different race" do not, themselves, constitute lies orjustifications.4
4m GTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 432, at 95; see also id. at 101 ("In a delibera-
tive democracy,.. . the principle of publicity requires that government adopt only
those policies for which officials and citizens give public justifications."). See generally
Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995) (describing the prac-
tice of reason-giving by legal officials and presenting considerations for and against
thatpractice).
GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 432, at 100-01.
437 See supra text accompanying notes 407-09 (noting various differences between
the veracity requirement and purported requirements defended in the literature on
expressivism).
43 Or at least not lies covered by the no-lying constraint. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 410-11 (discussing the scope of the no-lying constraint). The justification
requirement, like the veracity requirement, constrains the descriptive sentences ut-
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Finally, the justification requirement is a second-order requirement.
It presupposes some set of first-order moral factors applicable to gov-
ernmental decisions (the first-order component of M*), which could
well be wholly nonexpressive. Whatever those considerations are,
government is then under a second-order obligation to articulate
them. Contrast this with, for example, the expressive theory of pun-
ishment, which purports to impose a first-order obligation on gov-
ernment to respond to wrongdoing with condemnation; or with the
expressive theories of the Equal Protection and Establishment
Clauses, which purport to impose a first-order obligation on govern-
ment not to stigmatize persons or to endorse religion4 9 The justifica-
tion requirement is not expressivist in the sense of building expressive
components into our collective moral framework, but rather-and
more wealdy-in requiring that this framework, whatever its structure,
be described to the public.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I provided a reasonably full and precise definition
of an "expressive theory of law"-a definition that tracks our pretheo-
retical intuitions and that also conforms to the usage prevalent in
much, if not all, of the scholarly literature. This definition construes
expression as linguistic-an expressive action is one that possesses lin-
guistic meaning, specifically by triggering a sentence-meaning conven-
tion-and an expressive theory of law as a theory that accords founda-
tional or canonical relevance to certain types of sentence meaning
possessed by the actions of legal officials. I then discussed, in consid-
erable detail, those expressive theories that have been the best devel-
oped: the theories of punishment, of the Equal Protection Clause, of
tered by government along with (or apart from) its prescriptive sentences, and not the
prescriptive sentences themselves. I think it is therefore fair to say that thejustification
requirement, like the veracity requirement, does not really ground an expressive the-
ory of law. Seeid.
49 The expressive theory of punishment does not entail that there exist further
moral requirements applicable to a government action in response to wrongdoing,
beyond the requirement of condemnation. Similarly, the expressive theories of the
Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses do not entail additional moral require-
ments beyond the no-stigma and no-endorsement rules. By contrast, a justificatory
theory presupposes some further requirements, applicable to the justified action, that
ought to be articulated. To say that (1) government must articulate the moral re-
quirements relevant to its actions and that (2) there are no moral requirements for
governmental actions except (1), is incoherent or nearly so. That is the sense in which
the justificatory theory is "second-order," while the other theories just described are
not.
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the Establishment Clause, and of regulation, each of which has been
fleshed out and defended at some length by legal scholars. But each
of these particular theories is, in fact, unpersuasive-or so I tried to
show-and I presented a further and more general argument why ex-
pressivism is misguided. The moral factors upon which expressivists
standardly rely, such as culture, self-respect, desert, or deontological
norms, and which do figure in a sophisticated (consequentialist or
deontological) moral theory, are not in fact expressive. They do not
refer to linguistic meaning but, rather, to other act-properties only
contingently connected to the property of possessing a given mean-
ing.
If my arguments are correct, is there anything left for the expres-
sivist to defend? First, and uncontroversially, the linguistic meaning of
governmental action can have a moral impact. This is a point that I
stressed in Part I, and it bears reemphasis here. Where action A* pos-
sesses one meaning and action A possesses another, A* can fare better
than A, morally speaking, even though the underlying moral theory is
nonexpressive. For example, suppose a particular activity is strongly
dispreferred by most of the population (such that stopping the activity
is morally optimal, given an underlying theory of preference-
utilitarianism). Suppose further that A* means "the activity is bad"
and A means "the activity is good." If the performance of A* would
cause the activity to cease while the performance of A would not, then
one linguistic utterance (A*) would have a favorable moral impact
relative to a different linguistic utterance (A). This is true even
though preference-utilitarianism is the hallmark of a nonexpressive
theory.
The sheer proposition that linguistic meaning can have a moral
impact, within a nonexpressive theory, is not only uncontroversial, but
banal. No legal or moral scholar should be interested in defending
that proposition, for no one should reasonably want to deny it. What
is interesting and worth defending is the claim that particular kinds of
meanings have particular kinds of impacts, within particular nonex-
pressive theories. There are certainly legal scholars who have tried to
defend such a claim, and sometimes they describe themselves as "ex-
pressivists." By my lights, that description is incorrect (insofar as it
merely rests upon the scholar's ascription of moral impacts to particu-
lar meaning-types); but the project (whatever we call it) of delineating
such impacts surely is an important one. Nothing in this Article is
meant to cast doubt upon the worth of that project.
For example, Professor Dan Kahan, in his work on criminal pun-
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ishment, has argued that condemnation has a deterrent impact. A
governmental action, the sentence meaning of which is condemnatory
with respect to some criminal behavior, has the causal tendency to
prevent would-be criminals from engaging in the behavior.
Empirical studies show that the willingness of persons to obey various
laws is endogenous to their beliefs about whether others view the law as
worthy of obedience: if compliance is perceived to be widespread, per-
sons generally desire to obey; but if they believe that disobedience is
rampant, their commitment to following the law diminishes. Even a
strong propensity to obey the law, in other words, can be undercut by a
person's "desire not to be suckered." When the law effectively expresses
condemnation of wrongdoers, however, it reassures citizens that society
does indeed stand behind the values that the law embodies.4
0
Similarly, Professor Sunstein, in his recent work on expressivism, has
described the causal effect of governmental expression in shaping so-
cial norms:
[T]here is a subtler and more interesting class of cases [than where law
merely supplants norms], [cases] of special importance for understand-
ing the expressive function of law. These cases arise when the relevant
law announces or signals a change in social norms unaccompanied by much
in the way of enforcement activity. Consider, for example, laws that forbid
littering and laws that require people to clean up after their dogs. In
many localities such laws are rarely enforced through the criminal law,
but they have an important effect in signaling appropriate behavior and
in inculcating the expectation of social opprobrium and, hence, shame
in those who deviate from the announced norm.
44
1
In these passages, both Sunstein and Kahan are making different
versions of the generic, causal claim that governmental disapproval
tends to diminish the activity disapproved (either by changing actors'
beliefs, or by changing their preferences, or through some other
mechanism). This causal claim presupposes nothing about the moral
theory that justifies a reduction in the disapproved activity. Such a re-
duction could be warranted because the activity is harmful, or deon-
tologically wrong, or because it is generally dispreferred, or because it
decreases overall well-being (construed now in objective-list fashion),
or because it effects a redistribution of primary goods from poor to
rich, or from the deserving to the undeserving. The theory is, for all
we know, completely nonexpressive. Therefore, the Sunstein/Kahan
causal claim-and, more generally, any causal claim linking particular
440 Kahan, supra note 9, at 604.
441 Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 20, at 2032.
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kinds of governmental speech to various states or events via prefer-
ence-changes, or belief-changes, or in some other way-is left wholly
undisturbed by the arguments presented in this Article.
Claims to the effect that governmental speech has a moral im-
pact-that one kind of linguistic meaning is better than another or
than no meaning at all, in light of the nonexpressive factors at hand-
will typically be causal claims. I suggested in Part I that speech could
have a noncausal moral impact-for example, where some person has
an intrinsic preference that government utter a particular sentence-
type-but that would seem to be a fairly special case. Typically, then,
moral claims for and against a given kind of governmental expression
will need to be evaluated in just the same way that causal claims are
evaluated. The claim will be persuasive just insofar as (1) there is suf-
ficient empirical evidence for the claimed, causal regularity; (2) there
is sufficient theoretical warrant for the claimed, causal regularity; and
(3) the case at hand (the case of this particular kind of speech, in this
particular state of the world) is subsumed under the regularity. Ar-
guments about the moral impact of speech, if causal, will need to be
tested at the bar of physical, psychological, and social science. And if
the causal argument fails that test, then it will need to be qualified or
rejected. For example, the claim that governmental condemnation of
a criminal behavior always deters that behavior has been empirically
disconfirmed, as Kahan himself implicitly concedes:
Consider possession of guns in inner-city public schools. This behavior
is infused with social [significance]. Possessing a gun confers status be-
cause it expresses confidence and a willingness to defy authority. By the
same token, not possessing one signals fear, and thus invites aggression.
Policies that aim at suppressing possession usually fail; indeed, when
authorities aggressively seek out and punish students who possess weap-
ons, their behavior reinforces the message of defiance associated with
442
guns ....
Thus, governmental condemnation is not universally appropriate
within a deterrence theory. Rather, it will be appropriate only to the
more limited extent that (based on our best understanding of the
causal regularities under which governmental speech is subsumed)
condemnation actually deters.443
442 Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, supra note 15, at 363-64; see
also id. at 381-82 (criticizing low-certainty, high-severity crime-prevention policies on
similar grounds).
443 Sunstein provides a different example, which makes the same point.
A possible justification for [minimum wage] legislation is expressive in nature.
Some people might think that government ought to make a statement to the
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In short, the proper methodology for assessing governmental
speech is scientific, not moral-or so I have, in effect, argued in this
Article. To be sure, we need a moral framework in light of which the
causal upshots of governmental speech can be evaluated. But the cor-
rect framework, whatever precisely it consists in, will not incorporate a
factor that refers to the content of governmental speech. Within this
framework, the question whether government ought to perform, or
refrain from performing, a given utterance should be addressed in a
purely scientific way. Ordinary moral reasoning-what Rawls calls the
method of reflective equilibrium l-will be out of place. For exam-
ple, we may intuit that a particular kind of governmental utterance is
morally appropriate: condemnation may seem, intuitively, the appro-
priate response to crime; utterances proclaiming life or the environ-
ment to be priceless may seem the appropriate response to risky or
environmentally harmful activities. And intuitive judgments are, in-
deed, part of the method of reflective equilibrium. But if I am right
that the correct moral framework is nonexpressive, then these particu-
lar intuitions-intuitions about the appropriateness of governmental
speech-will be worthless, because the method of reflective equilib-
rium is itself inapplicable."4 All that matters, morally, about the con-
demnatory or life-and-environment-valorizing utterances will be their
contingent (typically, causal) connection to the further states or
events that do have foundational relevance within our nonexpressive
theory. It is these contingent (typically causal) connections, nothing
more, that legal scholars who are interested in the expressive dimen-
effect that human labor is worth, at a minimum, $X per hour; perhaps any
amount less than $X seems like an assault on human dignity. But suppose too
that the consequence of the minimum wage is to increase unemployment
among the most vulnerable members of society.... [If so] it is hard to see why
people should support it.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 20, at 2046-47. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the perverse causal consequences that the expressive content of statutes can
have, in the area of environmental law, seeJohn P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Leg-
islation, 17 ECOLOGYL.Q. 233 (1990).
4See RAvLS, supra note 379, at 48-51 (describing this method); NORMAN DANIELS,
JUSTICE AND JUSTIICATION: REFLEcrIvE EQUILIBRIUM IN THEORY AND PRACtiCE 1-17
(1996) (same).
That is, once we have used the method of reflective equilibrium to arrive at a
nonexpressive moral framework, the moral status of an expressive action is to be de-
termined by looking at its status within that framework-in particular, by looking to its
causal upshots-and not by giving weight to the intuition that a particular type of ex-
pression is intrinsically wrong. Given the premise that morality is nonexpressive, the
intuitions are unimportant. Of course, the intuitions could prompt us to re-engage in
reflective equilibrium and abandon the premise; but the very point of this Article is to
argue that, at the end of reflective equilibrium, the premise survives.
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sion of law should be concerned with delineating.
What about redefining "expression"? The term "expression"
might be construed as denoting something other than linguistic
meaning. The "expressive" cast of a governmental action would then
be some property of that action other than its possession of a sentence
meaning, and a genuinely "expressive" theory of law would be a theory
that accorded foundational or canonical relevance to that (nonlin-
guistic) property.
Meaning has both linguistic and nonlinguistic variants, as dis-
cussed in Part I.446 An action nonlinguistically "means" what it pro-
vides evidence of,447 in the way that spots "mean" measles, or clouds
"mean" rain, or the enactment of a spending program targeting a par-
ticular district "means" that beneficiaries are well-organized and the
representative from that district fairly powerful. I am highly skeptical
that basic moral factors refer to the nonlinguistic meaning of actions,
particularly governmental actions. Why should the fact that action A
evidences state S (measles, rain, the beneficiaries' organization) be it-
self a morally important feature of A? That feature is epistemologically
important-given the performance of A, we now know something
more about the world, namely S-but it is a glaring category mistake
to confiate epistemic with moral importance. Spots mean measles; that
hardly implies that I have moral reason to make you spotted. But this
is simply the bare sketch of an argument against a genuine "expres-
sive" theory of law, with "expressive" construed as nonlinguistic mean-
ing. This Article does not purport to provide a full argument against
such a theory; my focus has been on genuine expressive theories in
the linguistic sense.
I am not aware of any legal scholar who has pursued the task of
developing an "expressive" theory grounded upon nonlinguistic
meaning. What some scholars have done, implicitly or explicitly, is to
redefine expression in a different way-by equating the "expressive"
cast of governmental action with its cultural impact. A law is "expres-
sive," in this sense, if it shapes or reinforces social norms, social forms,
or social practices more generally. Consider what Robert Cooter has
to say about the expressive function of law:
446 See supra text accompanying notes 70-72 (distinguishing linguistic from nonlin-
guistic meaning).
447More precisely, Gricean nonlinguistic meaning involves a causal connection
between what is evidenced and the (nonlinguistically) meaningful actions. See Hurd,
supra note 72, at 953 ("[Such events] function as symptoms of conditions in the world
to which they are causally related."). This qualification is not important here.
EXPRESSITISM: A SKEPTICAL OVERVIEW
A system of social norms typically has multiple equilibria... A focal
point can tip the system into a new equilibrium. The process of chang-
ing the equilibrium can create or destroy a social norm without chang-
ing individual values. Creating focal points is the first expressive use of
law.
In addition, law can change the individual values of rational people.
Internalizing a social norm is a moral commitment that attaches a psy-
chological penalty to a forbidden act. A rational person internalizes a
norm when commitment conveys an advantage relative to the original
preferences and the changed preferences.... Changing individual val-
ues is the second expressive use of law.448
The claim here is not that expression, defined as linguistic meaning,
has a causal effect on norms, forms, or practices. Rather, the claim-a
conceptual or definitional one-seems to be that a law's "expressive"
property just is its cultural impact. On this conceptualization, a lin-
guistically meaningful law can, but need not, be "expressive," and a
linguistically meaningless law can also be "expressive." Other legal
scholars writing about the expressive dimension of law, such as Profes-
sors Pildes and Sunstein,49 have at least intermittently made the same
conceptual move as Cooter, employing "expression" as denoting a
property of governmental action that is only contingently linked to
language and, instead, is logically and noncontingently linked to the
action's cultural impact.
An "expressive theory of law," thus construed, is a moral theory
such that the cultural impact of a government action figures in the
most perspicuous description of that action, within the theory. At
various points in this Article, I have suggested that this kind of the-
ory-for clarity, let us call it a "genuinely cultural theory of law"-may
indeed be correct. It may indeed be the case that the correct moral
theory incorporates cultural factors-factors that refer to social norms,
forms, or practices, such that actions producing world-states identical
448 Cooter, supra note 43, at 586. I have omitted some language that makes
Cooter's definition of "expression" more ambiguous. At least on one plausible reading
(the reading that gives less weight to this omitted language) Cooter is simply redefin-
ing expression in cultural, norm-related terms.
"9 See Pildes, supra note 293, at 942 ("Public programs... mean something,
whether this meaning is talked about in terms of their expressive character, their role
in sustaining and creating a particular public culture, or the way in which understand-
ings of public programs directly influences their implementation."); Pildes & Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, supra note 8, at 66 (noting that "expressive dimensions"
of legal and political choices "might be understood as cultural consequences of
choice"); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 2430-32 (providing a cultural definition of
stigma).
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in the norms, forms, or practices that the world-states instantiate must
fare the same with respect to the factors. Cultural factors may emerge
within morality because well-being is both objective and partly de-
pendent on social forms (thusJoseph Raz's theory of well-being);" ° or
because the primary good of self-respect is linked to social status (thus
the link persistently drawn in the literature on the Equal Protection
Clause and the Establishment Clause); or perhaps in some other
way. Although I have not gone so far as to endorse a "genuinely cul-
tural theory of law," I have attempted, at various junctures, to distin-
guish between that kind of theory and a linguistic-meaning theory,
and to make clear that my arguments against an expressive (linguistic)
theory of law do not necessarily apply to the expressive (cultural) vari-
ant.
But legal scholars who want to pursue the project of developing
and defending a cultural theory of law need to be crystal-clear about
the concepts that they deploy. If they wish to use the term "expres-
sive" to denote that theory, then they need to stipulate that the term
has been given this (fairly esoteric) referent and that the conceptual
link to language has been severed. Terms like "expressive" and "social
meaning" are risky and confusing; they ought to be handled very care-
fully. Anyone who equivocates between expression in the linguistic
sense and expression in the cultural sense runs the risk of committing
a fallacy of equivocation, such as the following:
(1) "Social meaning" has intrinsic moral significance (with "social
meaning" defined as the state of social norms, forms, and
practices).
(2) Law is "expressive" (in the sense of changing or reinforcing
social meanings, thus defined).
Therefore,
(3) The "expressive" properties of law (now defined as law's lin-
guistic properties) are intrinsically important.
The major and minor premises of this false syllogism may well be
true, but the conclusion is not. The conclusion neither follows from
the premises, nor does it hold true on any other ground. (That is an-
other way of phrasing what I have argued for in this Article.) The
premises of the false syllogism bear further reflection, refinement,
and perhaps eventual endorsement, but the conclusion does not.
40 See supra text accompanying notes 347-50 (discussing Raz's theory).
4 See supra text accompanying notes 230-34, 281-85.
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Cultural theorists, as well as others who pursue yet a further, esoteric
construal of the term "expression," would do well to keep these points
clearly in mind.
* After this Article was written, Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes generously
agreed to write a response. Their response is published in this volume of the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, along with a brief reply on my part to the response. See
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restate-
ment; 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Matthew D. Adler, Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguis-
tic "Expression," and the Multiple Variants of Expressivisnv A Response to Professors Anderson
and Pildes, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2000). As I explain in the reply, the main thrust of
the response by Professors Anderson and Pildes is not to defend the kind of "expres-
sive theories of law" criticized in this Article-linguistic-meaning theories-but instead
to present an interesting and important nonlinguistic theory. To the extent that An-
derson and Pildes do challenge my criticisms of expressive (linguistic) accounts, I have
attempted to answer their arguments in the reply rather than in this Article itself.
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